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Foreword
The spread of organized crime around the world has stimulated considerable
national and international action. Much of this action has emerged only over
the last few years. The tools to be used in responding to the challenges posed
by organized crime are still being tested.
One of the difficulties in designing effective countermeasures has been a
lack of information on what organized crime actually is, and on what
measures have proven effective elsewhere. Furthermore, international dis-
cussion is often hampered by the murkiness of the definition of organized
crime; while some may be speaking about drug trafficking, others are talking
about trafficking in migrants, and still others about racketeering or corrup-
tion.
This report describes recent trends in organized crime and in national and
international countermeasures around the world. In doing so, it provides the
necessary basis for a rational discussion of the many manifestations of
organized crime, and of what action should be undertaken.
The report is based on numerous studies, official reports and news reports.
Given the broad topic and the rapidly changing nature of organized crime,
the report does not seek to be exhaustive. Instead, it focuses on general trends,
which are illustrated by recent information from specific countries.
Helsinki and Trento, 2 March 1998
Matti Joutsen Ernesto Savona
Director, HEUNI Professor
TRANSCRIME, University of Trento
III

Contents
Foreword . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . . III
Summary . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . VII
Organised Crime around the World .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . VII
1 Organising Crime .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . . 1
1.1 Introduction . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . . 1
1.2 Towards a common definition of organised crime . .  . .  . .  . .  . . 4
1.3 Trends in organised crime . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . . 10
1.3.1 Trends in subjects .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . . 10
1.3.2 Trends in activities . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . . 13
1.3.3 The management of crimes: interdependencies
among crimes and among activities .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . . 16
1.4 The money from organised crime . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . . 18
2 Organised Crime Across Borders .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . . 23
2.1 Introduction . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . . 23
2.2 Organised crime around the world . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . . 24
2.2.1 North America . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . . 24
2.2.2 Central/South America . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . . 30
2.2.3 Western Europe .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . . 37
2.2.4 Eastern Europe . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . . 49
2.2.5 Africa and Gulf States . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . . 57
2.2.6 Asia . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . . 71
2.2.7 Oceania . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . . 88
3 International Responses to Organised Crime . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . . 92
3.1 A tightening web of international co-operation .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . . 92
3.2 The role of international organisations
in the fight against organised crime .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . . 93
3.2.1 United Nations . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . . 93
3.2.2 The Council of Europe . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . . 98
3.2.3 G7/P8 .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . 103
3.2.4 The European Union .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . 106
3.2.5 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . 117
3.2.6 The Organisation of American States (OAS) .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . 119
3.2.7 Other international initiatives in the fight against organised crime 124
3.3 Bilateral agreements as a means to combat organised crime . .  . 128
V
4 National Responses to Organised Crime – Recent trends .  . .  . .  . 131
4.1 Introduction .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . 131
4.2 Criminalising organised crime . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . 132
4.3 Asset seizure and confiscation . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . 142
4.4 Law enforcement and special means of investigation . .  . .  . .  . 154
4.4.1 Law enforcement agencies . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . 155
4.4.2 Undercover agents . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . 165
4.4.3 Electronic surveillance . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . 167
4.4.4 Controlled delivery of drugs .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . 173
4.4.5 Witness protection programmes .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . 174
VI
Summary
Organised Crime around the World
This report seeks to provide an overview of the recent trends in organised
crime and the countermeasures taken against it throughout the world. The
framework used in analysing groups, activities and policies is the Political
Declaration and Global Action Plan against Organised Transnational Crime,
adopted at the World Ministerial Conference on Organised Transnational
Crime held in Naples, Italy, on 21-23 November 1994. The principles of this
Plan set specific guidelines to be followed by member states at the national
and international levels.
The Political Declaration and Global Action Plan focus on the need for
strict and effective legislative measures and operational instruments, and a
co-ordinated strategy of international co-operation against organised crime.
These documents call for acceptance of a common definition of organised
crime, criminalisation of membership of criminal associations or participa-
tion in conspiracies, enactment of evidence-gathering techniques, witness
protection programmes and legislation providing for confiscation of the
illicit proceeds. These are the points through which this report develops the
analysis of the characteristics of organised criminal groups and their activ-
ities world-wide, and the national and international responses to the threat
that they raise.
The analysis of the interaction between these two elements has been the
focal point of attention at TRANSCRIME - University of Trento since its
establishment in 1994 and has inspired the structuring of the five background
documents used for the World Ministerial Conference on Transnational
Organised Crime held in Naples in 1994 and the preparation, in particular,
of two and a half of them.*
Since the 1994 World Ministerial Conference is the starting point, the
analysis covers recent developments in the phenomenon. This report is
divided into four chapters each of which, with different aims, describes the
trends in organised crime activities and measures taken against them.
* In the original these documents have been gathered in Ernesto U. Savona and P. Williams,
Five Papers.....”, July 1994, mimeo, and published in the UN official version in P. Williams
and E.U. Savona (eds) The United Nations and Transnational Organised Crime, Frank Cass,
London, 1996.
VII
Chapter One gives a general overview of the tendencies and changes
displayed by criminal enterprises. Particular attention is paid to the possibil-
ity of elaborating a common definition of organised crime. This has long been
a source of controversy and contention, probably because of differences in
the way different persons and countries approach various aspects of the
problem. Nevertheless, an unequivocal, common definition of organised
crime could make co-operation among different countries easier.
In this chapter new trends in criminal subjects and activities are analysed.
The aim is to demonstrate how criminal organisations modify their structure
and goals in response to changes in world markets and their regulation. The
changes in the subjects involve, for example, the recruiting of professionals
with specific skills in order to infiltrate new markets more effectively and
efficiently and therefore earn greater profits. As regards changes in the
activities, criminal organisations are expanding into new markets and engag-
ing in new and less risky activities. In both cases, this has come about because
assessment of the opportunities for profit and of the risks involved suggests
that the former outweigh the latter.
This chapter also highlights the concept of interdependencies among
crimes and activities, which is a useful theoretical tool in understanding how
organised crime has altered its modes of operation and therefore in improving
control strategies. The offences committed by organised criminal groups are
growing increasingly interdependent, constituting a sort of illegal chain in
which the organisational structure links them together. In order to finalise a
particular crime of importance (in terms of effects or gains), organised
criminals utilise a chain of offences. This interdependence among crimes is
often a manifestation of the progressive specialisation of criminal organisa-
tions. Once it is realised that the activities of organised criminal groups are
increasingly interdependent, it becomes easier to understand the way in
which transnational organised crime shifts from one activity to another. In
practice, a criminal group with already-trained personnel, already-acquired
means, already-tested trafficking routes, already-developed corruption net-
works, and already-existing contacts in different countries of the world, will
move into new illicit markets, adding new activities to the ones in which it
already specialises.
The purpose of Chapter Two is to provide an overview of the recent trends
of illicit activities within organised crime in various areas in the world (North
America, Central and South America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe,
Africa and the Gulf States, Asia and Oceania) and the changes in criminal
groups which operate at the international level. The areas in which organised
criminal groups are most active have been singled out and their structures are
described. This is the reason why the organisational device of this chapter
varies from time to time, moving from activities and groups to the states
involved, as examples rather than as an exhaustive list. Since there are major
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diversities among countries and regions, this chapter has an informative
rather than an analytical purpose.
As far as individual groups are concerned, we have tried to illustrate their
characteristics and structuring and the way in which they spread on national
and transnational levels, penetrating new markets and exploiting the loop-
holes existing in the legal and economic systems of many countries.
Market globalisation and the subsequent abolishing of borders, together
with the advantages offered by technological innovations, have created
opportunities for new profits for existing and emerging criminal groups
which have adapted themselves to the new needs of the market. The demand
for illegal goods and services has changed and in turn resulted in an increase
in the associated crimes such as trafficking in migrants (and their exploitation
in local criminal circuits for prostitution, black market, theft, drug pushing,
etc.), environmental offences, drug smuggling, money laundering activities,
and trafficking in stolen vehicles. At the same time, criminal groups have
learned to exploit the loopholes and legislative discrepancies present in some
geographical areas and they have spread into sectors where the risk of being
arrested and heavily sentenced is relatively low, especially compared to the
attractive economic return. A typical example of this trend is fraud in general
and specifically fraud against the financial interests of the European Union.
Chapter Three describes the recent main initiatives taken internationally
against organised transnational crime by both governmental and non-govern-
mental organisations (the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the G7/P8,
the European Union, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment, the Organisation of American States) as well as other forms of
action, such as bilateral agreements. The aim of this chapter is to inform the
reader about the recent developments of international action.
The role of international organisations, both governmental and non-gov-
ernmental, is to overcome the problems that arise among countries because
of legislative discrepancies and inefficient co-operation (in information-
sharing, in joint investigations, in the provision of assistance in legal pro-
cedures - such as testimony-taking, locating persons and freezing forfeitable
assets - and in extraditing criminals).
The action taken by these organisations is aimed at counteracting, at the
international level, the criminals’ transnational development which appears
to be mainly due to their wish:
– to set a distance between the location in which the illicit activity is
conducted and the place from which they direct their operations, making
it more difficult for law enforcement agencies to reach the core of the
organisation;
– to diversify their activities among several countries in order to maximise
opportunities and minimise the “law enforcement risk”. In particular, they
develop tactical alliances with local criminal groups, taking advantage of
their expertise and local range of action, and they exploit the internation-
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alisation of financial systems to conduct money-laundering operations,
thereby concealing the origin of illicit profits;
– to respond to the international development of police and judicial co-
operation.
The aim of Chapter Four is to describe national legislation against organised
crime, in terms of both substantive legislation (focusing on the crimi-nalisa-
tion of organised crime and the introduction of measures allowing asset
forfeiture and confiscation) and procedural legislation (focusing on special
means of investigation and witness protection programmes). This chapter
also provides a brief survey of the results achieved by law enforcement
agencies and of their methods.
Different countries respond according to the specific local threats raised
by the criminal groups they have to deal with. Despite the fact that policies
against organised crime therefore vary according to the goals that they pursue
(prevention or crime control), in this report attention is focused only on the
ways in which criminal law and law enforcement have been adjusted to
national legal systems. Three issues in particular characterise the modern
approach to the matter, and it is therefore these that are analysed in this
chapter:
– the offence of belonging to a criminal organisation;
– the forfeiture and confiscation of illicitly acquired assets;
– law enforcement agencies and special means of investigation, including
witness protection programmes.
Reconstructing the legislation of different countries in these three areas is
virtually impossible, given that change takes place extremely rapidly, so that
information may be outdated and contradictory. For this reason, the informa-
tion set out in this chapter should be considered as solely indicative of
country-specific situations. The data derive from various sources: the United
Nations, the P8 Group, the European Union, the OECD, the Council of
Europe and other major organisations, as well as from reports prepared by
experts on individual countries.
The sources used when researching and developing this report were the
following: analyses and legislation provided by a world-wide network of
experts on organised crime trends and countermeasures; papers presented at
national and international conferences; reports written by universities and
research institutes; and material provided by governmental and non-govern-
mental organisations and law enforcement agencies. Given that the materials
derive from different sources, and in view of the frequent changes made to
legislation against organised crime, it may be that some information is dated
and/or not fully correct.
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1 Organising Crime
1.1 Introduction
1  Organised Crime
This report seeks to provide an overview of recent trends in organised crime
and the countermeasures taken against it throughout the world. The Political
Declaration and Global Action Plan against Organised Transnational Crime
adopted at the World Ministerial Conference on Organised Transnational
Crime held in Naples, Italy, on 21-23 November 1994 has been taken as the
framework in the analysis of groups, activities and policies that follows. The
principles agreed upon by member countries at Naples represent a milestone
in the prevention of organised crime because they set out specific guidelines
to be followed at the national and international levels.
The Political Declaration focuses on the need for strict and effective
legislative measures and operational instruments, and a co-ordinated strategy
of international co-operation. Particular stress is placed on defeating “the
social and economic power of criminal organisations and their ability to
infiltrate legitimate economies, to launder their criminal proceeds and to use
violence and terror”. At the same time, the Declaration emphasises the
importance of prevention and control measures linked to specific national
and regional situations. Organised crime in developing countries and coun-
tries in transition is deemed of particular concern, for it may seriously hamper
their economic and social growth. Help should therefore be given to these
countries so that they can develop appropriate control strategies, and inter-
national co-operation is also required so that the discrepancies among
country-specific laws on organised crime and related activities can be elimi-
nated.
The Global Action Plan envisages acceptance of a common definition of
organised crime and urges the increased collection, analysis and dissemina-
tion of statistics and information on organised crime trends among countries.
The Action Plan calls on the member-states of the United Nations to adopt
the following recommendations:
– They should base their action plans on the expertise gathered by the states
most actively  committed  to combating organised crime  in regard to
substantive, procedural and regulatory legislation;
– They should penalise membership of criminal associations or participation
in conspiracies, and they should introduce corporate criminal liability into
their legal systems;
– They should provide their investigative agencies with “evidence-gathering
techniques, such as electronic surveillance, undercover operations and
controlled delivery”, with due regard for the right to privacy and with the
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stipulation that these techniques shall be subject to judicial approval and
supervision;
– They should consider the introduction of witness protection programmes
and the granting of special treatment to co-operative witnesses who
facilitate the collection of first-hand information on the structure, mem-
bership and modus operandi of criminal organisations;
– They should jointly endeavour to introduce all the measures necessary to
ensure transparency and integrity in business, finance and administration,
thereby curbing corrupt practices and money laundering;
– They should promote bilateral and multilateral agreements and conven-
tions in order to improve reciprocal legal assistance in the investigation
and prosecution of organised crime. More specifically, countries should
develop more effective international instruments with which to combat
organised crime.
Further recommendations are intended to deprive criminals of their illicit
proceeds. Since profit is the main goal of criminals, policies that seek to target
their economic power are of the utmost relevance. In this respect countries
should:
– criminalise money laundering
– develop ethical standards in public administration, in business and in the
liberal professions, introduce rules to ensure the transparency of financial
transactions, and limit financial secrecy;
– in order to deprive criminals of their illicit proceeds, consider “legislative
measures for the confiscation of the illicit proceeds, asset forfeiture [...]
and the freezing or seizing of assets” together with “the possibility of
sharing forfeited assets and - under specific conditions and always under
judicial proceedings - of confiscating illicit proceeds without a criminal
conviction, or confiscating sums that are higher than those relating to the
crime for which judgement has been passed”.
The Political Declaration and the Global Action Plan provide the framework
for the present report, which examines the characteristics of organised
criminal groups and their activities world-wide, and the national and inter-
national responses to the threat that they raise. The analysis of the interaction
between these two elements has been the focal point of attention at TRANS-
CRIME - University of Trento since its establishment in 1994 and has
inspired the structuring of the five background documents used for the World
Ministerial Conference on Transnational Organised Crime held at Naples in
November 1994 and the preparation, in particular, of two and a half of them.1
2 1 Organised Crime
1 These documents have been gathered in an original version in Ernesto U. Savona and
P. Williams, Five Papers.....”, July 1994, mimeo, and published in the UN official
version in P. Williams and E.U. Savona (eds) The United Nations and Transnational
Organised Crime, Frank Cass, London, 1996 .
Since the 1994 World Ministerial Conference is the starting point, the
analysis will cover recent developments in the phenomenon.
Chapter One gives a general overview of the tendencies and changes
displayed by criminal enterprises. Particular attention will be paid to the
possibility of setting out a common definition of organised crime. New trends
in subjects and activities will be analysed, while interdependencies among
crimes and activities will be highlighted.
Chapter Two describes the different processes that characterise the dy-
namics of organised crime in the different regions of the world (North
America, Central and South America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe,
Africa and the Gulf States, Asia and Oceania), singling out the areas in which
organised criminal groups are most active, and describing their structure. Due
to the major diversities among countries and regions this chapter has an
informative more than an analytical purpose. Both criteria and methodology
used are explained at the beginning of the chapter itself.
Chapter Three describes the principal recent international initiatives taken
against organised transnational crime by both governmental and non-gov-
ernmental organisations (the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the
G7/P8, the European Union, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development, the Organisation of American States) as well as other
forms of action, such as bilateral agreements. The aim of this chapter is to
inform the reader on the recent developments in international action.
Chapter Four describes national legislation against organised crime, in
terms of both substantive legislation (focusing on the criminalisation of
organised crime and the introduction of measures allowing asset forfeiture
and confiscation) and procedural legislation (focusing on special means of
investigation and witness protection programmes). The chapter also conducts
a brief survey of the results achieved by the law enforcement agencies and
of their methods.
The sources used when researching and developing this report were the
following: analyses and legislation provided by a world-wide network of
experts on organised crime trends and countermeasures; papers presented at
national and international conferences; reports written by universities and
research institutes; and material provided by governmental and non-govern-
mental organisations and law enforcement agencies. Given that the materials
derive from different sources, and in view of the frequent changes made to
legislation against organised crime, it may be that some information is dated.
In order to remedy this shortcoming, reports from the media have sometimes
been used.
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1.2 Towards a common definition of
organised crime
Defining the concept of organised crime has long been a source of contro-
versy and contention, probably because of differences in the way different
persons and countries approach various aspects of the problem. Nevertheless,
there has often been a need for an unequivocal, common definition of
organised crime that, due to the cross-border character that this form of crime
has assumed, could make co-operation among different countries easier. It is
vital for the understanding of the organised crime issue to decide whether or
not a certain category of crime should be determined to be “organised crime”,
and then decide how to delineate that category,2 and finally to decide how
resources should be allocated and assess how effectively they have been used
in preventing and controlling it.3
The essential characteristic of the term “organised crime” is that it denotes
a process or method of committing crimes, not a distinct type of crime itself,
nor even a distinct type of criminal4. This is the reason why a good definition
of organised crime should grasp the essential aspects of the “process”
whereby certain criminals carry out criminal activity, increasingly within a
transnational arena. This “process” is what adds the additional level of danger
and social threat. In the following, some definitions are outlined which
correspond to different purposes (legislation, law enforcement, research) and
therefore focus on different characteristics of organised crime.
In the United States a definition of organised crime to be found in Federal
statutes is set out by Public Law 90-351, the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968: “Organised crime means the unlawful activities of
members of a highly organised, disciplined association engaged in supplying
illegal goods and services, including but not limited to gambling, prostitution,
loan sharking, narcotics, labour racketeering, and other unlawful activities
of members of such associations”. This statute defines organised crime less
in terms of unlawful activities than in terms of those who commit them. It
also lists a number of unlawful activities, but these are not necessarily those
that define organised crime.
4 1 Organised Crime
2 M.E. Beare, Criminal Conspiracies, Organised Crime in Canada, Nelson Canada,
1996, p. 219.
3 M.D. Maltz, “Toward Defining Organised Crime”, in H.E. Alexander and G.E. Caiden,
The Politics and Economics of Organised Crime, D.C. Heath and Company, 1986. See
also M.D. Maltz, Measuring the Effectiveness of Organised Crime Control Efforts,
Monograph No.9, The University of Illinois at Chicago, The Office of International
Criminal Justice, 1990.
4 M.E. Beare, op. cit., p.14.
The Federal Organised Crime Control Act of 1970 (PL 91-352) - enacted
in the United States two years after the Safe Streets Act - did not provide a
definition of organised crime. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
sations (RICO5) Act, as part of the Federal Organised Crime Control Act,
makes it a crime to infiltrate, participate in, or conduct the affairs of an
enterprise6 in a manner similar to racketeering. An enterprise is defined as
any “association in fact” comprised of two or more people. A racketeering
act (also called a RICO predicate) is defined as virtually any serious federal
felony, and as most state felonies. A second statute addressed to organised
criminal activity In the United States is the Continuing Criminal Enterprise
(CCE) statute7, which is designed to counter the threat raised by large-scale
drug trafficking organisations. The statute makes it illegal to engage in a
“continuing criminal enterprise”. The term “continuing criminal enterprise”
is given a statutory definition, which like the RICO statute, is descriptive of
the factual functioning of criminal organisations. The CCE statute, unlike the
RICO statute, is restricted to drug trafficking organisations.
In Canada8, where the term “organised crime” does not appear in the
current English version of the Canadian Criminal Code (CC), the 1989
Proceeds of Crime law uses the term “enterprise crime”. The French version
of the Criminal Code uses the phrase “infraction de criminalité organisée”.
The Criminal Code’s reference to enterprise crime - infraction de criminalité
organisée - lists twenty-four offences deemed to be enterprise organised
crime and designated drug offences to which the Proceeds of Crime legisla-
tion applies9.
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5 The RICO Act is part of the 1970 Federal Organised Crime Control Act and is found
at 18 USC §§ 1961-1968.
6 § 1961 states that “enterprise” includes any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in
fact although not a legal entity.
7 The CCE statute is found at 21 USC § 848.
8 M.E. Beare, op. cit., pp. 19-20.
9 The Canadian Criminal Code (S. 462.3) states that “enterprise crime offence” means
an offence against any of the following provisions: bribery of judicial officers; bribery
of officials; frauds upon the government; breach of trust by public officer; corrupting
morals; keeping a gaming or betting house; betting, pool-selling; bookmaking; keeping
common bawdy-house; procuring; murder; theft, robbery; extortion, forgery; uttering
forged documents; fraud, fraudulent manipulation of stock exchange transactions;
secret commissions; arson; making counterfeit money; possession  of  counterfeit
money; uttering counterfeit money; laundering proceeds of crime; possession of
property obtained by crime; designated drug offence; conspiracy or an attempt to
commit the above; an act or omission anywhere that, if it had occurred in Canada,
would have constituted an offence listed above.
In Germany the so-called “Organised Crime Law” 10(OrgKG) of 1992, an
amendment to the code of criminal procedure, avoids any definition of the
term “organised crime”, although the German Bundeskriminalamt (BKA,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation) defines organised crime as follows:
“organised crime is the planned commission of criminal offences, determined
by the pursuit of profit and power, which individually or as a whole, are of
considerable importance, whenever more than two persons involved collabo-
rate for a prolonged or indefinite period of time, each with own appointed
tasks
• by using commercial or business-like structures, or
• by using violence or other means suitable for intimidation, or
• by exerting influence on politics, the media, public
administration, judicial authorities or the economy”11.
The main components of this definition are planned continuous criminal
activities with some sort of organisational division of labour, and it also
applies to the manner of doing business, not to classes, ethnicity or supposed
formal structures  of  Cosa Nostra,  Mafia,  or other identified  criminal
groups12.
In Italy, the definition13 of Mafia-type crime is contained in art. 416-bis
of the Penal Code, which was introduced into the Code in 1982. An associa-
tion is “Mafia-type” when its members systematically use intimidation and
conditions of subjection deriving therefrom to commit crimes, to gain control
over economic activities and to acquire unlawful advantages.
Mafia-type crime has been defined by the Italian legislator in terms of the
traditional behaviour of the Sicilian Mafia, but the result is a general legal
definition which applies to any criminal group that acts in a similar manner,
no matter in what part of the country it operates, and no matter what it calls
itself.
At the international level, too, numerous different approaches have been
taken  to the  need for a common definition of organised crime. These
approaches correspond to different perceptions of what organised crime
means and to the different purposes to which the definition could be put. Part
6 1 Organised Crime
10 In July 1992 the Federal Parliament passed the Prevention of Drug Trafficking and
Other Forms of Organised Crime Act (Gesetz zur Bekämpfung des illegalen
Rauschgifthandels und anderer Erscheinungsformen der Organisierten Kriminalität -
OrgKG).
11 Arbeitsgruppe Justiz/Polizei des BKA, May 1990.
12 P.C. Van Duyne, “Organised Crime, Corruption and Power”, in Crime, Law & Social
Change, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997.
13 G. Turone, “Mafia-Type Criminality: the Special Features of Italian Criminal Law and
Procedure to Combat It”, Paper presented at the Council of Europe Multilateral
Seminar on Organised Crime, Minsk (Belarus), 16-18 September 1996.
of the problem for the international community in trying to deal with
organised transnational criminal groups is that there is no single organisation
or behavioural paradigm that provides a constant and accessible frame of
reference. Criminal organisations vary in size, scale, geographical scope,
relationship with the power structures in home and host states, internal
organisation and structures, the combination of instruments that they use to
avoid law enforcement and to pursue their criminal enterprises, and the range
of their legal and illegal activities14. Many transnational criminal organisa-
tions resemble major multinational corporations and often have a similar
managerial hierarchy. At the same time, they maintain a flexible structure
which enables them to relocate funds or to react quickly to law enforcement
efforts or to new opportunities for making illicit profits15 .
The Naples Political Declaration and Global Action Plan16 lists the fol-
lowing six characteristics of organised crime: (a) group organisation to
commit crime; (b) hierarchical links or personal relations which enable
leaders  to control the group; (c) the use of violence, intimidation and
corruption to earn profits or control territories or markets; (d) the laundering
of illicit proceeds to further criminal activity and to infiltrate the legitimate
economy; (e) a potential for expansion into any new activity beyond national
borders; and (f) co-operation with other organised transnational criminal
groups. Organised crime can thus be described as a form of economic
commerce which uses threats, physical force and violence, extortion, intimi-
dation or corruption, as well as supplying illicit goods and services.
As of 1997, the United Nations Draft Framework Convention Against
Organised Crime states that, for the purposes of the Convention, “organised
crime” means group activities of three or more persons, with hierarchical
links or personal relationships which enable their leaders to earn profits or
to control territories or markets, internal or foreign, by means of violence,
intimidation or corruption, both in furthering criminal activity and infiltrating
the legitimate economy, in particular by means of:
1. Illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, and money-
laundering, as defined by the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances;
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2. Traffic in persons, as defined by the Convention for the Suppression of
the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others,
of 2 December 1949;
3. Counterfeiting currency, as defined by the International Convention for
the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency, of 20 April 1929;
4. Illicit traffic in or the theft of cultural objects, as defined by the UN
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation Convention on the
Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property of 14 November 1970 and
the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law Convention
on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects of 24 June 1995;
5. The theft of nuclear material, its misuse or threats of its misuse to harm
the public, as defined by the Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material of 3 March 1980;
6. Terrorist acts;
7. Illicit traffic in or the theft of arms and explosive materials or devices;
8. Illicit traffic in or the theft of motor vehicles;
9. The corruption of public officials.
The Draft Convention also states that the term “organised crime” covers
commission of an act by a member of a group as a part of the criminal activity
of such an organisation.
In explaining their position on a convention against organised transna-
tional crime, several governments17 have mentioned the lack of an agreed
definition of the phenomenon. Others do not consider the lack of an accept-
able definition of organised transnational crime to be an insurmountable
obstacle against elaboration of such a convention. These governments have
emphasised the need to counter this type of crime at the global level, and the
positive advocacy and the “peer pressure” effects that a convention of this
kind would produce. A number of governments have also emphasised the
threat raised by organised transnational crime, rather than the activities in
which criminal organisations may be engaged at any given point in time. This
appears to stem from the understanding that the flexibility and diversity
displayed by organised transnational crime makes it more productive to focus
on characteristics than on activities.
The Criteria (divided into Mandatory and Optional) defined by the Euro-
pean Commission and adjusted by the Expert Group on Organised Crime of
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the Council of Europe18 may also be useful in defining the term ‘organised
crime’. The Mandatory criteria are:
1. Collaboration of three or more people;
2. For a prolonged or indefinite period of time;
3. Suspected or convicted of committing serious criminal offences;
4. With the objective of pursuing profit and/or power;
The Optional criteria are:
5. Having a specific task or role for each participant;
6. Using some form of internal discipline and control;
7. Using violence or other means suitable for intimidation;
8. Exerting influence on politics, the media, public administration, law
enforcement, the administration of justice or the economy by corruption
or any other means;
9. Using commercial or business-like structures;
10. Engaged in money laundering;
11. Operating on an international level.
The legal and international definitions of ‘organised crime’ tend to converge,
so that the term denotes a method of conducting criminal operations which
is distinct from other forms of criminal behaviour. Its salient features are
violence, corruption, ongoing criminal activity, and the precedence of the
group over any single member. Organised criminal groups are characterised
by their continuity over time regardless of the mortality of their members.
They are not dependent on the continued participation of any single individ-
ual.
Current understanding of organised crime, at the national and international
level, should take account of two significant changes which will have a major
impact on law enforcement. First, organised criminal groups have broadened
their operational range. Second, they no longer operate wholly in competition
with each other but have demonstrated a willingness and an ability to work
collaboratively.19 Focusing on organised crime with these aspects in mind,
and also focusing on it as a process rather than on the people who engage in
it, may enable the investigators and analysts to move away from unconscious
stereotyping and to broaden their understanding of the range of organised
crime.20 Ethnicity has frequently been cited as a determinant of organised
criminal group membership, but this is often misconstrued. Without denying
that foreign ethnic elements have played and still do play a recognisable role
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in the various manifestations of organised crime, it may be better to abstract
from the (social or ethnic) backgrounds of the organised criminal groups and
examine their (criminal) economic activities.21 The question changes from
“who” to “how”: How do organised criminal groups organise themselves to
meet public demand? What are the parameters of organised crime groups?
How can we best conceptualise the symbiotic relationship between organised
criminals and others (organised businessmen22, politicians and bureaucrats)?
1.3 Trends in organised crime
1.3.1 Trends in subjects
A recently-noted and distinct trend in organised crime is the restructuring of
criminal enterprises in response to changes in world markets and their
regulation. Technological development and the new opportunities provided
by the globalisation of financial markets and communications are key factors
in understanding the development of organised crime groups. In order to
exploit these new opportunities, criminals must acquire a much higher level
of expertise, and this is often possessed only by professionals. As a conse-
quence criminal organisations are increasingly recruiting professionals with
specific skills so that they can infiltrate new markets and earn greater profits.
Fraud against the interests of the European Union and money laundering
are good examples of the trend. Money laundering often involves banking
and financial institutions, as well as the legitimate enterprises in which the
illicit money is invested. When the laundering of money is the main task of
an organisation - which undertakes a series of fraudulent activities such as
the counterfeiting of invoices and the corruption of bank employees for the
purpose - it frequently relies on the advice of professionals and consultants.
Moreover, organised criminal groups need professionals not only as external
consultants but as full members of the group. Since such professionals are
more and more essential for risk management and money laundering activ-
ities, this full membership strengthens their loyalty to the group. Achieving
the most profitable balance between opportunities and the risk of law en-
forcement, in fact, requires criminal managers able to combine ruthlessness
and violence with the complex skills that managing corruption requires.
Some of the changes in organised crime have been brought about by the
altered environment23 in which criminal organisations operate. The growing
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globalisation of financial markets and communications, together with the
increased effectiveness of law enforcement control activities, are provoking
a series of changes in the structure of organised crime groups and in their
relations with other criminal groups.24
Evident today, therefore, is the growth of transnational criminal organisa-
tions able to adapt to changes in this global environment rather than to
national changes. Analysis of the transnational operations of criminal groups
in association with multinational organisations is therefore of paramount
importance. Since criminal activities are transnational, the criminal groups
engaged in them must be able to deal with different markets, even if this
means developing a structured organisation, like a corporation, with different
tasks and sections for every phase from production to marketing.25
Large, monolithic and rigidly hierarchical structures have proved rela-
tively easy targets for law enforcement operations. The results of these
operations suggest that criminal enterprises are now replacing a centralised
structure, often without multinational characteristics, with more flexible and
decentralised ones. The current trend seems to be towards the creation of
small organisations based on mutual understandings and agreements, and
with relatively few operating procedures, adjusting them to new market
features so that they can maximise the profits deriving from new business
opportunities and minimise their vulnerability to law enforcement (arrest of
their members and the seizure of their assets).26
This re-organisation of criminal enterprises in terms of structure seems to
be happening along the lines of more flexibility and more co-operation with
other criminal groups.
A flexible structure allows for the prompt re-organisation of illicit activ-
ities according to demand and to the number of competitors. Occasional
businesses or specific targets increasingly require small sub-units27 of crimi-
nal specialists, who work with external individuals to provide services and
expertise in fields unknown or not directly accessible to the criminal organi-
sation, thus enabling their rapid adjustment to new market opportunities. An
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outstanding example is provided by the Nigerian networks in the drugs
market. Small groups of executives, or even individuals, carry out operational
tasks or missions co-ordinated and instructed by a strategic centre in the
country of origin. Further examples are provided by the fraudulent activities
of Belgian or Dutch white-collar criminals and by the car thefts carried out
by Polish and Yugoslav organisations, networks which have acquired specific
expertise in the division of labour.
Flexibility also means that the hierarchical distance between the leaders
of a criminal enterprise and the rank-and-file is increasing. Although this
trend is not displayed by every organisation, it concerns at least the larger
ones or some phases of their production cycle. A further consequence is that
the ‘trail of evidence’ linking the crime and the top level becomes difficult to
detect, and this provides insulation against law enforcement. At the lower
levels, work is carried out by small units (‘cells’) which are aware of only a
part of the organisation’s activities or which operate only as servicing units.
This phenomenon has been observed in the drug markets, where ‘veterans’
are able to recruit a wide network of trusted executives.
At the political and law enforcement level, attention is being paid to the
problem of collusive agreements among criminal groups designed to opti-
mise opportunities and risk (in this case, trading fewer opportunities for less
risk).
These agreements are often reached in order to enter new markets. Some-
times, at the lower levels (mainly those of street drug smuggling or prostitu-
tion), violence is used to gain supremacy among exploiters of the same
market, cases in point being the East European groups in Germany, or street
gangs in the United Kingdom. The other method is to co-operate with
enterprises already in control of these markets, and which have greater
knowledge of local conditions and are more attuned to local problems, rather
than trying to set up as a competitor in unfamiliar territory.
An example of the effectiveness of these tactical arrangements is provided
by that between Colombian cartels and local Polish groups on the distribution
of cocaine in those European markets in which networks of Polish citizens
provide a crucial set of contacts.
These collusive agreements are favoured by a combination of different
variables, most notably: lengthy conflict among criminal groups with the
inevitable spread of violence, the structural weakening of organisations due
to infiltration, defection or the conviction of their leaders, changes in markets,
reduced resources, demand for specialisation, or the increased risk of law
enforcement.
The alliances thus created may take a wide variety of forms, including
combined operations, licensing or franchising agreements, and joint ven-
tures. Tactical arrangements are developed. In many respects, these activities
typify a large part of the drug-trafficking industry, in that they are carried out
by small, independent organisations set up to exploit a particular trafficking
route and a specific method to circumvent customs and law enforcement.
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Many of them are  small-scale  tactical  alliances based on transnational
networks, but when they prove effective they display an inherent capacity for
growth. Their flexible structure makes it likely that they will be disbanded
and their constituent elements reassembled in a different pattern. Tactical
alliances are made for specific purposes, and they are often followed by a
search for further partners, which will make shipments to other locations
using different methods of concealment.
The aim of co-operation among criminal organisations is often the circum-
vention of law enforcement and of national regulations. Accordingly, the
principal purpose of some criminal alliances is risk reduction. Criminal
organisations enter into alliances with governments, either through corrup-
tion or coercion or, more frequently, a combination of the two. A recurrent
feature is the extensive use of bribery - for example, in Italy - to strengthen
control over the territory, to minimise the risk of law enforcement, and to
increase the criminals’ advantage over competitors. Another example is
provided by the criminal networks involved in European Union or VAT
frauds, which must necessarily develop ties with institutions both at the
national and European level. Criminal groups transporting illicit goods across
European Union borders, too, must have accomplices at some level in the
customs service.
1.3.2 Trends in activities
In recent years, there has been an evident tendency for illicit activities to
expand into new markets, and for new and less risky activities to develop. In
both cases, this has come about because assessment of the opportunities for
profit and of the risks involved suggests that the former outweigh the latter.
Indeed, the opportunity/risk ratio is always the decisive variable that orients
criminals in their choice of activity. The problem is that this ratio is perceived
differently according to the organisational and professional capabilities of a
criminal group.
Technological developments in telecommunications, including telephone,
fax and computer networks, the explosive increase in the use of computers
in business, the development of electronic systems in the banking and
financial sectors, which use wire transfers to shift enormous amounts of cash
around the world very rapidly: all these combine to favour interdependence
among businesses and their internationalisation. Just as legal businesses are
expanding internationally in response to the globalisation of markets, so too
are criminal enterprises seeking to develop their illicit activities at the
international level in order to take advantage of the discrepancies between
the legal systems of countries in different parts of the world, and in order to
gain access to new markets.
Some of the most traditional crimes, such as drug trafficking, remain
highly productive businesses. However, owing to advances in legislation,
and in some cases owing to increased penalties for certain crimes, they have
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also become rather risky. Other criminal activities may be less productive,
but they involve less risk. Economic crimes belong to this latter group. In
many countries some sorts of crime, such as large-scale fraud, ecological
crimes and alien trafficking, are less closely targeted by law enforcement.
Moreover, investigation of these crimes is much more difficult, and the
sanctions are often more lenient than for drug-related crimes.
Alien smuggling or trafficking in aliens is a relatively new phenomenon.28
It is a business that links migration more and more closely with crime, and
it is characterised by the increasing involvement of organised criminal
groups. Intervention by the latter is changing the nature of the relationship
between migration and crime by introducing three connected links: traffick-
ing, exploitation and induced criminality. Quite often, these links belong to
a chain managed by the same criminal organisation. Criminals provide the
supply to meet this demand by furnishing services for illegal migration (from
fake documents to transportation). Once these migrants have arrived at their
destinations, they often find that they have little chance of earning regular
incomes or of receiving welfare assistance. They are consequently preyed
upon by the same or other criminal organisations, which place them in local
criminal markets, such as drugs and prostitution. As a consequence of this
exploitation, the illegal immigrants commit more crimes in the host countries
than does the native population. The high crime rates of aliens in host
countries should therefore also be read in the light of the trafficking-exploi-
tation-induced criminality circuit.29
Computer crimes are playing an increasingly significant role in the new
international dimension of organised crime. Among the crimes most com-
monly committed with the use of computers are money laundering and fraud.
Electronic networks offer enormous opportunities for the movement of
capital without the need to use a traditional institution to act as an inter-
mediary. Illicit funds can easily be moved through countries in which policies
to counteract money laundering are marginal or non-existent.30 Use of these
computer networks enables criminals to operate internationally without
physically crossing national borders. They can thus maximise their business
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and investment opportunities while at the same time reducing the risk of
identification. Cyberspace is still a safe territory, in fact, relatively immune
to control policies. In a system in which millions of transactions take place
without being checked by financial institutions, it is virtually impossible to
organise effective supervision.31
Fraud in general - and in Europe, fraud against the financial interests of
the European Union - is a growing source of illicit proceeds for organised
criminal groups. Fraud is committed not only by professionals in legitimate
industry, at the margin of their businesses, but also by extensive organised
crime networks. As regards fraud against the European budget, in Belgium,
the Netherlands, Portugal and Italy the criminals involved have developed
into well-established criminal trading communities. In 1996, losses
amounted to 1.3 million ECU (somewhat over $1.4 billion at current ex-
change rates) and approximately 1.6 per cent of the European Union budget
for that year.32 The fact that “two or three per cent of the cases are important
and represent more than two-thirds of the money involved”33 demonstrates
that these are large-scale organised financial crimes.
In Europe, considerable alarm has been provoked by the trafficking in
nuclear materials from the countries of the former Soviet Union. Although it
is almost certain that for the moment these traffickers are greedy freelancers,
traders, adventurers or opportunists34 looking for a quick profit, rather than
criminal organisations, it is likely that criminal organisations will enter this
market for extortion purposes in the future. If purchasers cannot be found,
and if the material is on hand, then extortion may be particularly attractive.
There are currently several hundred tons of weapon-usable fissile material
under inadequate physical security and material control in Russia. Kilograms
of this material have been stolen from institutes in Russia since the break-up
of the Soviet Union, and a proportion of it is not intercepted before it leaves
Russian soil. The quantities already stolen (and fortunately intercepted) are
enough to manufacture small nuclear weapons. It has been noted35 that
sufficient fissile material can be diverted from Russian stockpiles, with a high
probability of success, to provide a sub-national group with one or two
nuclear weapons, or even a rogue state with a sizeable arsenal.
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1.3.3 The management of crimes: interdependencies
among crimes and among activities
A survey of the world-wide activities of transnational organised crime groups
yields the following picture of the ways in which they have altered their
modes of operation, with closer interdependence among specific crimes
(vertical interdependencies,  or chains of individual crimes) and among
complex criminal activities (horizontal interdependencies, or interdependen-
cies among chains of crimes). A preliminary definition of these concepts may
be helpful, since they may be somewhat unclear. ‘Crime’ is used here to
denote individual conduct punished by law, while ‘activity’denotes the illicit
conduct as a whole (as a chain of individual crimes) and comprises the means,
knowledge and personnel of the criminal enterprise, as well as the expertise
that it develops in order to pursue its main criminal purpose (so that, e.g., the
skills acquired in corrupting officials when trafficking in drugs can be used
when trafficking in migrants or in arms).
It can be shown that the offences committed by organised criminal groups
are growing increasingly interdependent, constituting a sort of illegal chain
in which the organisational structure links them together. Vertical interde-
pendence among crimes arises when, in order to perpetrate a final crime, one
or more intermediate and instrumental offences are committed by the same
criminal organisation. In other words, in order to finalise a crime of particular
importance (in terms of effects or gains), organised criminals utilise a chain
of offences. This interdependence among crimes is often a manifestation of
the progressive specialisation of criminal organisations.
Numerous examples of vertical interdependency can be cited. For in-
stance, as far as fraud, corruption and money laundering are concerned,
analysis of criminal schemes and inspection of the modus operandi of
criminals shows that these three crimes are often functionally related, in that
one of them is the end-result of a criminal scheme and the other two are
intermediate steps towards it. Analysis of cases in which fraud against the
European budget is the final goal often reveals the corruption of customs
personnel and public employees of the European Commission, or of member
states. The proceeds of such fraud are often laundered in order to conceal
their criminal origins and to avert the risk, if the fraud is discovered, of the
sum being recovered. When laundering money becomes the main goal of an
organisation, frequently acting under the advice of professionals and con-
sultants, the process moves through a series of fraudulent activities, such as
the counterfeiting of invoices and the corrupting of bank employees. Since
this activity often involves banking and financial institutions, as well as the
legitimate enterprises in which the illicit money is invested, fraud and
corruption are the most frequent means used to achieve this goal. When
corruption is the aim, fraud and money laundering are instruments for
achieving it, the former at the beginning and the second at the end. “Operation
Clean Hands” in Milan (Italy) revealed that massive corruption of politicians
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by private enterprises was accomplished by creating - through false account-
ing or fake invoices - slush funds. The money thus obtained was then
laundered and reinvested.36
Turning to the trafficking of migrants and their exploitation (especially of
migrant women and children) in the prostitution markets of host countries,
the same pattern of vertical interdependence among offences emerges. In
fact, in order to perpetrate these crimes, a criminal organisation involved in
alien smuggling activities (also with the further purpose of sexually exploit-
ing migrants or of placing them on black labour markets) must usually plan
the commission of further offences, such as deception, illegal immigration,
corruption of public officials and theft and counterfeiting of documents for
use in their trafficking operations.
Once it is realised that the activities of organised criminal groups are
increasingly interdependent, it becomes easier to understand the way in
which transnational organised crime shifts from one activity to another. The
more a criminal organisation develops horizontal interdependencies, the
more it is characterised by opportunism. The horizontal interdependencies,
distinctive of  opportunistic  criminal organisations, display a pattern of
diversification rather than one of specialisation. The concept of horizontal
interdependencies among activities refers, in fact, to the connections estab-
lished among different activities by the same criminal organisation. A crimi-
nal enterprise usually relies on the particular expertise, skills and means
acquired in a specific illicit sector to expand its criminal activities, changing
into new criminal circuits. In practice, a criminal group with already-trained
personnel, already-acquired means, already-tested trafficking routes, al-
ready-developed corruption networks, and already-existing contacts in dif-
ferent countries of the world, will move into new illicit markets (adding new
activities to the ones in which it already specialises).
Examples of these horizontal interdependencies are readily available. One
thinks, for example, of the connections established between drug trafficking
and alien smuggling operations by the Albanian groups which transport both
nationals and drugs across the Adriatic Sea. The same applies to the organised
crime groups of Asiatic origin which move illegal immigrants across the
Canada-US border, utilising the routes, means and methods already devel-
oped for the smuggling of cigarettes. Generally speaking, when activities of
this kind involve diverse forms of trafficking (in drugs, arms, humans, toxic
waste, stolen vehicles), it is not difficult for criminals to shift from one form
to another, exploiting the knowledge that they have already acquired.
A further example of this kind of horizontal interconnection is provided
by the operations of Turkish organised crime groups, which use the wide
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network of corruption created while conducting their classic illegal activities
(drug trafficking, protection, prostitution, the sale of false documents) to
undertake their relatively new activity of alien trafficking from Eastern and
Central Asia to Western Europe.
The trend described here warrants closer attention in terms of policy. In
order to maximise the risk to criminals, criminal law and law enforcement
should concentrate on the interdependencies among crimes and among
activities, rather than considering them from a single perspective. As regards
the vertical interdependence among crimes in particular, special and stiffer
penalties should be introduced for criminals involved in a series of logisti-
cally and organisationally inter-linked criminal offences aimed at the com-
mission of a final crime.
1.4 The money from organised crime
Monetary profit is the fulcrum of all the choices and conduct of organised
criminal groups. It drives the development of numerous activities and of
numerous organisational aspects of criminal syndicates. Analysis of organ-
ised crime requires explanation of how it operates in relation to profit-making
and the re-investment of profits in existing criminal markets.
A criminal organisation conducts its activities in the criminal market in a
similar manner to a legitimate enterprise in the legal one: indeed, criminal
groups are frequently compared to legal businesses. Both seek to earn profits
by selling the goods and services that they produce, and both use their profits
to pay the people who work for them. They invest their money by purchasing
new technologies or machinery, by taking on new personnel, and/or by
enhancing their human resources in order to improve productivity. Both of
them diversify their investments among different fields in order to increase
profits, and they seek to expand into new markets: new geographical markets
(the large multinationals, for example) or new product markets (offering new
products or new goods to which they can easily convert without undertaking
major structural change). In pursuing these aims, both occasionally forge
alliances with other enterprises.
However, criminal and legal enterprises differ substantially in terms of
their opportunities and risks. Criminal enterprises are able to offer illegal
services and goods, and they can use violence, intimidation and corruption.
Corruption is an especially useful means available to criminal organisations,
and it is used world-wide to infiltrate the legal systems of countries and to
increase opportunities to obtain wealth and power. Various European groups
can be cited (with the recent phenomenon of the corruption of European
Union officials) as examples of criminal groups involved in the massive use
of corruption, together with the Turkish Mafia, the Nigerian cartels, Indian
criminal organisations, Yakuza groups and Triads. Moreover, criminal enter-
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prises are also able to distort competition when they infiltrate the legitimate
economy, given that they can rely on dirty money to re-capitalise their legal
entities with criminal proceeds. Legal enterprises borrow capital by paying
an official interest rate, but this is not paid by enterprises able to use criminal
profits to meet their needs for liquidity and capital.
Of course criminal enterprises incur greater risks compared with legal
businesses: the fact that they behave unlawfully exposes them to the danger
of losing their members and capital, as a result of action by law enforcement
authorities and judicial power. In exchange for their wide-ranging power of
action, they must run the risk of being dismantled by the authorities of various
countries.
These criminal enterprises engage in two basic forms of crime in order to
earn profits. One is crime in which an exchange takes place between money,
on the one hand, and goods and services on the other. This is the case of goods
like drugs, arms, stolen cars, waste or nuclear materials, and services like
prostitution or the transportation to industrialised countries of illegal aliens
(with the help of fake documents or corrupted officials), who are then placed
on the illicit market. The second form of crime is characterised by the lack
of a transaction in favour of the exploitation of resources, as in the case of
fraud or computer crimes.
The former category of crimes is therefore characterised by the matching
of supply and demand. In providing the supply, criminals have become expert
in shaping the desires and needs of their potential clients. This is the case of
the extortion market, for example, in which money is obtained in exchange
for protection (although in practice the menace against which the client is
protected is the criminal organisation itself). It is also the case of alien
smuggling, where it is the criminal groups themselves who sometimes
deceive would-be migrants, offering them job opportunities and misleading
them as to the dangers involved in the journey. Furthermore, by relying on
the human resources provided by alien smuggling, organised crime can also
increase demand for foreign prostitutes (by offering prostitution at cheaper
prices) and increase the demand for children prostitutes (by advertising this
kind of prostitution as safer).
To make money from these crimes, transnational organised criminals
evaluate the different markets of the world, seeking to identify the sources
of products to be sold and the circuits in which to sell them. Since they are
transnational, they can also exploit both the criminal resources available in
a certain region (drugs, a demand for emigration, luxury cars, nuclear
materials, etc.) and the demand for illicit products in a different or richer
geographical area (drugs, foreign and child prostitution, arms, luxury cars,
etc.).
The development of new criminal markets in the world has involved two
regions in particular. One is the Golden Triangle in East Asia, the traditional
area of opium production today of increasing importance due to its contiguity
to China and the flourishing activity of alien smuggling. The other is the large
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area comprising the former Soviet Union and the other Eastern European
countries. The collapse of the communist regimes in these countries, and
their difficult transition to democracy and a market economy, have provided
native and foreign criminals with substantial opportunities for gain. The
African continent, although not a leading area of criminal exploitation, also
shows signs of burgeoning organised crime. Increased fraud and corruption
has been noted in Southern and Eastern Africa; and it is also apparent that
narcotics trafficking, arms smuggling, the theft and resale of commodities,
as well as other white-collar crimes, have generated considerable proceeds,
which are now being laundered. While the traditionally wealthy regions
(North America and Europe) are still the best markets for a wide variety of
illicit products, the above-mentioned countries are developing ever larger
markets for such traditional goods as drugs. At the same time, they are
helping to increase demand for new goods (stolen cars for example) or for
new services (illegal migration). Transit countries are contributing to the
multiplication of traditional illicit routes by supplying transit services (trans-
portation, fake documents, logistical support, etc.), diversifying them and
differentiating the means of transport and the customers to whom the service
is offered, and managing the distribution of the same goods within their
territory.
The second category of offences (those that cannot be described in terms
of supply and demand, such as fraud or computer crimes) are of increasing
interest to organised criminal rings, who commit numerous kinds of fraud:
against the financial interests of the European Union, for instance, or credit
card and insurance fraud, and others besides. Criminal gangs in Europe
especially, as well as Nigerian criminal organisations, and Russian and Asian
groups in North America, are increasingly involved in this criminal activity.
Linked to this behaviour, of course, is the mounting need of these organisa-
tions for professionals in their ranks, with the consequence that greater
professionalism  and greater complexity can be  identified as  the recent
developments manifest in organised crime. Organised criminals seemingly
turn to activities such as fraud in order to maximise opportunities and at the
same time minimise risks. They in fact choose a field of action in which
advantages in term of profits outweigh disadvantages  in terms of law
enforcement (the risk of being identified, arrested and sentenced and of
having their assets confiscated). Economic crime is generally difficult to
investigate, and it is often punished with with less severe penalties than those
applied to more classical organised crime offences. Therefore, generally
speaking, many changes in the activities of organised criminal groups, in the
geographical areas in which they decide to operate and in the connections
established among them, result from their constant reaction and adjustment
to opportunities for gain and to the likelihood of law enforcement.
It is evident that, besides personal ambitions and the benefits accruing to
individuals, the organisation itself requires money and power to carry out its
activities. The more complex the structure of a criminal group, the more it
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relies on its capital. Money, in fact, is one of the best means to establish
connections and to undertake internal and external transactions. As far as
internal relations are concerned, the more stable the group, the more loyal
are its members and affiliates, with the consequence that the organisation
itself represents the main, if not the only, source of revenue for its members.
In the field of external relations, money enables criminal groups to establish
connections with each other and with public officials and authorities. Crimi-
nal groups are able to corrupt public officials by enticing them with the
prospect of easy profits, or they forge alliances with other national criminal
organisations, using money as the link.
But money may be the ‘Achilles’heel’of a criminal organisation. It leaves
an evident trail behind it, so that it is sometimes possible for law enforcement
agencies to trace the movements of dirty money to reconstruct the criminal
group’s activities and identify its members. No one is willing to do business
with a criminal organisation if the money involved is not ‘clean’, at least
apparently (or formally). Since criminals want to utilise their profits without
difficulty (to buy other illicit goods or to invest in legitimate industries, etc.),
their money must be ‘laundered’to conceal its criminal origin. Consequently,
money-laundering activities have become an integral part of the criminal
cycle. In this regard, a recent trend should be stressed: criminal groups make
increasing use of the services provided by financial experts in their money
laundering schemes. Very often these professionals become affiliates of the
organisation, becoming progressively incorporated into its structure. Some-
times, as in the cases of Colombian Cartels or the Italian Mafia, criminal
enterprises  set up autonomous cells and charge  them with the task of
laundering criminal proceeds by developing new money laundering tech-
niques.
A specific and widely-used method to launder the proceeds of crime is
investment in licit activities (such as the construction business, the tourist
industry or the banking sector). Criminals increasingly use legal businesses
to diversify their investments and obtain legitimate incomes, but they also do
so in order to reduce the overall risk of detection and the seizure of their
capital. As a consequence, the traditional distinction between the illicit and
legitimate modus operandi of organised criminals is becoming less clear-cut,
with the result that the distinction between what is criminal and what is legal
also grows increasingly blurred.
Another reason why criminals infiltrate the licit economy is that they are
constantly in search of respectability. Organised criminals use infiltration into
the ‘upper world’ as a means to climb up the social ladder. The history of
criminal organisations shows that penetration into legitimate business is a
stage in the evolution of numerous criminal organisations, as evidenced by
past American experience and the current situation in the ex-Soviet Union
countries. In the latter, the criminal class is now gaining respectability by
extending its activities into legitimate businesses, and it will probably merge
with the ruling classes in the future.
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This penetration into the legitimate  economy is achieved principally
through the investment of illicit money in company shares. By purchasing a
limited corporation, the criminal investor gains personal legitimacy, as well
as a profitable and apparently reputable method of commingling licit and
illicit funds, without the direct use of financial institutions. Depending on
the surrounding economy or on the criminal culture, such penetration may
be accomplished by means of violence, extortion, usury, or other, more
sophisticated financial methods.
In conclusion, the aspects to be considered when devising policies against
organised crime can be summarised as follows:
– crimes like fraud, corruption and money laundering increasingly require
the services of economic and financial experts. Organised crime is turning
to these offences because it must find new and less risky criminal sectors,
utilise its capital and broaden the spectrum of its criminal activities;
– organised crime exists because it operates as an enterprise and because it
can count on the liquidity of its money and on the opportunities offered
by this liquidity;
– the increased use of economic concepts when speaking about criminal
organisations.
In conclusion, one may suggest the following guidelines for political action:
– when defining organised crime, its recently-acquired economic compo-
nents should be borne in mind. The concept of organised crime should be
extended to include not only the traditional types of organised crime but
also other forms of economic crime, because of the high level of organi-
sation required to commit them. Organised financial crime or organised
business crime are merely different names for the same phenomenon:
criminals commit crimes in order to earn profits, and in order to do so they
require a stable organisation. These forms of behaviour, therefore, should
be included in any broad concept of organised crime;
– following the recommendations of the 1994 Naples’ Conference on Or-
ganised Transnational Crime, policies designed to deprive organised
crime groups of their money are essential. It is better to seek to dismantle
the organisation as a whole by attacking its capital, rather than concen-
trating on its individual members or bosses.
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Across Borders
2.1 Introduction
2  Organised Crime Across Borders
This chapter describes the recent trends of illicit activities within organised
crime in various areas in the world and the changes in criminal groups which
operate at the international level. Market globalisation and the subsequent
abolishing of borders, together with the advantages offered by technological
innovations, have created opportunities for new profits for existing and
emerging criminal groups which have adapted themselves to the new needs
of the market. The demand for illegal goods and services has changed and in
turn resulted in an increase in the associated crimes such as trafficking in
migrants (and their exploitation in local criminal circuits for prostitution,
black market, theft, drug pushing, etc.), environmental offences, drug smug-
gling, money laundering activities, and trafficking in stolen vehicles.
At the same time, criminal groups have learned to exploit the loopholes
and legislative discrepancies present in some geographical areas and they
have spread into sectors where the risk of being arrested and heavily sen-
tenced is relatively low, especially compared to the attractive economic
return. A typical example of this trend is fraud in general and specifically
fraud against the financial interests of the European Union.
The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to provide an overview of this
transformation in various countries in the world, grouped by major geo-
graphical  areas  (North America, Central  and  South  America, Western
Europe, Eastern Europe, Africa and Gulf States, Asia, Oceania). The descrip-
tion starts from the main criminal activities carried out in each geographical
area, highlighting those national and transnational rings which are most
heavily involved. Therefore, attention is concentrated within each geographi-
cal area on those states in which organised crime groups present major
concern. As far as single groups are concerned, we have tried to illustrate
their characteristics and structuring and the way in which they spread on
national and transnational levels, penetrating new markets and exploiting the
loopholes existing in the legal and economic systems of many countries. This
is the reason why the organising device of this chapter varies from time to
time, moving from activities and groups to the states involved, taken as
examples rather than as an exhaustive list.
As said in section 1.1, the information relies on different sources that
should be continuously updated due to the frequent changes that take place
in the phenomena considered.
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2.2 Organised crime around the world
2.2.1 North America
Two countries, Canada and United States, belong to this region. Illegal drugs
remain a significant public policy issue in this area, particularly the high level
of violence associated with both drug distribution and use. While different in
the origin of organised crime, these two countries tend to present today
progressive similarities in the evolution of the organised crime - money
laundering cycle. The contiguous geographical position and the development
of their economies are inviting factors for organised criminal groups for
illegal activities and infiltration into legitimate industries.
Organised crime groups involved in a wide variety of illegal activities
throughout Canada and the United States are increasingly entering the
legitimate business world; business enterprises are used as bases for the
planning of illegal activity, the laundering of criminal proceeds and the
receiving of merchandise with illicit products hidden in it. There are several
highly structured organised criminal groups operating in both these countries.
The Cosa Nostra, involved in all ranges of criminal activity, including drug
trafficking, fraud, labour racketeering, money laundering, murder and cor-
ruption of public officials, no longer appears to be the dominant criminal
organisation since it has an old, rigid and monolithic structure that hardly
adapts to the flexibility of the market.1 In a rapidly changing criminal market,
old criminals disappear or change and are replaced by new ones, in order to
exploit the new crime opportunities and to resist attempts at repression.2
Although still dominant in some big cities of the United States and Eastern
Canada, Mafia power and influence is waning as a result of a combination
of factors such as the increased effectiveness of the criminal legislation
enacted in the past years, the increased number of convictions achieved, and
the change in the value patterns of those new generations of criminals that
have  replaced  the old ones  who have died or been eliminated by law
enforcement policies.
Colombian cocaine cartels, Jamaican Posses, Russian organised crime
groups and Chinese Triads all have a strong and growing presence in the
United States and are involved in large scale drug trafficking, money laun-
dering, smuggling people across the borders and loan sharking. Black and
Hispanic groups dominate criminal activity in their respective ethnic neigh-
bourhoods. Typically, they control much street-level drug dealing and some
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distribution activity above street level. They often interface with international
traffickers who control wholesaling and regional distribution.
Nigerian drug traffickers, considered an emerging organised crime group,
have made enormous inroads in setting up drug organisations.3 They are
structured into numerous small, semi-autonomous criminal groups whose
members live and work in the cell structure. Although these criminal groups
have established a reputation in the USA for significant credit card fraud,
they  also  play a major  role in  drug trafficking. Couriers travelling by
commercial airlines have been the principal means used by these organisa-
tions to move heroin from source countries to the USA. In the 1990s, Nigerian
drug traffickers further expanded their activities to include carrying South
American cocaine from Brazil to Europe via Lagos.
Further to organised crime groups, such as Colombian Cartels and Jamai-
can Posses, the main concern today in the North American region centres on
criminal groups originating from Russia and other Eastern European coun-
tries.  These  groups have quickly become  major underworld players in
Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver and, although they have been in Canada
less than a decade, they have such a widespread presence in the country that
they could threaten the stability of the economy.4 Russian crime syndicates
in this country are involved in contract killing, tax and health-care fraud,
alien smuggling, extortion, drug trafficking and money laundering: they
launder their profits through Canadian banks and set up businesses that act
as fronts for criminal operations.5 In August 1995, the United States Federal
authorities unsealed indictments that provide new evidence of the growing
power of Russian organised crime in the metropolitan regions.6 They are
organised,  structured, cohesive  groups of Russian  emigrants who have
banded together to commit very sophisticated crimes on a large financial
scale. The authorities revealed ties between Russian emigrant criminals and
the traditional Italian organised-crime families. Russian organised crime
activity in the USA has been identified in cases involving such criminal
activities as extortion, contract murders, prostitution, insurance and Medi-
caid fraud, counterfeit documents, tax evasion, credit card fraud, cellular
telephone cloning, money laundering, car theft and drug trafficking. Al-
though Russian organised groups are not currently major actors in the US
drug market, given these groups’ capabilities, resources and the experience
that many of them have with drugs in the former Soviet Union, it is highly
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probable that drug trafficking will become a growing part of their activity in
the USA.
Asian organised crime in Canada is flourishing in several metropolitan
areas; these criminal groups are involved in crimes that reach beyond the
Asian community, including such white-collar crimes as money laundering,
credit card fraud and counterfeit cheque schemes, as well as in illegal migrant
smuggling operations, and in sophisticated major theft rings. There are also
clear indications that Asian criminal organisations have established links
with various other criminal groups, including the Hells Angels and Italian,
Iranian, Nigerian, Lebanese and Aboriginal organised crime. Most of these
connections are established for the purpose of drug trafficking, tobacco
smuggling, credit card fraud and counterfeiting. In Canada and in the United
States there is also increasing evidence of the presence of the Japanese
Yakuza crime syndicate, the Triads, and gangs commonly associated with
the international expansion of Asian organised crime. The crimes they
perpetrate are similar to those of the traditional Mafia organisations, but there
is concern about the growing level of violence and corruption often associated
with Asian organised crime operations.7
The main Triad groups operating in Canada include the Kung Lok, 14K,
Sun Yee On, United Bamboo, and Wo Hop To. In addition to the Chi-
nese/Hong Kong gangs, Vietnamese gangs operate across Canada, employ-
ing a combination of intimidation and force. These gangs commit a vast array
of crimes, including extortion, illegal gambling and legalised gaming fraud,
smuggling (aliens, alcohol, and cigarettes), trafficking in cocaine and heroin,
prostitution, credit-card fraud, forgery8 and home invasions. The Japanese
Yakuza crime syndicates focus on narcotics smuggling, tourist scams and the
sex trade.
In Canada and in the United States Asian and Latin American organised
criminal groups play the most important part in alien smuggling. Until the
Canadian government drastically cut taxes in 1994, the illegal importation
of untaxed cigarettes was a booming business. With that source of revenue
now dwindling, smugglers have moved from tobacco to people.
Although the vast majority of illegal Chinese immigrants is still coming
by air, in August 1991 a new type of operation began to take shape. It involved
the use of Taiwanese ocean-going cargo ships and fishing vessels to smuggle
illegal Chinese immigrants to the USA.9 The following incident, which hit
the headlines and raised public concern in the United States, highlights this
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growing problem: in 1993 about 280 illegal Chinese immigrants, en route
from Thailand, were stranded on Rockaway Peninsula, near New York,
resulting in 10 people drowned and 16 seriously injured. Each passenger had
paid about US$ 30,000 for the journey.10 This method of alien smuggling
represents a diversification of the far-flung smuggling networks that for years
have brought small groups of Chinese labourers to the United States by air
through Canada and Central America. The current tide of smuggling illegal
Chinese immigrants is operated by crime syndicates. Their operation is
transnational in that smugglers have to hire recruiters, sailors, corrupt offi-
cials, drivers, document forgers, employment agents and gangs in mainland
China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and the United States. Law enforcement intelli-
gence believes that the 14K, Wo To Wo, Sun Yee On, Big Circle Boys and
United Bamboo are the primary suspect groups for these smuggling opera-
tions. Consequently, the smuggling of illegal Chinese immigrants by sea is
far more than an immigration issue. It is a manifestation of Asian organised
crime groups that are committing transnational crime in a very blatant way.11
Another growing problem in the North American area is the incidence of
criminal gang activity. Outlaw motorcycle groups have changed greatly in
recent years: not only have they begun to tap into the influence networks
controlled by Mafia organisations with which they affiliate, but they have
been building up their own contacts with the economic and social estab-
lishment. While initially gang members were used in secondary roles or as
hit-men for more sophisticated operations, they now carry out their own
complex organised crimes and operate in more equal partnership with other
criminal groups.12 Outlaw motorcycle gangs are the major recognisable
organised crime groups involved in large-scale methamphetamine and LSD
trafficking. These gangs are also increasingly involved in the lucrative
underground trade in precursor chemicals.
There are different outlaw motorcycle gangs also in Canada, of which the
Hell’s Angels are the most powerful and best organised. They are increas-
ingly controlling the import, distribution and sale of illicit drugs such as
cocaine and cannabis with the support of other outlaw motorcycle gangs
across the country. They also appear to be increasing their involvement in the
contraband trading of alcohol and tobacco.
In the United States, motorcycle gangs, such as the Hell’s Angels, have
also become well organised and engage in a wide variety of criminal activity,
sometimes developing into international suppliers. The 1994 Violent Crime
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Control Act created new provisions aimed at criminal street gangs, by
increasing the maximum prison sentence under certain circumstances by up
to 10 years, for gang-related federal drug or violent offences committed by
members of a criminal street gang. The Act defines a “criminal street gang”
as an “ongoing” group or association of five or more persons that has as one
of its primary purposes either (a) the commission of a federal drug offence
punishable by at least five years in jail, or (b) the commission of a federal
violent offence.
Of particular concern to law enforcement personnel is the level of organ-
ised Albanian activity within the United States. By the early to mid-1980s,
Albanians in cities and suburbs outside Detroit and New York were already
involved in crimes ranging from robbery to extortion. Indeed, by 1985,
Albanians were already gaining notoriety for their drug trafficking. This
activity became predominant along the so-called Balkan Route. American
Drug Enforcement Administration officials estimated that by 1985 between
25 and 40 per cent of the US heroin supply was taking this route - with
Albanian assistance. Ten years later, more organised, disciplined and out on
their own, Albanian crime gangs increased the scope of both their activities
and geographic locations within the United States.13
The USA and Canada also have a wide variety of structured indigenous
groups  involved in criminal activities such as smuggling of cigarettes,
alcohol, illegal aliens, guns, drug distribution, theft and fraud. Law enforce-
ment officials are particularly concerned about the links that have been
established between Asian criminals, traditional organised crime, and abo-
riginal criminal operations.14 Certain Native American communities near or
on the Canada-US border continue to be the major strongholds for contra-
band smuggling into Canada. The commodities involved include alcohol,
tobacco and firearms. In Western Canada, Native American street gangs are
becoming more prominent; they are gaining a foothold in prostitution, drugs,
and crimes against persons. The street gangs have strong connections with
Native Americans in the prison population and recruit many of their members
there.15
The proximity to the huge US market, the porousness of the US-Canadian
border, and the volume of legitimate financial flows have facilitated the
development of money laundering activities in Canada. Even without its
connection to the US market, Canada’s stable currency and government,
advanced financial system, free movement of funds, and democratic safe-
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guards on police powers combine to make the country an inviting interna-
tional money-laundering location. Many of the money-laundering operations
that have touched Canada have had an international component often origi-
nating in drug-trafficking activities. The assets resulting from those activities
move through banks as well as through investments in real estate, precious
metals, gold shops16, commodities, insurance, securities and foreign ex-
change. Currency exchange houses, particularly those located in cities along
the US border, are suspected of moving large amounts of drug money
between the two countries.17 Canadian banks are also attractive because of
their Caribbean branches; a common method of money laundering is to
deposit illicit proceeds in a Canadian bank and then transfer the funds to the
traditional tax haven countries in the Caribbean.18
Not only is the USA the world’s major consumer of illicit drugs, but its
financial systems, banks and non-banks, are used to launder narcotics profits.
Considering the money-laundering activities carried out in the USA, no
reliable figures on its amount can be delivered. The dimension is certainly
huge, owing to the wide range of illegal activities. Organised crime proceeds
range from transportation and distribution of illegal narcotics to racketeering,
illegal gambling, loan-sharking, extortion, corporate and bank fraud, embez-
zlement, prostitution, alien smuggling, and other serious organised criminal
activities which generate large amounts of cash. White-collar crime proceeds
come from illegal funds, insurance fraud, securities and commodities fraud,
telemarketing fraud, advance fee fraud, and other types of corporate fraud.
Individuals who launder money to and from the USA use a variety of
techniques to avoid detection by law enforcement. Criminals often hide
ill-gotten funds until they can smuggle the money to another destination.
Although hiding funds increases the risk of seizure by authorities, or theft
by other criminals, it also eliminates the need for a professional money
launderer, who charges a fee to assist in transferring the money through
legitimate financial institutions. This technique was evident in a New York
case where authorities seized millions of dollars in currency, as well as
business records, from an alleged furniture and appliances warehouse.19
Another method for laundering money involves structuring financial
transactions. An increasing use of non-bank financial systems, unevenly
regulated in the USA, especially as the placement stage for cash, has been
observed. These include a wide variety of exchange houses, such as: the
casas de cambio of Latin America, the Hui Kwan and Chop Houses of the
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Orient, and the Hundi and Hawala systems of the Orient, South Asia and the
Middle East. The non-bank systems  also include insurers, mortgagees,
trading companies, gold and precious metal dealers, check cashing services,
express delivery services and other money movers of varying degrees of
sophistication and capability.
Also, in order to confuse the efforts of law enforcement, money launderers
use the current system of wire transfers to create intricate and almost
untraceable series of financial transactions. The use of wire transfers is
probably the most important instrument used for layering illegal proceeds in
terms of both the volume of money that can be moved and the extent to which
transfers occur.
2.2.2 Central/South America
Central and South America are geographically similar but politically and
economically quite different. While some Central American countries are
among the most acknowledged centres for money laundering, some South
American countries are characterised by intense cocaine production and drug
trafficking problems. As a consequence of globalisation and unification of
markets, to the traditional drug destinations in Europe and North America
the more recent markets in the Middle East and Eastern Europe have been
added. Transhipment from Mercosur (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Para-
guay) to the new transhipment points in Africa (South Africa, Nigeria) has
been consolidated, and even destinations as far away as Australia and the Far
East have become increasingly common. Latin American cocaine is also
exchanged in the Middle East for heroin, which is sent back to the Latin
American kingpins who re-route it to the traditional destinations.20
Illegal migrant trafficking is a major international business in this region,
where some countries are mainly source countries and others transit ones.
The trafficking of migrants is basically controlled by international organised
criminal networks. Trafficking organisations operate with near impunity, as
alien smuggling is a crime only in few recipient countries and penalties are
minimal. In Central America, alien smugglers operate openly since only
Honduras and Panama have an anti-smuggling law.21 Trafficking in women
and children for the purpose of commercial and/or sexual exploitation is an
important and increasing phenomenon in Latin America, especially in the
Dominican Republic. Sources in this country state that they have the fourth
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highest number in the world of women working overseas in the sex trade,
after Thailand, Brazil and the Philippines.22 The main concentration of these
women is to be found in Austria, Curaçao, Germany, Greece, Haiti, Italy, The
Netherlands, Panama, Puerto Rico, Spain, Switzerland, Venezuela and the
West Indies. Central America is also increasingly used as a conduit for the
irregular movement of persons. Significant numbers of Central American
nationals contribute to migrant trafficking flows heading towards Mexico and
the United States.
Central and South America are melting pots for organisations such as the
Cartels, Italian and US Mafia, Lebanese and Nigerian syndicates and even
newcomers from Eastern Europe.23 Criminal organisations in this area vary
in size, scale and in the range of criminal activities. Although many of the
activities of organised crime groups remain the same, they have expanded
their area of operation and their levels of co-operation. The criminal activities
range from the production and sale of illegal drugs to support for terrorist
groups, smuggling of cars and people, engaging in financial and banking
fraud, smuggling of embargoed commodities, and laundering huge amounts
of illicit money. The organised crime groups operating in Central and South
America are characterised by enormous financial resources, international
links, and the use  of sophisticated international business techniques to
maintain their illicit operations. Indeed, some criminal organisation use
sophisticated marketing assessments to guide their operations and to study
trade patterns to facilitate smuggling. Many groups and the most capable
drug-trafficking organisations have fluid and decentralised structures to
allow them to adapt not only to rapid changes in the marketplace but also to
challenges posed either by competitors or governments.
The most important growth factor of organised crime in this area has been
the development of a global network for illegal drug trafficking that produces
extraordinary revenues. Money laundering is an important issue that touches
both Central and South America. It is due to the interlacing of different
components: proximity to the USA, the biggest market of cocaine consumers
and an attractive financial market, foreign debt and the use of dollars in South
America, weak governments  and the extensive poverty of many of its
countries. The narcotics trade generates enormous amounts of money which
have to be integrated into the formal economy through a complex web of
money laundering activities. Countries such as Colombia and Venezuela are
witnessing the wholesale displacement of legitimate businesses from sectors
of the economy such as construction, tourism and agriculture, because
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launderer-controlled companies are using their laundering commissions as
subsidies to undercut their competitors.
Another area of concern in Central and South America are the criminal
gangs of various kinds which have been appearing in Belize, Guatemala, El
Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama, differing in size,
degree of organisation, strategies, operating methods and extra-regional
connections in their criminal activities. In Costa Rica and Panama, they are
relatively better organised and use more sophisticated criminal methods; in
other countries they are organised more informally. The members gather for
the purpose of committing crimes such as swindles, confidence games,
assaults (often armed), property theft, extortion, sexual crime and even
murder. Some of these crimes are closely associated with drug use and
trafficking. Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama and
Nicaragua also report the presence of organised car theft rings operating both
locally and internationally. These gangs steal vehicles, dismantle them and
sell them in parts or use them for export, ransom, or insurance fraud. Vehicle
theft rings in these countries are associated with corrupt public officials who
lend services in falsifying documents and other information related to the
ownership of stolen vehicles.24
As regards the drug trade, Peru and Bolivia are considered the largest
producers of coca leaves, and much of this production is refined into
intermediate base paste, and flown clandestinely to Colombia for final
processing into cocaine.25 The powerful criminal organisations and their
laboratories are located in Colombia. This country, in fact, is strategically
located between the coca-producing nations and the routes through the
Caribbean and Central America that lead to the North American and Euro-
pean markets. Colombian organised crime has shown enormous flexibility
in entering new markets, forging critical alliances with other crime groups
and using sophisticated techniques to launder its money.26 The Colombian
cartels are vertically integrated global businesses, a structure that enhances
the criminal groups’ ability to create whole new markets for goods and
services. This can be done either by creating new products, like crack, which
revolutionised the USA cocaine market in the mid-1980s, or by opening up
new market areas, as the cocaine cartels have attempted to do in Europe,
establishing links to the Mafia and other European criminal organisations.
Colombian drug traffickers are increasingly using groups in Brazil, Ar-
gentina, Chile and Venezuela to tranship cocaine to Europe, though distribu-
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tion remains in the hands of European, principally Italian, organised crime.27
The cartels are also trying to expand their markets into Asia. They are
establishing links to major Asian heroin traffickers, sometimes exchanging
cocaine for heroin. Moreover, the Colombian cartels are exploring, on a large
scale in the Andes, the potential of growing opium in marketable quantities.
In addition to their efforts to develop ties with other criminal groups, the
cartels have also forged relationships with organised crime groups emerging
from terrorist organisations like the Sendero Luminoso in Peru and the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. The cartels receive armed pro-
tection, and the insurgents receive large sums of money with which to
underwrite their efforts, particularly to acquire arms.
Money laundering is a natural corollary of the cocaine  trade,28 and
Colombia continues to be one of the primary money-laundering concerns in
the Western hemisphere.29 A considerable portion of the funds and property
obtained from drug trafficking, including funds and property that belong to
criminal organisations based in Colombia, are located in countries other than
those which are traditionally considered to be “drug-producing” countries.
Although a substantial portion of such funds may be controlled from Colom-
bia, this does not necessarily imply their passage through the country or the
active participation of Colombian agents in the process.30
A recent Colombian police report stated that, with the successful impris-
onment of major cartel leaders in Colombia, the drug industry is moving to
Mexico, making it and Brazil the new Latin American drug centres.31
Organised crime in Mexico is dominated by four consolidating cartels which
have emerged from local gangs organised by the Colombian cartels to help
in their cocaine smuggling operations to the United States. The Mexican
gangs have grown so rich and powerful from such activity that they have
gained co-equal status with their Colombian sponsors. Mexico is also a major
source for marijuana and heroin available in the USA. In league with the
Chinese Triads, the Mexican cartels also smuggle large numbers of illegal
Chinese migrants into the USA.
In Mexico, the  drug trade  has become a local problem in terms of
addiction, corruption, organised crime, and other related socio-economic
problems, and the Mexican Government is using the military effectively in
the war on drugs. As a mid-transfer point for narcotics proceeds to Colombia,
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Mexico has become a major destination point for laundering proceeds from
narcotics sales by Mexican drug organisations. A great deal of currency is
also returned from the USA through Mexico, en route to South America.
Traffickers are reverting to bulk shipments of drug currency; having been
‘stung’ by enforcement officials though Operation Green Ice, they are more
fearful of being detected through improved US bank reporting requirements.
Large quantities of cash are secreted in tractor trailers or cars, often carrying
legitimate merchandise, which are driven across the Southwest border (some
bulk shipments are by air). Inside Mexico, cash is placed into the financial
system, or moved in bulk further to South America.
Once placed in Mexico’s financial system, drugs cash is being moved in
a variety of forms, including wire transfers and drafts drawn on Mexican
banks, payable through US correspondent accounts.32 Also, drug traffickers
move assets through foreign exchange houses, investments in real estate and
commercial ventures and transfers abroad. Colombian cartels are purchasing
businesses in  Mexico  in preparation  for the  trafficking and  laundering
opportunities that will develop under the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA). In Mexico traffickers also make specific use of currency
exchange houses, since the government does not regulate the casas de
cambio. These casas can only exchange one form of currency for another.
Another role in money laundering is to create a layer of anonymity between
the owner of the currency and the financial institutions where the casa has
an account; that account can be used to wire transfer funds. Illegal proceeds
are also invested in legitimate enterprises and the money laundering which
occurs can involve loans, letters of credit, offshore banking transactions and
other schemes.
Situated half-way between Colombia and the USA, Guatemala is a major
transit country for cocaine, as well as a producer of opium and marijuana.
Haiti remains a base for Colombian trafficking organisations and an increas-
ingly important transhipment point for South American cocaine to the United
States. Jamaica is both a major producer of marijuana and a flourishing
transhipment site for South American cocaine en route to the USA, the
Bahamas, Canada and Europe. Many major criminal organisation in Jamaica
also deal in cocaine, since it is more lucrative and easier to conceal.
Panama is a major narcotics money-laundering centre and a key transship-
ment point for narcotics flowing from South America.33 A dollar-based
economy, the Colon Free Zone (CFZ), weak controls on cash and commodity
imports/exports and lax incorporation regulations, make Panama particularly
vulnerable to the laundering of drug profits and to organised crime problems.
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Peru is the world’s largest producer of coca. The criminal organisations in
Peru typically act as regional subsidiaries of the Colombian Cartels and deal
directly with the growers, initiating the first stage of refining raw coca into
cocaine paste or base. Peru has also been considered as one of the money
laundering countries.34 Its unregulated ‘parallel’ or ‘black’ market provides
an exchange mechanism for tens of millions of drug and legitimate dollars.
Complicating the drug and money laundering picture in Peru is the violent
guerrilla organisation called Sendero Luminoso. Terrorists protect the drug
traffickers, negotiate between growers and drug traffickers for handsome
payments and use the proceeds to finance more terrorism.
Uruguay’s role in the international drug trade is that of a money-laundering
centre. It is an important financial centre within the South American area.
Economic stability, unrestricted currency exchange and strict bank secrecy
laws and tax advantages have made the country a haven for Argentine and
Brazilian investors. These conditions create the potential for large-scale
money laundering. The country’s location also makes it a natural transit point
for drugs transported between Argentina and Brazil as well as to the USA
and Europe.
Colombian criminal organisations use Venezuela to handle large quantities
of drugs destined for the USA and Europe. Venezuela is also a bridge for
essential chemicals used by the Cali drug mafia to process cocaine. Ven-
ezuela’s proximity to Colombia, a weak judiciary system and absence of
strong bank controls make Venezuela vulnerable to money laundering.35
Bolivia is a country in which the economic and political influence of the
cocaine industry is and has been indisputable, amounting to a large portion
of the entire economy and dwarfing other sectors. After Peru it remains the
second largest producer of coca leaf. The trend in recent years is towards the
emergence of larger, more powerful, and more violent local criminal organi-
sations, particularly in the eastern part of the country. Money laundering
arises from indigenous cocaine production and export by drug traffickers
who repatriate revenues from international trade. The Bolivian financial
system is not a significant factor in South American drug money launder-
ing.36 But Bolivia is a serious concern because money laundering, like
corruption, contraband smuggling, and drug trafficking, is widespread, and
there are few effective controls to prevent it. Bolivian traffickers launder drug
proceeds through the purchase of real estate and the operations of front
businesses.
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Argentina is a purchase zone for precursors needed for cocaine production
and it serves as a transit point from Bolivia to Europe and North America.
The country has witnessed the presence of criminal groups like Italian Mafia
heroin traffickers and Colombian and Bolivian cocaine dealers, and there
have been numerous documented cases of money laundering. Illegal funds
are mainly related to narcotics trafficking but some of them consist of illicit
funds from bribery, tax evasion, contraband and other criminal activities.
International cash transactions and the use of monetary instruments have
increased in correlation with the increase of money laundering. Colombian,
Italian, Bolivian and Argentine traffickers launder drug money through
banks, businesses, hotels and casinos; traffickers are also investing in office
buildings, shopping malls, hotels and condominiums. Argentina, Uruguay
and Chile are currently subject to the largest money laundering operations
in Latin America.
In Brazil, the marginal economy deals mostly with the proceedings of drug
trafficking, trafficking in children, gambling, and weapon smuggling. To-
gether with Mexico, the country is an important route for the export of
cocaine from Bolivian and Colombian producers to North American, Middle
Eastern or European markets. Colombian or Bolivian trafficking organisa-
tions control most of the drug shipments transiting the country. Sometimes
Brazilians are involved in the transactions. Brazil is quite often used as a
kind of refuge for Mafia bosses, who co-ordinate their illegal activities from
this country. During 1993, the Brazilian Federal Police identified a drug
syndicate comprising Nigerian nationals (headed by a US national) who were
regularly smuggling cocaine to Lagos, Nigeria. The drug was concealed
inside fish exports sent to West African countries under the name of a
fictitious fish export firm established in north-east Brazil.37
Although Chile does not produce cocaine, it is a transit country for South
American cocaine smuggled to world markets. The presence of money-laun-
dering specialists who represent the world-wide interests of the Medellin and
Cali cartels, other Colombian and Peruvian groups, and European arms and
heroin organisations suggests that Chile is becoming a more important
money laundering location. A main attraction for the drug mafias is the
possibility for money laundering provided by Chile’s liberal foreign invest-
ment laws. Chile’s robust economy is attracting drug dollars as well as
legitimate investment. Moreover, drug money is laundered not only in the
banking system but also through the booming construction and fishing
industries. Also, casas de cambio are reportedly laundering drug money from
Peru, Colombia and Bolivia. In the free-trade zone money laundering is
facilitated by the utilisation of bearer bonds, which can be bought in any sum.
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In view of its strategic location, Costa Rica has had for some time a
substantial presence of organised crime groups, such as the Colombian drug
traffickers. Not only drugs but bulk shipments of cash are known to transit
the country, and significant money-laundering activity has been revealed.
Some launderers smuggle funds into the country and convert them into Costa
Rican currency before depositing them in bank accounts.
2.2.3 Western Europe
Western European overview
Western Europe is characterised by the presence of Italian organised crime
groups not only in Italy but also in France and Germany, and sporadically
even in Austria and the United Kingdom, and by the development of “domes-
tic bilateral organisations” operating from country to country, for example
between Belgium or the United Kingdom and the Netherlands in order to
take advantage of the opportunities offered by drug price differences in these
countries. In other countries, specifically in France, the United Kingdom and
Spain, there are domestic organised groups (gangs).
Western Europe is also a cross-roads for other criminal groups operating
internationally. From the West, Colombian cartels are still mainly predomi-
nant in the importation of cocaine, helped by national criminal groups.
Galicians in Spain and the Mafia in Italy co-operate with the cartels to import
and distribute cocaine in the whole of Europe. From the South, Nigerian
groups are responsible for drug trafficking and also exercise their expertise
in fraud. Other groups from the Maghreb area are involved in the importation
of hashish. From the East, Chinese Triads have established stable commu-
nities in Spain, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Italy, Austria, Belgium
and Portugal. Their main activities in drug trafficking, alien smuggling, local
extortion, illegal gambling and prostitution rackets are interrelated. Turkish
and Pakistani groups control the trafficking of heroin from the Middle East
and Central Asia through former Yugoslavia or other Eastern countries.
Part of Europe’s modern criminal history is the threat of the progressive
expansion of organised groups from Eastern and Central Europe, mainly
from Russia. But to call these groups “Russian” means keeping an old label
for a new product. The process of criminal fragmentation that is happening
today in Russia, in other CIS republics and in the states of former Yugoslavia
should be closely watched, especially for its future implications for the
European geography of organised crime. Talks with national law enforce-
ment agencies in many European countries confirm that groups of Russian,
Polish, Czech, Rumanian and former Yugoslav origin are active in Spain,
Germany, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Austria, the United Kingdom,
the Netherlands and Sweden. Their main activities are drug trafficking, the
export of stolen cars, alien smuggling and prostitution.
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Organised crime development in Europe shows a progressive increase in
sea, air and land trafficking routes to Europe and onward routing from key
European points to outside countries. Spain and Italy are still the major entry
points for cocaine in Europe, along with Portugal. Spain may be considered
the natural bridgehead for drug traffickers entering Europe and its geographi-
cal location provides countless coastal landing sites.38 DEA estimates that
80% of all cocaine destined for Europe transits through Spain.39 Drugs,
dropped in plastic bags on the high seas from ships or planes, are collected
and brought ashore by  Galician  fishing boats  and  then distributed in
Europe.40 The Colombian cartels found a natural gateway in Spain for
importing their cocaine into all European countries. Another gateway used
by Colombians to import cocaine into Spain is Barajas airport, near Madrid;
Colombian traffickers stow the cocaine on fly weekly commercial airline
flights from Bogota to Madrid. As regards cocaine trafficking in Italy,
“Operation Cartagine” of March 1995 revealed that the business is mono-
polised by a well-structured Mafia organisation (‘Ndrangheta in this specific
case), working in collaboration with the Colombian cartels and with the
Italian-American Caruana family. The ‘Ndrangheta is believed to purchase
and sell a huge amount of cocaine throughout the entire country, without
competition from  other  criminal organisations. It operates at the same
hierarchical level and with the full co-operation of the Colombians. Law
enforcement officials observed that ‘Ndrangheta men may occupy leading
positions in the Colombian cartels.41 Some experts state that Colombian
Cartels also have links with the Sicilian Mafia42.
Portugal is also an important transit point for cocaine from South America,
heroin from Southwest Asia, and hashish from North Africa destined for
Western Europe.43 Portugal’s location and close linguistic and historic ties
with Brazil and the former Portuguese colonies in Africa facilitate the transit
of drugs and attract traffickers from those countries. Cocaine arrives by ship
from Brazil and transits Portugal on its way to the rest of Europe. The African
route (Angola, Mozambique and Cape Verde) is used as an alternative to the
Balkans for the transporting of heroin from Pakistan and Southwest Asia to
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Western and Northern Europe. Hashish enters by boat from Morocco and is
transported by lorry to Spain and Northern Europe.44 Much of the drug trade
is controlled by gangs based in Galicia, a region in Northwest Spain in which
a dialect similar to Portuguese is spoken. Close ties between Colombia’s
cocaine cartels and the Galician gangs have been reported by senior police
officials.45
Transhipment of heroin from Central Asian regions and Middle Eastern
countries, and of cocaine from South America, seems also to be conducted
by Nigerians through the main international airline points. Also, Turks and
Kurds are involved in heroin trafficking from production points to Germany
and the United Kingdom, passing through the Balkan routes and Greece.
Germany is a major drug-consumer country in Europe. Because of its central
geographical location and its major seaports and airports, Germany also
serves as a transit country for the flow of drugs from Asia, Central and South
America to Britain and Central Europe (heroin), Western Europe (marijuana)
and Eastern Europe (cocaine). Germany is not a major narcotics-producing
country, although there is small-scale production of amphetamines. Never-
theless, heroin represents the largest volume of illicit trafficking, usually
shipped to or through Germany from Southwest Asia via Turkey, Bulgaria,
Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania and Austria. Most of this
traffic is controlled by Turkish, Slav, North African and Italian groups, as
well as indigenous syndicates. On the other hand, cocaine smuggling is
controlled by Colombians, who recently have turned to Rostock and Ger-
many’s other Baltic ports as a route to the European market.46 Germany is
also a significant consumer of amphetamines produced in Poland and the
Netherlands, and of cannabis and opiates from Southwest and Central Asia.47
Due to consolidated interaction among Russian, Chinese and Vietnamese
gangs, Austria has become a transit country for heroin coming from the
Central Asian regions and for cocaine arriving via Central Europe and Russia.
In Southern Europe, Albania is being used, instead of the traditional transit
route through former Yugoslavia, for drug trafficking and, to some extent, for
smuggling aliens into Italy, a point of entry into Europe. France is a transit
route for hashish originating in South West Asia and North Africa. Ireland is
another entry point for sea-borne drugs (hashish from North Africa) destined
for the United Kingdom and continental countries.
Ports and airports in Europe are the main points of onward transmission
inside and outside Europe. Many cases reveal Nigerian criminals, especially
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active in this context, as importers of cocaine and heroin along routes
involving Lagos (Nigeria), London, Athens, Antwerp (Belgium) and other
main international airline destinations. They also act as exporters to the
United States (Chicago) and Canada (Toronto). Part of the heroin imported
by Nigerians and hashish from South West Asia and Northern Africa first
crosses France, and then is re-exported to other European and North Ameri-
can or Canadian markets. Also, opium enters through French borders and,
after being refined locally, is exported as pure heroin.
In the Netherlands, local networks are becoming one of the main producers
of synthetic drugs in Europe. From the Netherlands they are exported through
new routes leading away from the European Union; these routes are also used
for the trade in marijuana and hashish, which is still flourishing. Several
internal routes are designed to transport synthetic drugs produced in the
Netherlands and amphetamines produced in Poland to Sweden, Finland and
other European countries via Dutch, Belgian and Polish networks. Belgium
is a consumer market for synthetic drugs, and the trafficking is carried out
through co-operation between networks of Belgian and Dutch citizens.
Denmark is a popular transit point for drugs destined for the Nordic region.
It is also the largest foreign exchange dealer among the Nordic countries,
accounting for about 45 per cent of the turnover. South American cocaine
and Southwest Asian heroin traffickers use Denmark’s transportation system
to move their products to Scandinavia, Western Europe and the USA. Danish
officials are concerned that the use of narcotics is spreading from large urban
areas to small communities; they estimate that there are now approximately
10,000 addicts. Heroin and hashish are the drugs of choice, but the use of
cocaine and amphetamines is growing.48
The entry of Eastern European organised crime into Western Europe
The entry of Eastern European organised crime into the international market
has changed and increased the routes traditionally used. Russia, together with
the Baltic States, Finland, Sweden and other Eastern European regions are
becoming the new two-way-routes for illegal activities: drug trafficking and
illegal aliens smuggling from Southeast Asia to the West and car theft from
Germany, the UK and the Netherlands towards the Eastern countries and
Asia.
Two main migration routes lead through Poland. The Eastern route,
controlled by Russian organised crime, is used to transport Asians (mainly
Armenians, Indians and Afghans) and Africans (mostly Somalis, Algerians
and Nigerians). The Southern route is most often used by Balkan residents,
mainly Romanians. The Eastern route starts in Moscow, from where the
Asians and Africans take trains to Belarus and are then transported by car to
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the Polish border with Lithuania or to Ukraine, and finally into Western
Europe.
Police investigations confirm that in 1993 there were close contacts
between Finnish organised crime and the flow of Russian and Estonian
prostitutes into the country. According to the police, there are also suspected
links between the sex trade and the laundering of illicit money. Police warn
that the proceeds from this kind of organised crime may be used to help
establish Russian gangs in Finland.49
Smuggling of nuclear material, an alarming phenomenon that has touched
Germany, also involves Eastern European organised criminal groups. This
dangerous traffic has placed Germany in the front line. The government is
deeply concerned about the growing evidence that Germany is becoming the
main smuggling route for nuclear material from the former Soviet Union.50
Today the problem should be considered as another opportunity offered by
the network created by former agents of the STASI (the now-defunct East
German secret police) and their KGB colleagues.51
Beside Germany, Russian criminal organisations are active in the United
Kingdom. Russians come to the United Kingdom to invest in expensive
properties with suitcases full of cash. Britain is still the favourite destination
for Russian organised crime. This is partly because of the language: English
is overwhelmingly the second language of Eastern Europe, and Britain, with
its cheap airline connections, is seen by many visitors as a natural route for
America, and partly because Britons have a reputation for minding their own
business, unlike countries where nosy neighbours ask questions.52 Russian
criminal organisations bring to Britain some of the criminal activities, such
as prostitution, that they carry out in their own country. In Britain there is
concern that violence may seep in on the back of Russian businesses. There
have been frequent media reports of extortion. The extent of laundering in
the United Kingdom is disputed. There can be no doubt that the explosion of
commerce in Russia has created vast new wealth for entrepreneurs, legal and
illegal. But not much of this seems to be making its way to the United
Kingdom. There are perhaps 20,000 Russian businesses operating in Ger-
many but only a few dozen in the United Kingdom.53
Eastern European groups originate mainly from the former Soviet Union
and use the British banking system to launder the proceeds of their crimes.
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There have been examples of Russian criminals seeking to commit crimes in
the UK with forged and false documents and valuable instruments, with the
help  of certain  gangs which specialise  in counterfeiting. There is also
considerable evidence that Polish gangs are moving into the production of
amphetamines.
Also in the Greek part of Cyprus the problem seems to concern Russians
and other former Soviets, like the dozen people deported recently on suspi-
cion of extortion, and allegations of money laundering by Russian mobsters.
Russia, like Cyprus, has laws making it illegal to export capital without
permission from the competent authorities, the respective Central Banks. In
fact, the Russian Government has also warned the Central Bank of Cyprus
about the type of Russian creating business in Cyprus. It has claimed that
many have Mafia connections and although Cyprus is benefiting from their
money, their presence is not in the island’s best interest.54
Chinese organised crime in Western Europe
Alien smuggling is another very profitable activity organised crime groups
deal with in Europe. For example, Chinese human smuggling gangs have set
up a major base in Austria.55 Moreover, the Chinese Triads are an important
and growing foreign organised group operating in Spain. Madrid has a
thriving Chinese community that has become a breeding ground for organ-
ised crime gangs specialising in extortion. The authorities have outlined the
main areas of influence of these burgeoning gangs and have explained the
difficulties of combating them. There seem to be widespread Triad-based
activities, such as illegal immigration, near-slave labour, extortion, prostitu-
tion, drugs and gambling. According to the Spanish police large operations
are controlled by Triads and groups based on Triad organisations. Chinese
restaurants and businesses operating in Spain are subject to Triad extortion,
while food and imported goods stores are fronts for heroin smuggling. The
gangs also force restaurants to buy imported goods from them. In addition,
they run Asian-only underground casinos and prostitution rackets involving
young girls, many of whom are forced into the trade.56
In the United Kingdom the Chinese Triads have their bases in London,
Manchester, Hull and Glasgow. They make money from drug trafficking,
prostitution, credit card fraud, protection, extortion, illegal gambling, immi-
gration and, more recently, also counterfeiting, video piracy and money
laundering. To expand their interests in the UK, Triads use violence and
intimidation within Chinese communities. It is difficult to persuade wit-
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nesses to come forward because of brutal reprisals and intimidation. Accord-
ing to press sources, there would also be evidence that Chinese gangsters
have become involved in organised financial operations. Further to drug
trafficking, these operations have been characterised by a centralised organi-
sation capable of operating through a host of jurisdictions, often in sophis-
ticated financial products such as commodities futures contracts. Chinese
criminals have exploited Vietnamese ones and only a few Vietnamese have
risen to positions of any significance in the Triads. However, there are
indications that small groups of Vietnamese criminals are breaking away
from the Chinese-dominated gangs and either establishing themselves within
their own territories or operating on a “freelance” basis. The Vietnamese
gangs have international contacts and have established their credibility with
international heroin trafficking operations, in particular those based in the
Golden Triangle.57
EU Fraud
A relatively new, but quickly increasing, criminal activity in Europe is
represented by VAT frauds. This is one of the major concerns of the Belgian
authorities. Well-established organised crime  networks of Belgians and
Dutch citizens carry out extensive fraud scams against VAT and European
Union regulations. The network organisations consist of white-collar crimi-
nals and long-standing criminals with traditional backgrounds. They test new
market opportunities and elaborate existing ones like the oil market and the
hi-fi market. Immigrants who have settled in Belgium appear to take the
initiative in these markets: for instance, Pakistanis have done so with oil,
ex-Yugoslavians with hi-fis, and Italians with car import and export. In order
to improve these illicit traffics, the Italian minority in Wallonia maintains
strong Mafia relations with Italy.
Besides Belgium, the criminal activity of fraud against the European
Union is carried out for example in the Netherlands, France, Greece and,
most of all, Italy. As regards European Union fraud, there is an unclear
transition zone between the fraudulent entrepreneur who fiddles European
Union regulations in the margin of his enterprise and the organised fraudster
who can only run his company if he commits fraud. Organised European
Union-fraudsters operate more often than not on a cross-border crime basis.
While the organisational kernel is small, they need a large and experienced
network of co-operating fraudsters and legitimate entrepreneurs to carry out
their fraud schemes. Very often, organised European Union-fraud is only
feasible with the help of corrupt officials: documents have to be stamped,
subsidies have to be “smeared” and investigation must be prevented or
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delayed. Areas which generate a great deal of money are: mineral oil,
cigarettes, alcohol and home electronics. Phoney exports are made to North
Africa and Eastern Europe. It has recently become clear that Eastern Euro-
pean entrepreneurs are no longer only “receiving” documents and/or cheap
goods, but are themselves exploring the fraud options on the European
market. There is also evidence of investment fraud carried out by Canadian
organised fraudsters, operating out of Amsterdam and targeting victims in
the surrounding jurisdictions. The principal Canadian organisers can be
characterised as veterans, operating for years in several jurisdictions and in
connection with Canadian-Italian crime families.
Since 1 January 1993, the date on which customs barriers were eliminated
in the EU, in Italy too, criminals have increasingly utilised their capabilities
in VAT fraud, mainly involving livestock. Customs investigations have
shown that criminal organisations use false invoices to evade VAT on beef
imports from Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. The mechanism was
simple and exploited weak transitional legislation (in force until 31 Decem-
ber 1996) which allowed payment of VAT according to the amount declared
by the buyer, not according to customs controls at the border. The “triangu-
lation” method of false invoicing is relatively straightforward: the Italian
buyer uses a “cartiera” (shell company run by frontmen) which acts as
intermediary between the foreign company and the Italian one. The shell
company receives the documents regarding the purchase and issues an
invoice to sell the goods back to the Italian firm, without paying VAT. If
checks are made, the Italian firm can show documents regarding an internal
operation between it and the “cartiera”. These “cartiere” are born and die
very quickly in order to leave no trace behind.58 Fraud is not restricted to oil,
meat and agricultural products (even if these are still the main sources of
illicit income59) but also involves imports of every kind of goods and adopts
ever more sophisticated methods. It turns out, in fact, that a third of all
detected EU-fraud is committed in Italy. In monetary terms, the balance is
even worse: 67.5 per cent of the total sum is defrauded in Italy (ECU 79,49
million)60, especially in the regions of Sicily, Calabria, Apulia and Campania,
where there is a closer connection with organised crime.61
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Organised crime in Italy
Beside frauds, Italian criminal organisations are involved in a variety of illicit
activities, also because the Italian organised crime framework, known under
various definitions, is complex. In Italy, the term generally refers to the
Sicilian  Mafia  or Cosa Nostra, the Neapolitan Camorra, the Calabrian
‘Ndrangheta and the “Sacra Corona Unita” in Apulia. The most important of
these, however, is clearly the Cosa Nostra in Sicily. Its most important
criminal activities are, besides drug trafficking, illicit investments in the
building sector, the waste disposal business, counterfeiting and arms traffick-
ing.
The building sector has always been a privileged area for investment by
organised crime in Italy because it does not require advanced technology or
expertise, it can be used as a money-laundering mechanism (through the
payment of wages, purchases of machinery and materials), and it is consid-
erably instrumental to control of the territory in order to provide work and
to channel political consensus. Around 1988, criminal clans realised the
importance of waste disposal as an illegal business and moved into the sector,
creating a network of fictitious companies to channel bribes to the political
parties.62 The Sacra Corona Unita entered the business, collaborating when
necessary with Cosa Nostra, Camorra and ‘Ndrangheta.
Another new and profitable activity is counterfeiting, for which direct
links have been established with foreign criminal organisations, especially
Russian organised crime. The forging of documents is an activity which can
be both profitable and suitable for a wide range of purposes: false papers for
illegal immigrants, false bank documents, such as credit cards,63 certificates,
bonds, means of payment, and recently also US dollar banknotes. This is why
the Italian criminal organisations which control printing houses are either
forging dollars or, using a special chemical process, converting one-dollar
banknotes into 100-dollar ones. They then sell this cash to the Russian
organisations, which either spend it in Western countries or circulate it within
their domestic economic systems. In exchange for forged dollars, the Italian
organisations receive arms, chemicals for drug production and raw materials
to place on legal markets. Also very important is the production of counterfeit
goods, brands and fashion items, which are then exported to the new and
profitable markets in Eastern European countries.
The flourishing illegal arms trade in Italy is almost exclusively in the hands
of the Italian Mafia (specifically the ‘Ndrangheta), linked to its international
activity of economic and financial intermediation. Particularly dangerous
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arms (bazookas, automatic firearms and a wide range of explosives) have
come into the country from the arsenals of former Yugoslavia, imported with
the help and cover provided by import-export firms located in foreign
countries.64
Local organised crime groups in Western Europe
Besides more traditional organised criminal groups, there exist a number of
local organisations which represent a problem in a number of European
countries. According to the Danish police, motor cycle gangs in Denmark are
the exclusively Danish organised groups. These are mainly associated with
illegal drug trafficking and have international ties with parent or similar
organisations abroad. Their recognised fields of operation are: drug traffick-
ing, car theft and human smuggling.65 Similar patterns have been discerned
in Finland and Sweden.
In Ireland, Dublin’s criminal gangs are currently witnessing the emergence
of a new side to the IRA, determined to seize control of Ireland’s underworld.
The IRA must find new ways of raising money because many of its traditional
sources are drying up and, therefore, the West’s most feared paramilitary gang
is reinventing itself as a dominant criminal force. The new IRA’s most
significant success has been to team up with a north-side Dublin criminal
gang in the biggest robbery in Ireland’s history, the Brink’s-Mat heist in
Dublin, in January 1995. Falling revenues have also forced the IRA to
diversify. Since 1993, it has been off-loading drinking clubs under the
direction of one of the IRA’s Northern Command finance officers. The
pattern is simple: social clubs, ostensibly owned as friendly societies by their
members, are sold to businessmen in return for an over-the-counter payment
to the members and a larger under-the-counter payment to the IRA.66 The
IRA has also been involved in bank robberies in co-operation with Irish
American gangs in the United States, in illegal exports from America of
alcohol, tobacco and heavy arms equipment, and in smuggling illegal immi-
grants through Canada to the United States. The IRA is also responsible for
the widespread circulation and sale of counterfeit currency; American cus-
toms believe about US$ 25 million worth of bogus dollars are currently being
circulated by the IRA. The scope and reach of the IRA’s operations, built up
for  purposes  of  political subversion but now turning into a dangerous
criminal organisation, put it in an ideal position to move in at the top layer
of the Irish criminal underworld.
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The term ‘Yardies’ is used to describe drug dealers with links to the
Caribbean, in particular to Jamaica. They are based mainly in the United
Kingdom in South London, particularly Brixton, but also in Manchester,
Bristol, Birmingham, Leicester, Nottingham and Leeds. Yardies are distin-
guished by their readiness to use extreme violence and firearms. There is also
concern about their increasing use of witness intimidation. British criminal
groups also include the Bikers, including the Hell’s Angels, who are divided
into sub-gangs and are involved in firearms, drug trafficking, car theft and
extortion. Several gangs are believed to have set up legitimate businesses with
an underground banking system. The Hell’s Angels have joined forces with
Colombian cartels for cocaine trafficking. They have bought up a fleet of
merchant ships to import drugs from South America and use sophisticated
technology to recover consignments of drugs. There is evidence that these
gangs have opened numerous Swiss bank accounts and taken partial control
of the real estate sector.67
Money laundering in Western Europe
Money laundering is a very widespread illicit activity in Europe. All the
above-described criminal activities, in fact, generate huge amounts of illicit
proceeds which need to be laundered. In Western Europe there are a number
of offshore centres, such as Malta and the Isle of Man, and very important
international banking and financial centres like Luxembourg, Liechtenstein,
Switzerland, Germany and the United Kingdom. In addition, money laun-
dering can be found in other Western European countries.
Since 1988, in an attempt to develop the domestic economy, the govern-
ment of Malta has turned the country into an off-shore financial centre.68 As
a result, Malta has become an attractive haven for tax evasion and money-
laundering practices. Under the off-shore legislation, businesses with an
off-shore base in Malta pay only a five per cent tax on declared income; as
well as banking, off-shore brokering, general trading companies, holding
companies owning trading businesses and insurance are allowed. The Isle of
Man, a British Crown’s possession, but an independent territory with its own
independent Parliament, as well as its own fiscal system distinct from the
British one, is also becoming a leading off-shore centre. In fact, the island’s
main economic resource is its banks, exempt companies, trusts, insurance
companies, investment funds, etc. The Isle of Man is well placed for local
businessmen seeking to avoid UK financial regulations but who want to
operate in the European time zone.69
2 Organised Crime Across Borders 47
67 A. Levy and I. Burrell, “Hell’s Angels Flood Britain with Drugs”, in Sunday Times, 9
April 1995.
68 “Malta: The Newest Off-shore Banking Centre Has Learned from the Experience of
Others”, in Euromoney Supplement, 27 December 1988.
Luxembourg is one of the world’s most important international banking
and financial centres and, as such, risks attracting criminal organisations and
illicit assets. This risk increases with the country’s specific tax haven legis-
lation regulating the financial sector, consisting of strict bank secrecy laws,
absence of exchange controls, and lack of a withholding tax on interests.
Numerous international banks are located in Luxembourg, where they oper-
ate as “universal banks” pursuing an unrestricted range of activities. This may
provide a crucial channel for the transfer of illegal earnings from the country
of origin to another destination. Luxembourg’s attraction as a centre for
laundering suspect money has increased in recent years, following introduc-
tion of tougher measures against money laundering in neighbouring Switzer-
land.70
Liechtenstein is renowned as a haven for investors seeking to place their
money, often by funnelling it through companies set up in Liechtenstein
purely to escape tax authorities. In fact, funds deriving from tax evasion, drug
trafficking and other illicit activities are believed to pass through Liechten-
stein’s banks.
The German banking system is one of the largest in the world, and its
currency plays a fundamental role in international financial transactions.
Money laundering has increased rapidly in recent years, so that Germany is
now considered to be one of the most important money-laundering centres.71
Switzerland has no major domestic criminal organisation operating on its
territory, and criminals come mainly from outside. It is a typical transit
country in terms of criminal activities, and the same applies to money
laundering. In most of the money-laundering cases investigated in Switzer-
land, the crime producing the money to be laundered was committed abroad.
Switzerland is, however, an important drug-connecting point for flights
from Asia, the Middle East and Africa and attracts traffickers from those
regions. Most of the drugs transit the country to other European countries.
Swiss authorities believe that the distribution of heroin in Switzerland is
controlled by Lebanese or Kosovo Albanians who reside in the country
illegally or are seeking asylum.72 Money laundering involves proceeds from
all three major smuggled drugs (cocaine, heroin and cannabis), and illegal
earnings deriving from this traffic are converted in Switzerland. The largest
traffickers are generally not present in the country during these transactions.
Switzerland’s long-established laws on bank secrecy, and its role as leading
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world financial centre, make its banking system a significant target for
money-laundering operations. Nevertheless, Switzerland is regarded as more
important as a tax haven than as a money-laundering centre, since Swiss laws
do not allow legal assistance if tax evasion is the only alleged crime.73
Foreign criminal organisations are attracted by the size and sophistication
of the financial infrastructure in the United Kingdom, including the services
offered by financial havens such as the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man,
where they channel the proceeds of their activities using the offshore banking
facilities. In fact, as one of the world’s most important commercial and
financial centres, the United Kingdom attracts a high volume of currency
transactions, both licit and illicit, through British financial institutions.
2.2.4 Eastern Europe
In the international framework of organised crime, Central and Eastern
European criminal organisations raise an increasingly serious threat because
of their rapid expansion and the large amount of illicit proceeds that they
produce. Local criminal groups have reorganised themselves and are expand-
ing internationally, while foreign groups have started to infiltrate these
countries’ markets, although to differing extents from country to country.
These countries have undergone major political changes which have also
involved the reorganisation of economic systems into free markets. Both local
and foreign criminal organisations have benefited from the situation, using
the opportunities offered by economic systems to expand their traffic and to
invest their illicit proceeds in the financial system by corrupting political
figures and public officials.
Since the fall of communism, at the state level in some countries local
groups have managed rapidly to occupy key positions in the economy and
the administration. They have thus acquired monopoly over illicit activities
in the big cities and also initiated important processes of internationalisation,
crossing the borders of their respective national markets. At the same time,
these groups are either in competition or build strategic alliances with
foreign-organised criminal groups, who have extended their activities to
these countries and, above all, have started to invest large amounts of capital.
Trafficking in drugs, prostitution, art objects, stolen cars and arms are
forms of organised crime in which local and foreign groups, active in Eastern
Europe and in the Balkans, have traditionally been involved and which are
carried out at the international level. Beside these, new forms of organised
crime linked with the transition to a market economy have rapidly developed:
tax evasion, illicit activities in the privatisation process, infiltration of the
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legal economy by criminal elements, illicit traffic in migrants, extortion and,
last but not least, money laundering.
Drug trafficking poses two problems in this area which are different but
interrelated: the first concerns the creation of new traffic routes across the
region; the second concerns the production in some countries of psychotropic
and synthetic drugs and their international trafficking. Moreover, new routes
have grown up in the Eastern European states. Authorities have determined
the existence of a new channel through Romania and Hungary. One of the
major Balkan routes runs from Pakistan through Turkey and Bulgaria into
Western Europe; another passes from Nigeria to Malta before moving into
Central Europe. Both are the final sections of a network which ships drugs
from India, Nepal, Thailand and Laos.74
Heroin traffickers make use of Hungary’s modern road and rail transpor-
tation systems, as well as the Danube-Rhine canal system, on which river
barges from the Black Sea pass through Hungary, to move their illicit cargoes
westward. Seizures of cocaine also underscore Hungary’s role as an entry
point for drugs originating in Latin America. Turkish drug-trafficking groups
continue to spearhead smuggling operations through Hungary. In addition,
South American traffickers are making inroads into Hungary, and more
recently several Colombian cocaine couriers have been apprehended at the
Budapest international airport.75
Because of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, also Poland has to some extent
replaced the Balkans as a favourite route for heroin, hashish and other drugs
smuggled to the West. Not only a transit country, Poland is also becoming a
consumer and a producing country. Poland’s amphetamine industry consti-
tutes the most sophisticated indigenous narcotics enterprise in Europe. Con-
sidering the extremely high purity of the final product, it is obvious that
criminal groups use first-class laboratory equipment and highly qualified
chemists. Like successful trafficking organisations elsewhere, Polish am-
phetamine gangs are starting to invest in the legal economy. Moreover,
outside Poland, especially in Germany and the Scandinavian countries, they
operate through a network of Polish citizens who serve as critical links in the
wholesale trade.
This network can move any type of drug into Western markets: Central
Asian hashish, Afghan heroin, even Colombian cocaine. The Cali Cartel
recruits Polish couriers to smuggle cocaine across the Polish-German border.
For instance, in October 1991, Polish Customs at Warsaw Airport arrested a
Colombian nurse carrying 600 grams of cocaine in vials which she had
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swallowed. The cocaine was destined for further transhipment to the Neth-
erlands.76
The drug trade is also escalating in all three Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania. Organised criminal groups from this region are deepening
their involvement in the illicit drug trade and establishing closer links with
criminal organisations in the West and the former Soviet Republics. Open
borders and proximity to markets in Scandinavia offer trafficking networks
alternative routes to Western European heroin markets. Central Asian and
Russian crime groups have now begun to establish smuggling networks
through the region, and nascent money laundering operations are suspected
in all three countries.77 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have also been used in
the last few years as conduits for illegal migrants from Asia to Europe. Illegal
migrants pay several thousand dollars to be taken to the Baltic States and then
by ferry to, for example, Sweden.
Similarly, there is no doubt about the involvement of Belarusian criminal
organisations in human trafficking. In Belarus, illegal immigration is not only
a source of great concern, but is connected to both organised crime and drug
trafficking. Illegal immigration and most other forms of trafficking involve
inherently transnational networks. In the case of Belarus, many of these links
originate within the Soviet Union: with the disintegration of the Union and
the emergence of domestic linkages among independent states, they became
transnational overnight. Belarus has consequently become vulnerable to
penetration by transnational criminal organisations from Russia, the Cau-
casus and Central Asia. At the same time, there have been cases of groups
from Belarus active in Poland and Germany.
Beside drug and migrants trafficking, also the traffic in stolen cars organ-
ised by, among others, Russian and Ukrainian criminal groups is increasing
noticeably. In fact, Russia, the Baltic states and, to a lesser extent, Ukraine
rank as the most promising markets for stolen cars. Three main routes pass
through Eastern European countries. Through the Balkan route, stolen vehi-
cles are driven from West European countries towards the Middle East.
Otherwise, stolen cars are driven from Western European countries via
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to the CIS countries. The Northern
route, finally, brings cars by ferry from the Nordic states and Germany
directly or through Finland to the Baltic countries and Russia.78
The problem with foreign cars in Russia (including stolen ones) is that
they are usually stolen again, this time from the new owners to be sold once
again in the Republics of Central Asia or the Caucasus. Sometimes it is the
same syndicate that sold a stolen car to a Russian which steals it again and
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transports it further into the ex-Soviet hinterland. The market is thriving, as
expensive models are in high demand. Often cars are stolen ‘on order’: if the
future buyer is in a hurry, a stolen car may even be brought in by air. Virtually
all Russian dealers in foreign cars will only accept already-renovated cars
from abroad. In the case of stolen cars (as opposed to genuine second-hand
cars) the renovation takes place in Poland, the Baltic Republics and, on rarer
occasions, in the Czech Republic, Slovakia or Hungary.79
In Bulgaria, organised groups are corrupting customs officers and traffic
police authorities, and ‘legalise’ the cars stolen from Western countries with
forged documents. Three main channels have been uncovered: the ‘Vienna
channel’- that is, the importing of stolen cars from Germany, Italy and Austria
and their wholesaling to local car shops; the ‘Russian or Moldovian channel’
which exports stolen Bulgarian cars to the former Soviet Republics; and the
‘Macedonian channel’ which deals in stolen cars from Bulgaria and exports
them to Macedonia and Albania. Many car shops in Sofia have stickers in
their windows announcing that they are protected by a security or insurance
firm known to have underworld links. As a clear warning to rival gangs to
keep clear, this practice seems the safest option for many Bulgarians.
Within the framework of the growth and diversification of international
economic-financial crime, forgery of money and of other valuable documents
has increased alarmingly. “Some groups prefer literally to make their own
money: counterfeiting is one of the most pervasive crimes in Belarus, with
rarely a day going by without counterfeit money being discovered. The most
popular counterfeit notes are dollars, but German marks and Russian rubles
are also produced. There are also forged “superdollars” which are extremely
difficult to distinguish from authentic notes, but the majority of counterfeit
money consists of dollar bills to which one or more zeros are added by
specialist forgers, in some cases in Belarus itself”.80
The traffic in strategic materials and radioactive substances has prolifer-
ated since the break-up of the former Soviet Union and the simultaneous
relaxing of controls. In their search for buyers of these goods en route to
Germany, the United States or to some Islamic countries, such as Iran and
Libya, Russian criminal organisations have called in the support of Romanian
gangs.
Russian criminal organisations are alleged to be major exporters of crime,
as well as being extremely active within Russia. In a broad sense, organised
crime in Russia is a merger among criminal groups, Russian godfathers, state
officials, former Communist Party members and members of elite society.
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The levels of organisation of Russian crime are frequently described as three
circles. The first is characterised by street fighting and so-called ‘gangster-
ism’. At this level, there is relatively little organisation, although it would
seem that these groups account for a significant number of the estimated
8,000 organisations currently existing in Russia.81 The second circle consists
of better-organised groups which aim higher than street robberies and bur-
glaries, seeking money and power, and using corruption as a key device to
expand their operations to the regional and interregional level. It has been
estimated by the Russian police that such groups spend between 30% and
50% of their incomes on bribes for officials. The third circle is a network of
entrepreneurs in league with ex-members of the Communist Party elite and
with some corrupt state officials. In some cases, these entrepreneurs have
served time in prison or else began their criminal careers in gangs involved
in theft, robbery or extortion, and then advanced into the upper reaches of
criminal activity.
It is almost impossible to draw the line between the state and organised
crime. High-ranking regional government officials have requested the co-op-
eration of crime organisations in the transport of gold out of the country, in
one case 10 tons and in another more than 20. Some former and current state
officials (including military, security, militia and customs officials) collude
with the underworld in the smuggling of natural resources, raw materials,
and almost anything else besides. The range of activities carried out jointly
by criminal groups and corrupt state officials includes extortion, contract
murder, hostage-taking, kidnapping, prostitution, gambling, narcotics traf-
ficking, the smuggling of raw materials, natural resources and antiques,
bribery, car theft, the theft of and trade in weapons, bank fraud schemes and
many others.
According to Ministry of Interior officials, in addition to weapons and
narcotics, the most profitable areas of Russian organised criminal business
are:
1. financial, property and other types of frauds. About 30% of groups
specialise in this area. They ‘control’- as the Russians put it - over 40,000
businesses, including state enterprises (2000), associations (4000), co-
operatives (9000), small enterprises (7000), banks (407), exchanges (47),
markets (697);
2. violent crimes. So-called ‘gangsterism’ is most characteristic of the
groups with a lower degree of organisation. Groups in the former Soviet
Union have stable contacts with criminal entities in several countries
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including Germany, the United States, Poland, Hungary, China, Israel
and Austria.82
The Russian criminal organisations are also involved in the trafficking of
women. Even when they are not directly responsible for trafficking women
overseas,  Russian mafiya organisations may provide a krisha (roof) or
security and protection for the operations. According to Europol Drugs Unit
experts, in Russia and throughout the world such trafficking “is organised by
criminal groups who kidnap, imprison and force females into prostitution by
the use of, at times, extreme violence and intimidation”.83
The current stage of organised crime in Russia involves the consolidation
of the criminal underworld in the various regions of the country. The
so-called vory v zakone or “thieves professing the code” - leaders of the
underworld - are adapting to recent dramatic changes. There is massive
corruption of government officials, and criminal groups are developing
intelligence and counter-intelligence capabilities to neutralise all forms of
social control. The vory v zakone, frequently also translated as “thieves in
law”, occupy a position of authority and honour in the criminal hierarchy.
By tradition, vory v zakone scorn everything associated with “normal”
society. It is difficult to gauge their current status: on the one hand, the view
from Moscow is bleak; on the other, the criminal elite is apparently adapting
to the vast changes that the former Soviet Union has undergone.
According to Ministry of Interior sources, vory are making territorial gains
outside Moscow.  Traditionally, they  are  very  active in  the Krasnodar,
Khabarovsk and Primorsky territories, and also in the Rostov, Irkutsk, Amur
and Tiumen regions. In the past decade, the significant spread of vory v
zakone has been noted throughout Russia, particularly in the Far East, Siberia
and in the Ural Mountain region. In the 1990s, other regions are reported to
have fallen under the influence of vory: Pskov, Omsk, Smolensk, Buryatia
and others. Vory v zakone are beginning to operate internationally, either to
expand their activities or to seek refuge from the disintegrating order of the
criminal world of the former Soviet Union. Some fifty vory v zakone are said
to operate out of Vienna, from where they control a variety of activities back
in Russia.84
Open frontiers to Western Europe have influenced the development of all
criminal activities. Local criminal organisations have reorganised them-
selves in order to exploit the new situation and to become more internation-
ally competitive. The multiplication of investment opportunities has also
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favoured the penetration of foreign criminal groups. Due to the loopholes in
legislation and the inefficiency of law enforcement agencies, Eastern Europe
is ideal terrain for the expansion of all forms of trafficking by large interna-
tional criminal groups.
This is said to be the case of Romania, for example. An active role in
Romanian criminality is played by Turkish and Arab citizens, who are present
in the country in very large numbers, especially in the large urban areas.
Organised into criminal groups, they commit a vast range of crimes ranging
from theft, robbery and forgery to kidnapping, drug trafficking and murder.
They are known to be well-organised into criminal networks and are equipped
with sophisticated weaponry.
As regards ethnic groups, Chinese citizens are directly involved in Roma-
nian criminality and Mafia-type activities. Analysis of police criminal inves-
tigations which involved Chinese citizens as either perpetrators or victims
has shown that most of them come to Romania for illegal purposes and
personal interests, with their formally declared purposes (economic, com-
mercial, cultural, etc.) in fact representing only a minor part of their activities.
In order to hide their real intentions, most Chinese citizens set up commercial
societies and, after obtaining a permit of residence in Romania, withdraw the
capital deposited in the bank. In this way the company becomes a fictitious
one, and the share in foreign currency invested by the Chinese citizens in the
joint venture is insignificant.
Also Hungary has been targeted by foreign organised crime groups,
including Chinese Triad gangsters. The gangs mostly comprise ethnic Ro-
manians, Russians, Ukrainians and Serbs, but Hungary’s burgeoning Chinese
community is also beginning to develop its own criminal structure.
The country is particularly concerned about the activities of the Italian
Mafia, which is believed to have established an enormous base for illicit
funds in Austria while spreading its money-laundering operations through
the inexperienced and vulnerable Hungarian financial sector. In Italy and
Hungary the Mafia is also blamed for recent seizures of vastly increased
amounts of Asian heroin. It has recently diversified into numerous other areas
of operations including the trade in toxic wastes, property, precious stones
and metals, antiques and art, transport, construction and, significantly for
Hungary, financial holding companies.
Another criminal threat of even greater significance to the Slavic countries
as a whole, rather than just to Hungary and Austria, is Russian organised
crime, which comprises an estimated 5,700 individual groups. The main
areas of its business are drugs, prostitution, metals, weapons and nuclear
materials, money laundering, art and car theft, and the recruitment of
mercenaries.85
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With very few exceptions, all the countries in the region display worrying
levels of money laundering. The transition to a market economy has provided
criminals with ample opportunities to invest their illicit proceeds. While at
present there are numerous factors, including currency restrictions, lack of
confidence in the banking system or in economic conditions, actual or
potential turmoil and political instability, that combine to make laundering
rather difficult, the opening of frontiers to Western Europe and the privati-
sation process act as strong incentives for the investment of dirty money.
A first set of considerations regards the sectors of the legal economy used
for money laundering. From the banking sector to financial non-bank insti-
tutions, from privatised enterprises to the real estate market, these are all
potential targets for criminals.
Unlike in the European Union, where the directive on money laundering
contains specific provisions to protect the banking system, banks in Central
and Eastern Europe are still widely used for money laundering because of
loopholes and, in some cases, a lack of legislative provisions. This enables
vast quantities of black money to enter the new banking systems and then to
leave these countries, which makes them the ideal choice for the initial
depositing of illicit funds.
This is the case of Poland, where activities related to money laundering
take the external form of either legal financial transactions (e.g., banking
operations) or legal transactions which violate particular administrative
arrangements (e.g., safety standards in the banking system), or illegal opera-
tions forbidden by regulations and subject to economic and penal law
sanctions.
Banks are only one of the money-laundering mechanisms used. As already
mentioned, the whole of the East European financial system risks being
infiltrated by ill-gotten proceeds. In Bulgaria, for example, as the country
moves towards a market economy, not only are the ‘classic’ laundering
methods used, but huge amounts of money are also laundered through
participation in the privatised tourist industry, light industry and other prof-
itable branches, and through investment in ‘projects of exclusive necessity’.
This form of money laundering in part involves the sheltering of illicit gains
by the former nomenklatura (officials).86 Since 1994, there has been increas-
ing concern about the vulnerability of the poorly regulated financial system
to money laundering.
Organised criminal groups in one country establish alliances with other
groups abroad in order to create new methods for money laundering. For
example, the Ministry of the Interior of the Russian Federation (MVD)
reports that organised smuggling groups have set up branches in Russia to
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launder drug money. The authorities’ lack of control over joint ventures and
other private enterprises in Russia, as it moves toward a market economy,
hinders the Government’s ability to control such activity. The MVD’s lack
of money-tracing mechanisms compounds the problem. However, Russian
and foreign observers agree that drug money is only a small component of
the general money-laundering scenario. In addition to the proceeds from the
crimes listed above, there are stolen Party funds and profits from price-fixing
schemes, tax evasion, graft and corruption. The gross movement through licit
and illicit channels back to the West also includes private capital fleeing
Russia’s political and financial instability.
In Belarus, too, joint ventures provide a particularly attractive method for
money laundering, and they require careful supervision. Although law en-
forcement  agencies monitor joint ventures involving Italians and Latin
Americans, there is a clear need for greater professional expertise on money-
laundering matters, and for even closer scrutiny than these activities have
hitherto been subjected to.87
2.2.5 Africa and Gulf States
Northern Africa and Gulf States
Northern African countries have been grouped together with the Gulf States
because of their geographical position and their common denominator, which
is Islamic law. As regards organised crime activities, these nations are
especially concerned with drug-related problems, although some worries
have also been expressed in connection with money laundering, particularly
in Egypt, Bahrain, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
Algeria has relatively modest problems of drug consumption and traffick-
ing, although domestic consumption and the transit trade in cannabis and
pharmaceuticals appeared to be increasing until the border with Morocco was
closed. Cannabis seems to be the only narcotic cultivated or produced in
Algeria, and it is grown for domestic consumption.The Algerian Government
estimates that 95% of the narcotics brought into Algeria, primarily hashish
from Morocco, are re-exported to Europe or the Middle East.
Since 1994 Egypt has played an important role as a transit point for opium
and cannabis en route for other countries in the Middle East, Europe and the
United States. Egypt continues to serve as a significant transit point for heroin
from Southeast and Southwest Asia to Europe and the United States. Culti-
vation of cannabis and opium is a small but growing problem, and the
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Government of Egypt has been aggressive in eradicating suspected planta-
tions, while also beginning to address the transit problem in the Suez Canal.88
Iran is an important heroin supplier to the West. Historically, the country
has been a transhipment point for illicit opiates produced in Afghanistan and
Pakistan. The eight-year war with Iraq and recent efforts by the Iranian
Government have considerably, but not completely, disrupted this traffic.
Traditionally, traffickers brought drugs into Iran from the East and then
shipped them out again through the West into Turkey and other countries in
the Middle East. Iran is also a major transhipment point for illegal opiates,
primarily opium and morphine base moving from the Golden Crescent to
Turkey, where it is refined prior to its further distribution in Europe and the
USA. Iran also cultivates opium poppies. The US Government estimated in
1993 that 3,500 ha were given over to the cultivation of opium poppies, and
it also receives intermittent reports that drug-related corruption is endemic
among Iranian law enforcement and security personnel. According to these
reports, there is extensive bribing of border guards to allow drug caravans
through the reinforced border crossings. Arrested traffickers are sometimes
set free on payment of a bribe. Iran’s economic difficulties - particularly its
inflation rate of approximately 50% and an unemployment rate of more than
30% - are likely to contribute to corruption.
Jordan is mainly a transit country for drugs from the Lebanon to Egypt
and Saudi Arabia. The Jordanian authorities are concerned that the opening
of new border crossing points with Israel may make the country even more
attractive to international trafficking organisations.
Morocco is one of the world’s largest producers of cannabis, given that its
cultivation and sale is the main economic activity of a large portion of
Northern Morocco. Most Moroccan production is processed into hashish
resin or oil, and exported to Europe, Tunisia, and Algeria for consumption
or for re-export. Latin American cocaine and Asian heroin also enter the
country, both to service a small but growing domestic market, and for
transhipment to Europe. The drugs are trafficked along routes traditionally
used for the cannabis trade. Cocaine from South America is transhipped
across Morocco by air to Europe, primarily by Latin American and West
African couriers, or by sea from ports in Casablanca and Tangier. Some
cocaine enters Morocco from Europe, as payment in kind for exported
cannabis, and is sold domestically. Small amounts of heroin from Asia arrive
in Morocco for transhipment to Europe and, to a lesser extent, for domestic
distribution.89
The Moroccan hashish industry generates sufficient income to cause
governmental concern, and Spanish officials are allegedly concerned about
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the laundering of drug proceeds through the Spanish enclave of Ceuta.90 The
hashish-exporting networks repatriate their profits to Morocco in the form
of contraband goods and electronic equipment. Profits are banked or invested
in businesses and real estate in Northern Morocco. The volume of bank
deposits in cities like Tangiers and Nadour in the North are far greater than
any amount commensurate with the level of economic activity in the re-
gion.91
Some of the countries belonging to Northern Africa and the Gulf States,
namely Egypt, Bahrain, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, have money
laundering problems. In Egypt, money laundering is now perceived as a
serious issue particularly closely related to the illegal dealing in narcotics.
The most frequent money-laundering methods are possession of company
equity to operate illegal businesses such as hotels and car dealerships in which
dirty money is mixed with clean money and is therefore difficult to trace,
separate and define.92 The Persian Gulf State of Bahrain became quickly
aware of the danger of drug money from other financial centres, such as
Panama, being laundered in its very substantial financial and off-shore
banking industry. Interestingly, Bahrain at present hosts more than fifty
off-shore banks from different parts of the world. In fact, largely responsible
for such confidence in the stability of its financial system is strict adherence
to bank secrecy and confidentiality. Prior to the Iraqi invasion, Kuwait was
a major Middle Eastern financial centre with a significant potential for
money laundering. Banking activity and financial services were disrupted
by the invasion and occupation, but the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War
created  new opportunities for money laundering. Rapid repatriation of
capital, transfers of large sums for construction and other rebuilding activities
and the confusion and chaos following the war have resulted in regulation
less  stringent than in the other Gulf Co-operation Countries. Scandals
involving theft and fraud in the oil and banking industries have recently
surfaced, as have reports of corruption and vulnerability in the banking and
other sectors of the economy.93 Dubai, in the United Arab Emirates (UAE),
has a long tradition of gold dealing, an activity which is particularly suited
to smuggling and money laundering. The Emirates are also strategically
located for the clearance of proceeds from drug dealings with Southwest
Asia, given their open banking practices, free convertibility of currency, and
opportunities for smuggling gold or other valuables into the Indian subcon-
tinent. Of particular relevance are Dubai’s banks and gold markets, the latter
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being a traditional hub for gold smuggling. There is evidence that these gold
markets have laundered drug proceeds from various drug markets, including
India and Pakistan, and from other localities as far away as Australia. The
likelihood is that narcotics proceeds are also laundered through banks in the
United Arab Emirates; and it is a certainty that the underground hawala
system has been used to transmit drug proceeds.
Africa - the remaining countries
The criminal situation in Africa displays two principal features: first, the role
played by drug production and trafficking; second, the existence of unlawful
activities, such as diamond and emerald smuggling, firearms smuggling,
vehicle theft, fraud and commercial crime run by structured criminal organi-
sations (Nigerian gangs mainly, but also Namibian and South African ones)
which tend to operate transnationally.
Money laundering is not particularly prominent in this area. A number of
factors combine to reduce the incidence of money laundering on the African
continent. The relative poverty of many economies and populations leaves
little opportunity for the laundering of the proceeds from domestic crime.
Turbulent conditions or fear of turmoil in countries like Somalia or Algeria
have hampered the development of money-laundering centres. The factors
that elsewhere encourage money laundering - such as stable banking and
currency conditions and a tradition of governmental laissez-faire towards
foreign deposits - are lacking in many African countries. Consequently, only
a few of them have experience of this particular form of crime.
By contrast, drug-related activity is an extremely serious problem in the
majority of African nations because many of them are used as trafficking
routes, and some also produce drugs.
Botswana,  for example,  is  a transit country  primarily  for Mandrax
(methaqualone) shipped through East and Central Africa from India and
destined for South Africa. Botswana is not a major producer or consumer of
illegal drugs, although there is some local production and use of marijuana;
Mandrax is consumed in limited quantities.94
Cameroon is not a significant narcotics producing or consuming country,
although there has been an increase in Asian heroin smuggled to Nigeria via
Cameroon. The growth of drug trafficking in 1994 was a consequence of
worsening economic conditions, the devaluation of the CFA franc and a more
determined effort by traffickers in neighbouring Nigeria to take advantage of
relatively weak controls at Cameroon’s border posts and airports.
Cape Verde is not a significant narcotics producer or consumer country,
although it is a transit route for narcotics, particularly cocaine, shipped by
sea and air from Asia and South America to Europe and North America.
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The Ivory Coast is a transit point for heroin from Asia and cocaine from
South America bound for the North American and European markets. The
production of narcotics in Ivory Coast is confined to the cultivation of
low-grade cannabis. Abidjan serves as a regional hub for both international
airline travel and financial activity and is thus an attractive staging-post for
the transhipment of narcotics.
The only illicit drug produced and consumed in Ethiopia (where it is licit)
is qat, some of which is also exported to neighbouring countries. Addis
Abeba’s international airport is increasingly being used as a narcotics trans-
shipment point, primarily for heroin originating in India and Thailand and
destined for Europe and North America. Criminal sentences in Ethiopia for
trafficking offences are not severe and do little to deter drug couriers. A large
consignment of heroin (10 kgs) was seized at Addis Abeba’s Bole Interna-
tional Airport in 1994, and resulted in the arrest of several Nigerians and one
Ethiopian.95
Drug trafficking is also one of the most profitable criminal activities in
Ghana. Ghana’s role as a transit route for cocaine from Latin America and
heroin from Asia - both ultimately bound for the USA and Europe - has
increased in spite of intense efforts by the government in law enforcement
and public awareness raising. The government of Ghana also has acknowl-
edged the ongoing cultivation of marijuana and mounting drug consumption
in the country. It believes that, in addition to the long-established Nigerian-
Ghanaian organisations based in Accra, international groups headquartered
elsewhere are now operating in Ghana. The inauguration of direct flights to
the USA enhanced Accra’s appeal as a drug transit point. Counter-narcotics
agencies have also uncovered the growing use of international mail to
smuggle heroin from Thailand into Ghana. Cocaine seizures have decreased
markedly from their 1993 levels. Ghanaian counter-narcotics officials believe
that cocaine couriers now primarily employ swallowing methods rather than
external concealment, which makes detection more difficult. Cocaine couri-
ers are normally Ghanaian nationals who obtain the drugs in Rio de Janeiro
and travel to the Ivory Coast or Nigeria. They then return to Ghana overland
or by air. Both heroin and cocaine are transhipped to the USA or to the UK
and other parts of Europe. The majority of drug trafficking organisations
appear to be run by Nigerians who have formed small syndicates, with
Ghanaians serving as couriers.96
Kenya is another popular transit point for consignments of Southwest
Asian brown and Southeast Asian white heroin. Drugs typically enter the
country from India, Pakistan and Thailand. They are then picked up by
non-Kenyan African couriers and transported through Nigeria and other West
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African countries to Europe and the USA. Kenyan drug enforcement agen-
cies also report that cocaine from South American source-countries is bar-
tered for heroin in Kenya. Cocaine is then exported to Europe, while heroin
in shipped to the USA.97
The principal criminal activity in Mauritius is the trafficking of heroin
brought into the country from Bombay by couriers using commercial air-
lines. The volume of the traffic suggests that a significant portion of ship-
ments is for onward transport, although there is no real evidence to confirm
this belief. Good air and sea connections to Europe and South Africa, the
establishment of a free port, a growing off-shore banking industry, and the
large cash turnover of its successful tourist industry, all indicate that Mauri-
tius may develop into a major narcotics transhipment point and money-laun-
dering centre.
In recent years, Mozambique has grown into a significant transhipment
point for narcotics (primarily Mandrax and hashish, but also cocaine) des-
tined for the South African and European markets. The country’s drug trade
appears to be partly tied to regional arms trafficking and stolen vehicles
syndicates, and it is facilitated by Mozambique’s extensive transportation
links with neighbouring countries. Mozambique is not an important centre
for money laundering, but there is increasing concern that money laundering
and related financial crimes may become significant problems as a result of
these criminal activities.98 Local interdiction efforts are extremely weak
because of the undermining of the country’s counter-narcotics unit. Mari-
juana use is common among rural Mozambicans and it is often cultivated for
traditional medicinal purposes, not for exportation.
Senegal is an important transit point for heroin and cocaine, given its good
air and sea connections with Europe and North America, as well as its
worsening economic climate. The suspension of direct commercial flights
between Lagos and New York in 1993 increased the importance of Dakar as
a direct transit point for Nigerian criminal organisations smuggling Asian
heroin to the USA. Senegal is not a major drug-producing country. The only
drug crop cultivated is cannabis, sold mostly for local consumption. Nor is
there evidence that Senegal is a major money laundering centre. According
to the 1996 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, there have been
speculation that narcotics money has been invested in some of Senegal’s
coastal tourist resorts; this speculation, however, was not corroborated.
Sudan is neither a significant producer nor a consumer of illicit drugs, but
it is gaining increasing importance as a transhipment point for the interna-
tional drug trade. Sudan’s strategic location at the cross-roads of Africa,
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along with its 500 km of largely unpatrolled coastline on the Red Sea, offers
easy entry and exit for drug shipments.
Tanzania is strategically located on established and developing narcotics
trafficking routes. There is mounting concern about Tanzania’s apparently
increasing use as a transit point for Mandrax from India and other drugs such
as heroin and cocaine moving from the Asian subcontinent to South Africa.
Most narcotics enter the country from Pakistan or India via air or sea routes,
or overland from Kenya. Onward shipments are then frequently moved to
Zambia, Mozambique, Malawi and South Africa.99
Zimbabwe is not an export producer of illicit drugs, but its location and
relatively well-developed infrastructure make it a convenient drug transship-
ment point. Regionally-grown marijuana destined for Europe and South
Africa, as well as Mandrax from India and cocaine from South America,
cross  Zimbabwe’s borders and move through its airports in significant
quantities.100
Turning to the control of drug markets in the African continent, the power
of Nigerian criminal organisations, together with Namibian, South African
and Zambian groups, should not be minimised. These powerful criminal
organisations (especially the Nigerian ones) are also very active in other
criminal fields like the smuggling of goods, fraud, and vehicle thefts.
Nigerian criminal enterprises continue to expand their operations, not only
throughout the continent, and especially in West Africa, but also in North and
South America, Europe and Asia. In Africa, Nigerian traffickers use Ghana,
the Ivory Coast, Senegal and South Africa as springboards for the transport-
ing of heroin and cocaine to Europe and the United States.
Nigerian drug trafficking to Liberia and other West African countries
causes particular concern. Nigerian trafficking organisations control courier
networks which move heroin from Asia to the USA and Europe. Unlike past
courier systems, which moved drugs in bulk, Nigerians use large numbers of
small-scale smugglers, each carrying a tiny quantity of heroin, sometimes
packed in condoms and then swallowed.101
It may be helpful to list some of the countries in which Nigerians have
been found to carry on their trafficking activities. International investigations
have revealed that they use the following as transit conduits for heroin:
Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Caribbean Basin, Egypt,
Ethiopia, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India,
Indonesia, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Nepal,
The Netherlands, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Russia,
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Senegal, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, United
Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom.102
The loose-knit Nigerian smuggling organisations are connected by blood,
marriage and tribe; the most typical of them are headed by a ‘drug baron’ in
Nigeria with financial resources. The baron may ‘hire’ several couriers, who
then share in a percentage of the drug profits. Not only in their own country,
but also abroad (as in the United States), members of Nigerian trafficking
groups tend to operate in ‘cell’ structures. These cells are usually headed by
a “lieutenant”, supported by a “recruiter”, a “cell leader” and various “sol-
diers”.103
It has been estimated that there are around 500 small Nigerian organised
crime cells operating throughout the world: the geographical extension of
their criminal network enables them to commit a wide range of transnational
criminal activities. A medium cell consists of about ten to forty people and
there is great freedom in the movement of personnel and information from
one cell to another. The cells operating in various cities are in close contact
with each other and, unlike the Colombian Cartels or Italian organised crime
groups, they tend to avoid internal struggles and conflicts, thereby making
the efforts of law enforcement agencies more difficult.104
The primary point for drugs carried by Nigerians and entering the USA is
New York’s JFK Airport, although other airports are now being increasingly
used. A recently discovered route has involved flights from Lagos to the
United States, with an intermediate stopover in either Montreal or Toronto.
Likewise, drugs are increasingly transported by Nigerians departing from
Bangkok, Bombay, New Delhi or Lagos airports with stopovers in the United
Kingdom. The other most popular transit locations are Italy, Germany,
Switzerland and the Netherlands. Airports in Japan, South Korea and Eastern
Europe have also been utilised as transit points. Nigerian drug organisations
quickly adapt in response to increasingly vigorous international law enforce-
ment, finding new methods to evade detection, and altering and expanding
their heroin smuggling routes and markets.
Another significant trend has been the dramatic increase in transhipments
of cocaine by Nigerians to Europe and the United States. Traffickers import
South American cocaine, especially from Peru and Colombia, for re-export
to the USA and Europe and, to a lesser extent, for consumption in Nigeria.
According to Interpol, 80% of the cocaine transiting Africa in 1992 was
seized  in  three countries: Italy, Switzerland  and  the United Kingdom.
Nigerians buy cocaine in Bolivia or Colombia, and then transport it to Rio
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de Janeiro or Sao Paulo for shipment to Lagos, Nigeria, where the drug
trafficking organisations hire couriers to carry the drug to European destina-
tions.105 They also ship cannabis - the only illicit drug grown in Nigeria - to
Europe and other countries in West Africa. Although the Nigerian govern-
ment has sought to take action against narcotics trafficking and money
laundering, rampant corruption appears to facilitate both these activities.106
However, Nigerian criminal activities are not limited to drug trafficking
alone. Nigerian criminal organisations are closely involved in extortion and
large scale fraud involving credit cards, banks and commercial businesses.
Nigerians are particularly adept at obtaining false identity documents which
they use for student loan frauds, social service frauds and insurance frauds.107
As a consequence, financial institutions and many other businesses world-
wide lose hundreds of millions of dollars per year108.
For instance, in recent years, Nigerian criminal groups have exploited the
potential profits offered by advance fee frauds:109 the U.S. Secret Service
estimates that Nigerian advance fee letter schemes (mail fraud) cost Ameri-
cans $ 250 million a year.110 In these scams, foreign businessman or firms
are solicited by Nigerians (for claimed fiscal or other purposes) to deposit
large sums of money from Nigeria (usually from 10 to 30 million dollars) in
their personal bank accounts in exchange for a percentage of the total amount
transferred. In order to finalise the transfer the businessmen or the firms are
requested by the criminals to send a fee and/or other information relating to
their bank accounts and economic activities (like the company letter head or
credit card data). Once the Nigerian contact receives the fees or the informa-
tion, it vanishes and the information is usually used to obtain illegal gains
through further frauds.111
Nigerians are also very active in the production of fraudulent identity
cards, credit cards and other documents. This is largely confirmed by law
enforcement operations in which members of these organisations have been
arrested and the materials used to forge documents have been seized. More-
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over, Nigerian organised syndicates conduct bank frauds by obtaining bogus
identity cards and opening accounts at numerous different banks, which they
use for money laundering, for the depositing or writing of fraudulent cheques,
and the obtaining of cash advances on credit cards. Nigerians are also
developing credit card frauds on a global scale. Once they obtain the cards
(illegally forging or receiving them), they use them to purchase expensive
goods or to rent cars.112
Nigerians also utilise other West Africans, including Ghanaians, Gam-
bians, Kenyans, Malians, Senegalese, Tanzanians and Zairians, in their
criminal activities. They also have links with the Colombian Cartels and the
Jamaican Posses (in this case for the distribution of drugs and to inflict
violence on members who have lost favour with the organisation).113
Namibian criminal organisations are involved in two main activities:
drugs and diamond smuggling. Though not a drug producing country itself,
Namibia has started to be used as a transit route for Mandrax and cocaine
from Latin America and Asia smuggled via Angola to South Africa. The
smuggling of diamonds is one of the main sources of income for Namibians.
More than 60 per cent of the country’s diamond production is classified as
gem diamonds, which increases the attractiveness of the activity. The smug-
gled and stolen diamonds find their way to Europe, where they are sold to
diamond cutters and then pass into the legal market.114 Moreover, several
attempts at organised fraudulent scams, mainly originating in Nigeria, have
been discovered. A total of 14 cases of fraud involving organised crime
syndicates were investigated in 1996. Besides Namibians, citizens from
Nigeria, Tanzania, the United Kingdom and the USA were also involved.115
The theft and smuggling of motor vehicles has also developed into a highly
organised activity in Namibia, which is used as a transit route and a dumping
ground. As well as Namibians, South Africans, Tanzanians, Angolans and
Zambians have been arrested for this crime.116
In South Africa, criminal gangs engage in almost all forms of criminal
activities besides drug trafficking, such as vehicle theft, housebreaking,
prostitution, murder, robbery, extortion, fraud and commercial crime. The
extent of organised crime is accentuated by the fact that 481 organised crime
syndicates are currently known to be operating in or from within South
Africa. The vast majority of crime syndicates operate in or from within the
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Gauteng Province, and many of the organised crime syndicates in the country
operate internationally.117
The illegal drug trade has grown enormously in the past two decades. The
South African drug market is dominated by cannabis, Mandrax, cocaine,
heroin and LSD. Statistics compiled by the South African Narcotics Bureau
(SANAB) show a sharp rise in cocaine trafficking to South Africa. South
Africa is fast becoming a transit point and consumer market for cocaine from
South America, mainly due to the country’s accessibility by sea, land and air
routes and the demand for illicit drugs. Significant quantities of cocaine from
South America, particularly Brazil, transit Nigeria to South Africa. The
cocaine trade in the country, especially in the Gauteng, is largely dominated
by Nigerians operating from hotels in Johannesburg. It was reported in 1994
that the South African Narcotics Bureau arrested 14,278 people for drug-
smuggling, unlawful possession and dealing in drugs.118 Methaqualone, or
Mandrax as it is locally known, is largely a South African problem, since the
country is the world’s largest consumer of this substance.
South Africa is also undoubtedly the major source of stolen vehicles in
Africa. The South African Police have recently recovered vehicles originally
stolen in South Africa from as far afield as Cyprus, Greece, Portugal and
Australia.
A significant trend is the growing presence of Triads in the South African
criminal markets. The most prominent Triad societies currently operating in
South Africa are the Wo Shing Wo Group and the 14K. The Triads view South
Africa as the gateway to Africa for the expansion of their smuggling net-
works, and as an especially attractive market for drug trafficking. Other
organised crime activities pursued by the Triad societies are prostitution and
the smuggling of ivory, rhino-horn, diamonds, gold, abalone and sharkfin.
Triads are also involved in white-collar crime, fraud, tax evasion, money
laundering, forgery and the fraudulent use of credit cards. Triad society
members assist illegal aliens to obtain passports, identity documents and
visas. Lesotho is frequently used by Triad societies in South Africa as a
springboard for the entry of illegal aliens from Asian.119
In Zambia, apart from drug trafficking, the most lucrative activities by
organised crime groups are the theft of motor vehicles, firearms smuggling,
commercial poaching, bank frauds and money laundering. These are all
cross-border crimes which ramify through the Southern African region.
Motor vehicles stolen from Zambia find their way to Zimbabwe, Namibia,
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Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa and Zaire, and vice versa. Foreign
nationals living in Zambia, mostly Zairians, Zimbabweans and West Africans
are behind this illicit activity.120 Zambia has seen a proliferation of all types
of drugs. Whereas initially the country was only a transit point for illicit
narcotics shipments, principally Mandrax from the Asian subcontinent to
Botswana and South Africa, today most drugs are in fact for local consump-
tion: they include hashish, Mandrax, opium, heroin, cocaine, morphine
amphetamine and LSD. Some of these drugs are manufactured locally in
clandestine laboratories.121 With direct and indirect air routes to and from
South America, Asia and Europe, Zambia is strategically situated on estab-
lished and developing narcotics-trafficking routes. West African heroin traf-
fickers use Zambian documentation and couriers to ferry drugs to Europe and
North America. Cannabis is the only drug cultivated in Zambia. Money
laundering by regional traffickers, made easier by economic liberalisation, is
increasing as well.122 Zambia’s narcotics traffickers appear to be growing
bolder and are smuggling increasingly larger consignments. In April 1995,
Canadian drug officers impounded a record four tons of Zambian cannabis.
Two weeks later, a Korean national was arrested in the Zambian capital of
Lusaka on being found in possession of over four tons of cannabis, as well
as equipment to make heroin.123
Criminals in Zambia also engage in the illicit trade in emeralds. West
African nationals (the majority of whom are Senegalese and Malians) and
Zairean nationals have formed cartels which illegally sell precious stones in
Europe, South East Asia and North America.124 In recent years, Zambia has
experienced an increase in fraud cases, ranging from bank fraud to insurance,
credit cards and computer scams. The most common are bank frauds involv-
ing cheques and other bills of exchange.125
As already mentioned, money laundering is not perceived as a threat in the
African continent; nevertheless it is present as an important criminal activity
in Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria and Zambia.
Gambia’s location - with direct flights to three European capitals several
times weekly, together with its liberalisation of economic policies and the
continued existence of centrally planned economies in neighbouring coun-
tries - make it a potentially very attractive country for organisations or
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individuals engaged in money laundering. This results in a surprising volume
and variety of currencies traded on the informal “kerbside” market. This is
largely due to Gambia growth as a mercantile entrepreneurial centre for
trading, with no restrictions on foreign exchange. The most common practice
of money laundering in the sub-region involves company invoices (which the
purchasing companies use to justify the transfer or transportation of huge
sums of currency from their country into Gambia for onward transmission
overseas) and money transportation through ‘suitcase deals’ using couriers
who physically move cash to Gambia from Europe and the United States.
Prior to 1992, there was no evidence of significant money-laundering
activity in Ghana. Records seized in Colombia and investigations of the Cali
and Medellin Cartel have revealed cartel transactions in Ghana, and it is now
believed that non-bank financial institutions, e.g. exchange bureaux, in the
country provide money-laundering services, as do non-bank financial insti-
tutions run by Ghanaian nationals in North America, some of which are tied
to exchanges in Ghana. There is increasing evidence in the United States that
drug proceeds and the revenues from criminal activity are being laundered
through non-bank financial institutions controlled and operated by Ghana-
ians. Money laundering involves the proceeds from diamonds, gold and
narcotics.126
Kenya has long been considered a potential money-laundering centre
because of its well-developed international banking community and its role
as a transit point for Southwest and Southeast Asian heroin. There are
preliminary indications of currency flows and the presence of criminal
elements consistent with money laundering. United States Customs report
that Nigerian traffickers move money through international banks in Nairobi.
It has long been suspected that this activity is organised by Nigerian drug
traffickers moving funds through Kenya, possibly through the South Asian
hawala informal banking system. There are suggestions that the bulk of drug
money is laundered by overseas bank-account holders well connected with
the “political establishment.” Since 1989, the media have reported that some
gambling houses and hotels along Kenya’s Indian Ocean coast are being used
as hideouts by drug traffickers, although the authorities have denied these
reports.127
Mauritius established an off-shore financial centre in July 1992. As of
mid-May 1995, there were 2,379 licensed off-shore companies in the country,
including seven banks.
Nigeria has become the focus of global concern about the development of
money laundering in Africa. In the 1980s, numerous Nigerian nationals were
found to be acting as heroin couriers, while the Nigerian economy was
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sustained by oil revenues. As these revenue diminished in the late 1980s,
Nigerian organisations became major heroin traffickers on a global scale, as
well as highly successful practitioners of credit card swindles and other
frauds like advance fee schemes. As a consequence Nigerian banks prolifer-
ated. The proceeds from these criminal activities, particularly drug traffick-
ing by five major organisations, are believed to be laundered through bank
and commodity transactions conducted by Nigerian nationals. Although
there is occasional evidence of transactions involving non-Nigerian sources
of criminal revenues, such as the Colombian cartels, money-laundering
services seem to be furnished primarily for Nigerian nationals or in aid of
Nigerian drug traffickers. Nigerians use a variety of methods to launder
money, including bulk smuggling in refrigerators and other merchandise
which is later sold, wire transfers to Hong Kong and Thailand, couriers and
the purchase of “junk commodities” which are later sold at high prices.128
Relative to the size of the country’s economy, money laundering is an
increasing problem in Zambia as well. The Bank of Zambia and the Drug
Enforcement Commission consider money laundering to be rampant in the
banking industry. Economic liberalisation and the elimination of foreign
exchange controls have enabled traffickers to launder drug profits through
banks and exchange houses with comparative ease.129 In some cases, pro-
ceeds from Mandrax sales in South Africa are converted through the purchase
of luxury automobiles and manufactured goods, which are then imported into
Zambia and resold, often after bribes had been paid to reduce customs
duties.130 Drug traffickers from Zambia are apparently engaged in increasing
drug-money laundering by banks and exchange houses and through the
importing and resale of luxury and manufactured goods, partly driven by the
desire for scarce foreign exchange. Similarly, criminal syndicates which
organise the theft of motor vehicles and aggravated robberies intermingle the
proceeds with legitimate money in banks and other investment portfolios.
Numerous Zambian companies are in effect legal fronts for money launder-
ing. Most of them are trading companies like wholesalers, confectioners and
bakers, beer and liquor outlets, the public transport services and commercial
banks.131
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2.2.6 Asia
Middle-East
In Middle-East Asia the most serious and dangerous threats posed by
organised crime are connected with drug production and trafficking. The
countries in this area suffer from criminal drug-related problems, inasmuch
as they  constitute the  transit ring of an international trafficking chain,
although some of them are themselves drug producers. Turkey is the country
in the region with the most stable criminal organisations: Turkish groups do
not concentrate on drugs alone, but engage in other criminal activities as well.
In Israel the presence of Russian organised crime elements is becoming an
increasing menace. In particular criminal elements from CIS countries are
still using Israel for laundering their huge capitals. The police possesses
information that Jewish “sharks” from among immigrants from the former
Soviet Republic are actively operating in Israel under the guise of successful
businessmen.132
Some concern has been voiced concerning the Middle East peace process.
The open borders and improved regional trade relations resulting from the
process will probably increase drug trafficking through Israel. Since drug
cultivation and production are a problem in the countries surrounding Israel,
the country is a potential trafficking route, particularly from Lebanon, which
is a major transit country for hashish and heroin en route to Egypt. Israel
therefore lies on a drug transit route for heroin, which enters airports and
seaports from south-west Asia via Turkey, and from south-east Asia via
Europe, and then moves through Israel to Egypt.
Lebanon is a major hub for narcotics production and trafficking since it
has historically been a source country for opium-based drugs and hashish.
The country’s success in 1994, when it achieved a dramatic reduction in the
cultivation of both opium and cannabis, was offset by the continued process-
ing of imported narcotics.133
In Syria, too, the most profitable criminal activity is drug trafficking. The
country’s drug trafficking problems stem from its occupation of Lebanon’s
Bekaa Valley, where it still maintains a military presence but fails to enforce
anti-narcotics controls. Syria is a transit point and a refiner of heroin:
Lebanese-produced hashish and heroin destined for Europe and the USA,
transit the country, while morphine base and opium from Asia enter Syria
via Turkey on their way to processing laboratories in the Bekaa Valley.
Cocaine, heroin and hashish refined in Lebanon and Turkey transit Syria en
route to markets in the Persian Gulf region. Syria is an important transit point
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for narcotics flowing through the Middle East to Europe and, to a lesser
extent, the USA. Raw materials for the production and processing of heroin
and cocaine reportedly transit Syria on their way from Turkey to Lebanon.
Turkish criminal organisations are particularly active in drug trafficking.
There are three principal criminal organisations in Turkey with international
links. The most important of them is the Turkish Mafia (the “Babas” - Turkish
for “fathers”), a loose collection of gangsters originating from the area lying
to the east of the Black Sea port of Sarnsun. These gangs have established
themselves in Istanbul and other Western Turkish cities, and they maintain
links with Turkish immigrant communities in Germany and other Northern
European countries, including the Netherlands. Other groups active in the
country are the Iranian Mafia, which comprises thousands of Iranian immi-
grants and reportedly maintains links with the Iranian secret  service
SAVAMA, and the separatist Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), which in turn
has links with Turkish Kurdish immigrant communities in Germany, the
Netherlands and the UK.
The Babas and the Iranian Mafia obtain narcotics from the growing areas
in Southeast Turkey and also import them from Afghanistan (via Iran).
Narcotics from Afghanistan are transported across Iran and then, allegedly
with the assistance of Iranian revolutionary guards, proceed to the point at
which Turkey, Iraq and Iran meet. Here they are loaded into containers on
Turkish refrigerated International Road Transport (TIR) lorries and trans-
ferred to Istanbul. (Virtually all opium production in the Afyon area, Western
Turkey, has been used for legal medicinal purposes since the 1970s). Most
narcotics-smuggling between Turkey and Europe is carried out by the Babas,
although the PKK mounts its own operations.134
As well as controlling the Turkish drug markets, the Babas, the Iranian
Mafia and the PKK are active in prostitution, protection rackets, money-laun-
dering and the traffic in false documents. They are also prominent in the alien
smuggling market: they control a large proportion of the flow of immigrants
from Asia seeking to move westwards along the Balkan route. There are also
signs that a joint venture comprising Turkish, Pakistan and Greek criminal
organisations controls migrant flows of Asiatics, Kurds and Middle Eastern-
ers. The most dramatic recent development is the extension by Turkish
criminal groups of their influence into the legal system, after infiltrating parts
of the government, the customs authorities, the police and security forces.
The year 1997 is replete with examples of this trade, with hordes of migrants
(mainly Kurds) crowded by unscrupulous Turkish traffickers on to old and
dangerous boats as they try to reach the Italian coast. Recent events have
shown, in fact, that the organised crime groups mostly closely involved in
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human smuggling to Italy comprise Turks, Greeks, Kurds, Iraqis and Paki-
stanis.135
Turkey has also emerged as a major money-laundering country. Given the
country’s location as a cross-roads between Europe and Asia for the move-
ment of narcotics and drug trafficking proceeds, Turkey and Turkish traffick-
ers figure prominently in European drug trafficking. They control the bulk of
the European heroin trade, and millions of illicit drug dollars are conse-
quently spirited out of Europe into Turkey. Payments for shipments of heroin
to Europe enter Turkey on lorries and international buses, through under-
ground banking channels, or other methods. Funds are also deposited in
European banks and then wire-transferred to international accounts. Foreign
currency may be freely purchased by nationals, and foreign exchange ac-
counts may be opened.
South Asia
Criminal organisations engage in numerous illicit activities in South Asia.
Although the greatest concern centres on the trafficking and production of
drugs, there are criminal organisations throughout the Asian region involved
in other illicit activities such as gold and arms smuggling. Of particular
concern are the organised criminal groups that operate in India, given their
infiltration of the legal system by means of violence and, especially, corrup-
tion. Money laundering is widespread, but is especially rife in Nepal, Pakistan
and India.
As regards drug production and trafficking, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan
and Nepal in South Asia have important connections with Europe and the
USA via the Middle East (and Turkey). There is some cannabis cultivation
in Bangladesh, primarily for local consumption, and in recent years the
country has grown vulnerable to drug trafficking because of its close prox-
imity to the Golden Triangle and the drug-producing countries. The author-
ities fear an increase in the transhipment of narcotics from Myanmar and
India, and report the beginning of shipments from Pakistan and Afghanistan.
India is an important cross-roads for international narcotics trafficking. It
is located between the two main sources of illicitly-grown Asian opium, the
Golden Triangle and the Golden Crescent, and is itself the world’s largest
producer of licit opium. India is also a transit route for illicit narcotics from
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Myanmar, bound mainly for the European market.
Although Indian traffickers have effected large shipments of heroin directly
to the USA and Canada, the most dramatic recent increase has been in the
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trafficking of Indian-produced methaqualone to Southern and Eastern Af-
rica.136 Indian traffickers are developing  a drug  transit route through
China.137 Criminal organisations produce semi-refined heroin from both
diverted legal opium and illegally grown opium. Poppies are grown illicitly
in the Himalayan foothills of Kashmir and Uttar Pradesh, and in Northeast
India near the Bangladeshi and Burmese borders in the states of Manipur,
Mizoram, Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh.
Nepal is not yet a major drug transit country, although its 1,000 mile border
with India, as well as its proximity to Pakistan and Myanmar, make it an ideal
alternate route for illicit narcotics moving through Asia to Europe and the
USA. Southwest and Southeast Asian heroin is smuggled into Nepal across
the porous Indian border and through Katmandu’s international airport.
Pakistan is a significant producer and transit country for opiates and
cannabis products. Considerable amounts of Afghan opium, morphine base
and cannabis products are either processed in laboratories in Pakistan or
transhipped through the country. Pakistan is the second-largest source of
heroin after the south-east Golden Triangle. Its tribal border areas are the
main centres of production, and opium grown on both sides of the border is
used.138
In Afghanistan, payments for opium and heroin made in US dollars,
German marks or gold are used by traffickers and warring factions to
purchase weapons in Pakistan or Iran, or to buy commodities which are then
smuggled back into Afghanistan.139
The smuggling of commodities, especially gold, is widespread in Bangla-
desh because of the country’s geographical location and lack of natural
boundaries. The importing of gold into Bangladesh is subject to customs
restrictions, and increasing clandestine flows of gold are indicative of its
growing problem of money laundering. Moreover in Bangladesh, there is a
wide-spread child sex industry, aimed primarily at “the local population or
is associated with trafficking in girls. Human rights lawyers in Pakistan have
reported a considerable increase in the number of Bengali women being sold
into prostitution in Pakistan. Bangladeshi women and girls are also auctioned
for the sex industry or servile forms of marriage in India and the Middle East.
In the last 10 years, an estimated 200,000 women have been trafficked,
including girls as young as nine years of age”.140
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Particular attention should be paid to the situation in India. Organised
groups in the country have assumed transnational dimensions and are in-
volved in a wide range of criminal activities. There are two major syndicates
in the country. One of the largest and best-known organised crime syndicates
was until recently based in Bombay but now works out of Dubai. When in
Bombay, its operations extended to the states of Maharashtra and Gujarat. Its
‘army’ of dedicated killers does not hesitate to liquidate anyone setting
themselves up as a rival or questioning the authority of its leader.
The other major syndicate is “Dhanbad Mafia” which controls the work-
force in the country’s coal belt. It does so through loan sharking, since it holds
virtual monopoly over coal transport and all economic activity in and around
Dhanbad in the state of Bihar. This syndicate is notorious for its ruthlessness
in liquidating anyone deemed to be an enemy or an informer.
Apart from these two major syndicates, which wield enormous money and
political power, there are numerous other criminal organisations which
commit every type of trans-border crime, such as drug trafficking, the
smuggling of arms and ammunition and other contraband goods, port control
and dock thefts, gambling and loan sharking, import and export fraud
(customs fraud), money laundering, etc. The syndicates have their head-
quarters at Amritsar (Indo-Pakistan border-Punjab sector), Jaisalmer and
Barmer (Indo-Pakistan border-Rajasthan sector), Siliguri and Gorakhpur
(Indo-Nepal border), and Imphal and Aizawl (Indo-Myanmar border). Most
of the syndicates use India’s long coastline - particularly the west coast and
the southern part of the east coast - for the bulk of their illicit landings of
contraband, or for their shipments of drugs and other prohibited goods. The
majority of them have links not only with others involved in related criminal
activities (smugglers have links with drug traffickers and both have links with
money launderers) but also with criminal organisations operating in other
countries, such as Singapore, Hong Kong, the United Kingdom and the USA.
Another criminal activity now flourishing in India is the trafficking of
children for the sex trade. Women and children are transported from Nepal
and Bangladesh to the brothels of Bombay and Calcutta. Bangladeshi chil-
dren are taken through India en route to Pakistan. Children from one region
of India are trafficked into other countries. In February 1996, Bombay police
raided India’s largest brothel and rescued over 400 women and children: 218
of them had been brought from Nepal. The women and children were
detained by the police, who have since been unable to release them because
the governments of India and Nepal have refused to co-operate on the
matter.141
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In India a long-standing informal money-laundering network of great
sophistication, the ‘hawala’ system, is now being used for narcotics-related
financial transfers. The hawala is only one component of India’s underground
economy, which involves a broad range of consumer goods, foreign curren-
cies (particularly dollars), and gold. Throughout India and much of South
Asia the hawala or hundi systems rival the underground Chinese banking
system and are an integral part of a large underground economy which moves
money, gold, and consumer goods across the subcontinent.
Eastern Asia
From a criminal point of view, Eastern Asia is a highly complex region in
which every form of criminal behaviour associated with organised crime can
be found: drug production and trafficking, prostitution, gambling, fraud,
smuggling, trafficking in aliens with a view to their exploitation, and signifi-
cant levels of money laundering. This is mainly due to the presence of
well-established international organised rings throughout the region. Most of
these organisations are internationally notorious and raise severe problems
at the global level because of the transnational nature of their activities
(Chinese Triads and Japanese Yakuza are the best-known groups operating
in the sub-region).
As a consequence, the criminal menace in this geographical area relates
primarily to drug trafficking and production (Myanmar produces more opium
than any other nation in the world); secondly, and more in general, it relates
to all the activities of these powerful criminal groups, with their ability to
cross borders and pursue their operations in different regions of the world,
to contract alliances with other criminal groups, and to switch rapidly from
one criminal activity to another: and all this in an opportunistic criminal
endeavour to maximise opportunities and reduce risks to the minimum.
Almost all the Eastern Asian countries are involved in the illegal drugs
market. The People’s Republic of China is one transit route for heroin from
neighbouring Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam to the USA and other overseas
markets. Besides China’s geographical position, its transport and communi-
cation links consequent on economic development facilitate the movement
of narcotics together with legitimate goods. Myanmar is the origin of most
of the heroin that transits China.
Hong Kong is also an important transhipment centre for heroin from
Southeast Asia, although the volume of the drug passing through the country
may be diminishing. In contrast to this apparent decline in heroin movement,
there has been an increase in transhipments through Hong Kong of crystal
methamphetamine produced in China for sale in Japan, the Philippines and
the USA. The amount of heroin detected transiting Hong Kong for Taiwan,
Japan and the USA fell in 1994, and heroin arriving in Hong Kong is
increasingly intended for domestic consumption.
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Since 1989, Myanmar has become the world’s largest producer of opium
and heroin. Drug trafficking criminal organisations protected in ethnic en-
claves at the periphery of central government control are the main forces
behind the massive expansion in the Burmese drug trade. These armies,
consisting mainly of ethnic minorities, are controlled by Chinese or Sino-
Burmese drug traffickers, who use their private armies to protect heroin
refineries and drug caravans. By means of the political control exercised by
these large, standing drug armies, traffickers are able to oversee the produc-
tion of most of 1994 Myanmar’s estimated 2,030 metric tons of opium gum.
Essential chemicals used for the processing of this gum into heroin are
obtained from China, Thailand and India. The bulk of Myanmar’s opium and
heroin output leaves the Shan state through unmarked crossings on the porous
Chinese and Thai borders. Drug-trafficking ethnic groups like the Wa and
Kokang control most of this territory along the rugged frontiers with China
and northern Thailand. Trafficking routes from Northern Myanmar to the
Indian and Bangladeshi borders are used to a lesser extent to move heroin to
Western markets, but they serve as key channels of supply to the growing
addict populations of Bangladesh and Eastern India. They are also used for
the large-scale importing of Indian-produced acetic anhydride into Myan-
mar.142 As Myanmar produces more opium than any other nation, the
population’s economic reliance on narcotics production hinders its eradica-
tion.
Taiwan is not a producer of heroin, but it is a consumer of heroin and
methamphetamine. Though not produced in Taiwan, heroin is transhipped to
and through the country. Numerous smugglers have been arrested while
attempting to smuggle drugs into Taiwan concealed in a variety of products
and materials. Most of the heroin entering the country apparently arrives on
ships, concealed in a variety of products, including labelled canned goods,
machinery or lumber. Smuggled amphetamines usually enter the island on
fishing boats, many of which carry drugs from mainland China. The transit
of drugs through Taiwan principally involves heroin, although US informa-
tion indicates that amphetamines are also sent to Japan and the Philippines,
either from or via Taiwan.143
In East Asia, not only drug trafficking, but also alien smuggling, theft,
murder, extortion, credit card fraud, prostitution and illegal gambling are
dominated by the Triads and the Japanese Yakuza.
The Triads are based in Hong Kong, with outposts in Taiwan. However,
from these countries they have spread with little difficulty into China and
Japan, establishing links with local criminal groups. The Triads are highly
structured, but they do not direct crime from the top as do the vertically
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integrated cocaine cartels. Triads serve as criminal networks through which
their members organise various enterprises. Largely ethnically based, they
use rituals, oaths, secret ceremonies and incentives to ensure loyalty. Family
affiliation is important in the major Triads, while individual membership
provides credibility and influence.
As regards structure, there are three main types of Triad society in Hong
Kong: those operating on an unstructured, unilateral basis with no established
leadership or “parent” Triad to oversee their activities; those operating on
traditional lines with carefully assigned office-bearers; and those operating
according to new principles. The Triads using new methods pose the greatest
threat: they operate in more compact units than do their traditional counter-
parts, with a leader and a closely-knit central committee. Their business-like
methods reflect a new direction in Triad-related crime, that could also change
in relation to the present political changes that have taken place in Hong
Kong.
The Triads are opportunistic insofar as, unlike the Colombian cartels, they
engage in a broad range of crimes. Their presence causes particular concern
in China because Triad gangs slip easily in and out of the Chinese mainland
and form alliances with Chinese criminals. However, Triad activity on the
Chinese mainland has so far primarily focused on investments in legal
businesses, given their awareness of the stricter controls exercised by the
Chinese law enforcement agencies. The Triads, together with Chinese crimi-
nal groups, dominate the importing of heroin into the USA at both ends of
the pipeline. The smuggling of illegal Chinese aliens into the USA and
European nations has also grown into a lucrative business for international
Asian organised crime.144 With an annual turnover estimated at more than
3.5 billion US$ in 1994, human smuggling from China had become a priority
activity of many Chinese criminal organisations. Syndicates of Chinese
traffickers - often in collaboration with Russian, Middle Eastern and Euro-
pean gangs - have created a global network covering more than thirty
countries.145 The Triads in control of the Chinese criminal market “bring in
huge sums, exploiting the Chinese people’s despair and desire to make a
fortune abroad, thus creating a fertile ground for recruiting petty criminals
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and cheap labour force. It has been ascertained that Chinese criminal organi-
sations use illegal traffic of migrants as a means for introducing into a certain
territory people knowing from the start that in order to pay their transportation
they will have to commit all kinds of crimes for the organisation.”146
The Chinese local groups with which Triads establish contacts endeavour
to imitate feudal and overseas underworld societies by electing ring-leaders,
formulating domestic rules and regulations, and giving themselves such
exotic names as the ‘13 Taibac’, ‘9 Betrothed Brothers’, ‘Butterfly Gang’,
‘100 Birds Gang’. These criminal groups are usually composed of relatives,
friends or schoolmates. They dominate certain areas and commit crimes
consisting mainly of the misappropriation of property. They collude with and
manipulate local malefactors in such crimes as smuggling, trafficking in
drugs and firearms, theft, robbery, murder, extortion, fraud and illegal immi-
gration, thereby escalating crime rates, encouraging local organised crime,
and gravely compromising local social security.
Like the Triads, the Japanese Yakuza, too, has been involved in significant
criminal activities across national borders, including trafficking of metham-
phetamine into Hawaii and California and the smuggling of guns from the
USA into Japan. The Yakuza maintains a significant presence throughout
much of Southeast Asia, where Japanese criminals have became a major
organising force in the sexual slavery of women. The Philippines, for exam-
ple, have been used by the Yakuza as a base for production and smuggling of
amphetamines and hand guns.147 In addition, the Yakuza has moved into
gambling, fraud and money laundering. In Hawaii, Yakuza members have
been closely involved in the sex and drug trades, and they have also invested
heavily in real estate. The police and Yakuza gangs have for many years
maintained a “modus vivendi” whereby as long as the Yakuza confine serious
violence to their own ranks, and do not threaten civil order, their activities
are to some extent tolerated.
In Japan, the Yakuza - or the Boryokudan (violent ones) as it is also known
- has been much more visible than most other criminal organisations. There
are several major organisations internally to the Yakuza, the most important
of which is the Yamaguchi-gumi. The second largest gang is the Inagawa-kai,
while the third largest is the Smiyoshi-kai.148 The Yakuza has been riven by
internal warfare among its various branches, but this has not prevented it from
infiltrating legitimate business and extending corruption into the political
system.
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Recent evidence indicates that Japan’s organised crime syndicates are
branching out into the lower Yangtze river basin in Southern China, appar-
ently attracted by China’s booming economy. Using such legal fronts as
legitimate joint ventures, karaoke bars and hotels, they employ Chinese-
speaking Triad members from Taiwan to work with local criminals and seek
out bases for their operations149. Yakuza have also been implicated in the
smuggling of Chinese  workers into Japan  as  cheap  labour, and in the
enticement of women from mainland China, Taiwan and Southeast Asia to
work as prostitutes or bar hostesses in Japan. In April 1993, three members
of the largest Japanese gang, the Yamaguchi-gumi, were arrested in Ku-
mamoto Prefecture while attempting to smuggle 145 Chinese into Japan.150
Japanese organisations tend to establish close relationships with Korean
crime syndicates as well. Several groups in South Korea are linked, or are
trying to forge links, with Japanese gangs involved in drug trafficking and
smuggling. These gangs have opened clandestine gambling dens in Seoul to
attract Japanese tourists, who easily fall prey to fraudulent gambling swin-
dles. Korean methamphetamine manufacturers supply factions within Ja-
pan’s organised crime syndicates. It is believed that a significant portion of
this multi-billion dollar trade returns to South Korea, which is also a major
supplier to the methamphetamine markets in Hawaii and on the West Coast
of the USA. Nevertheless, although the techniques of Korean criminals are
becoming more sophisticated, brutal and mobile, organised crime in South
Korea is still in its infancy.
There have been increasingly frequent but largely unconfirmed reports of
collaboration between the “boryokudan” and the cocaine cartels. The South
American cocaine cartels have established a presence in Japan as they try to
expand their markets into the Far East. In 1994, several suspected narcotics
traffickers from Third World countries, including a member of Colombia’s
Cali cartel, visited Japan. In the same year, Nigerian traffickers were discov-
ered using Osaka and Okinawa as points for transhipment of heroin, indicat-
ing that Japan may become a more frequently used transit point for narcotics
shipments. There are continuing reports of Thai and Chinese nationals trying
to tranship heroin through Japan.151
A growing number of corporations, including the nation’s largest, are
beginning to stand up to the professional groups of extortionists that have
victimised them for decades. Before the passage of a 1982 amendment to
Japan’s  commercial law  banning  corporations from paying “protection
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money” to the sokaiya, there were an estimated 6,000 of these racketeers in
the country.152
The Japanese Yakuza is now emerging from the underground. Despite the
protracted economic downturn, Yakuza gangs are steadily expanding their
money-making activities into the corporate sector and boosting the number
of corporate crimes in the process, according to the Japanese National Police
Agency. To date, Yamaguchi-gumi has been the most commercially success-
ful of the Yakuza syndicates. Now that the government’s 1992 Violent Groups
Control Law has made it more difficult for Yakuza groups to operate in their
own names, crime bosses have strengthened their relations with sokaiya and
uyoku, right-wing extremists who sometimes extort money from companies
by threatening them with blackmail and harassment.153
US officials believe that a significant amount of money laundering -
including drug money laundering - has been going on in Japan for years. The
boryokudan have probably taken advantage of the wide-open Japanese
banking system. Furthermore they have penetrated the real estate market in
Seoul. US officials continue to believe that narcotics and other money
laundering in Japan is a more serious problem than is indicated by arrests or
prosecutions. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents estimate that
approximately 40 per cent of the income of the boryokudan organised crime
syndicates derives from drug trafficking, and the remainder from other
criminal activities.154
Besides Japan, money launderers also operate extensively in Myanmar
and Taiwan. In Myanmar, the free-market rate of exchange often rises to ten
times above the official standard. The parallel economy is the only viable
commercial system in the country, and given the political situation and the
instability of the kyat, neither legitimate businessmen nor traffickers wish to
hold kyats or use the banking system. In Taiwan, money laundering and other
financial crimes are believed to have increased in the wake of measures to
liberalise the country’s financial system. Tracking illicit proceeds is difficult,
because licit and illicit funds are intermingled in the underground financial
system, which is now sufficiently sophisticated to process large loans, and
even trades in stock to an extent that rivals the official exchanges. The
underground economy is estimated at roughly 25 per cent of the legitimate
economy. Narcotics money-laundering in Taiwan is heroin related. Funds
entering Taiwan can be transferred from the official banking system to the
unofficial traditional remittance system, and vice versa. Money laundering
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takes place within both the official banking system and the non-bank financial
system. There are no legal exchange houses or non-banking financial insti-
tutions, although there are unlicensed or illegal exchange houses which
allegedly handle drug money from Hong Kong.
South East Asia
Considering that Laos and Thailand are two of the three countries forming
the Golden Triangle (the third one is Myanmar), the importance assumed by
drug criminal markets in South East Asia is obvious. Various criminal
organisations operate in this area, engaging in a wide variety of criminal acts,
of which extortion, illegal gambling, arm robbery and traffic, prostitution
and alien smuggling are the more common. In this context it is important to
underline two main trends taking place in the area: first, the continuing flow
of foreign criminal organisations entering and operating in the Eastern
Asiatic criminal markets (this is particularly evident in Philippines and
Thailand); second, the prominent role played by criminal Vietnamese organi-
sations.
Cambodia shares borders with Thailand, Laos and Vietnam, and lies near
the major trafficking routes for Southeast Asian heroin. Cannabis is cultivated
in Cambodia, primarily in areas near the Thai border and it is believed to
enter Thailand. Opium is believed to transit Cambodia from Laos to Thailand.
Small amounts of heroin are known to transit Cambodia on their way to
Vietnam, Hong Kong, Australia and the USA.155
Indonesia is not a major narcotics processing country or a narcotics money
laundering centre, but it increasingly serves as a transit point for Southeast
Asian heroin, including transhipment to the USA. Marijuana is produced in
large quantities primarily for domestic consumption. Indonesia’s millions of
square miles of territorial sea and island waters include some of the world’s
busiest international straits and provide countless opportunities for the
smuggling of narcotics and other items. Indonesia’s maritime authorities lack
the resources to adequately interdict narcotics smuggling via sea. While
Indonesia has not been for a long time a major drug transit country, since
1994 an increase in cases of heroin smuggling has indicated that narcotics
traffickers from Thailand, Nepal, Myanmar and Nigeria would be increas-
ingly using Indonesia for the transhipment of heroin to the USA, in particular
to Los Angeles.156
Opium is produced in the ten northern provinces of Laos. It is grown
primarily by ethnic minority groups, who have always cultivated it by
tradition. There are indications that Laos is increasingly being used as a
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transit point for major criminal groups moving heroin from Myanmar to
Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam and China. There is no estimate of the extent
of trafficking through Vietnam, although officials of both countries believe
it occurs and grow increasingly concerned.157
Malaysia is a transit point for heroin from Myanmar and Thailand to
markets in the USA, Australia and Europe. Illicit heroin processing, heroin
trafficking, and a growing addict population continue to be serious problems.
However, no opium poppies are grown in Malaysia. Heroin smuggling into
the country is believed to be centred in Northwest Malaysia and across the
land border with Thailand. Increased controls along this land border have
resulted in more smuggling by sea. There is speculation that narcotics are
being shipped directly to Malaysia from Myanmar, but the evidence is scarce.
Marijuana, hashish, crystal methamphetamine and heroin are the main
illegal drugs in the Philippines. The Philippines are also Hong Kong’s chief
supplier of marijuana, and they have also become the second-largest mari-
juana grower, behind Mexico and ahead of Colombia: in 1994 the provinces
in the extreme North and South produced around 1,800 tons of the substance.
Most of the marijuana grown in the Philippines is exported to Australia and
Japan. Hashish is also produced for export to Europe, Australia, and Japan.
The Philippines are a transit point for heroin and crystal methamphetamine
bound for points in East Asia, the Pacific, Europe, and the USA. The transit
of heroin by couriers occurs at all Philippine international airports. In
addition to these drugs, the Philippine authorities have made several small
cocaine seizures over the last few years.158 The country, in fact, has become
a major transhipment point for cocaine originating in Colombia and Peru.
The international drug trade is also creating unlikely alliances in organised
crime, such as the trade among the 14K Triad, the Bamboo Union of Taiwan
(which moves drugs to South Korea and Japan), the military-dominated Big
Circle Boys (which run Southern China’s drug laboratories), and Japan’s
Yakuza (which also has great influence on Philippine organised crime).
According to the Narcotics Command Director, there are 36 drug syndicates,
with around 2,000 dealers, in the Philippines.159
Some of the local Philippine drug syndicates have connections with
international syndicates which use the country as a transit point for heroin
and cocaine moving from the Golden Triangle and the Golden Crescent to
the USA and Europe. The Chinese 14K and the United Bamboo Gang traffic
“shabu” from Mainland China and Taiwan. Latin America’s predominantly
cocaine trafficking syndicates have reportedly branched out into East and
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Southeast Asia, including the Philippines. As a source of cannabis, the
Philippines rank as the second-largest exporter in Southeast Asia.160
Drugs enter Singapore by land, air and sea, by courier and car, from
Myanmar, Thailand and Malaysia. Singapore has not yet been designated a
major drug transit country, although it is developing into a significant
transhipment point. There have been several cases in which heroin has been
placed in containers in Thailand and shipped to Singapore, where it is then
re-labelled ‘Product of Singapore’and given a new termination bill of lading.
Drugs transit Singapore en route to the USA, Europe, Australia and other
destinations.161
Although Thailand, together with Laos and Myanmar, is one of the Golden
Triangle countries, illicit opium cultivation is no longer a serious problem in
the country. However, owing to its relatively advanced economy and highly
developed infrastructure, Thailand remains a primary export transit route for
the bulk of the illicit drugs produced in the Golden Triangle. Road building
and other development projects in North Thailand have facilitated access to
Thailand’s transportation system for international trafficking organisations,
especially those with ties to producers in neighbouring Myanmar. Whilst
there has been an increase in the use of alternate routes (e.g. through China),
Thailand’s well established drug trafficking groups, with their contacts in
Hong Kong, Taiwan and China, and its superior transportation infrastructure
and international cargo-handling facilities - both sea and air - are factors that
will persuade the major traffickers to continue to use Thailand as their
principal transit route. These same roads have also enabled insurgent ethnic
groups in Myanmar (many of which are engaged in the drug trade) to import
commodities from Thailand and from the outside through Thailand. These
materials include the essential chemicals used in heroin processing.162 Thai-
land connects neighbouring countries with the international market for drugs.
Thai and Thai-Chinese financiers engage in trafficking from Laos and from
ethnic minority insurgent groups in Myanmar. Burmese insurgents finance
their resistance activities by producing and protecting narcotics. Relation-
ships between Thai military and civilian officials and these groups, formed
for security and economic reasons, foster production and trafficking, and
some of them have been involved in narcotics activities. Traffickers from
Western nations produce and market marijuana in Thailand, while Thai
producers cultivate cannabis and opium poppy domestically. Golden Trian-
gle opium is refined into morphine and heroin in Myanmar and trafficked
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through Thailand into the international market. Highway and rail systems
serve as conduits for drugs flowing from the Golden Triangle. Narcotics leave
by passenger and car aircraft, ocean-going transport vessels and fishing
trawlers, and in commercial vehicles bound for Malaysia.163
Scattered opium cultivation goes on throughout the northern provinces of
Vietnam, which too are being increasingly used as a transit point for South-
east Asian heroin. This has been confirmed by seizures of Golden Triangle
heroin on its way to Vietnam from Thailand and by seizures of onward
shipments from Vietnam to Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Southern China - all
major transit points for Southeast Asian heroin en route to the USA and other
Western markets. Heroin shipped from Vietnam has been seized in Australia,
and there are suggestions that heroin may also be entering or leaving Vietnam
across the northern border with China.164
Besides drug-related crimes, numerous other criminal activities are pur-
sued by criminal groups in this sub-regional area. For example, regarding
the Philippines in particular, one finds kidnapping for ransom, drug traffick-
ing, illegal logging, arms trafficking, the white slave trade, illegal gambling
and white-collar crimes. Rapid technological development in the Philippines
has made the criminal syndicates in the country better organised. Now highly
sophisticated and more firmly entrenched, they have expanded both their
power and wealth. The country’s location on the Asia-Pacific rim provides
transnational organised crime syndicates with a strategic hub for their
operations. In 1994, the number of organised crime groups in the Philippines
dropped substantially to around 780, which was 27% lower than in 1993, and
membership likewise declined by 32%. Metropolitan Manila accounted for
49% of identified crime syndicates.165
Other criminal activities widespread in the Philippines are international
gun-running and car thefts. Gun-running is flanked by the clandestine ship-
ment of firearms, crew-served weapons, ammunition and explosives for
communist insurgents and Muslim secessionists. Locally-made and cheap
handguns proliferate, while smuggled firearms enter the country through the
‘southern back door’ via commercial aeroplanes and shipping lines. Illegal
trafficking in local guns is easier and more lucrative because legitimate
marketing documents are not required and because prices are cheaper. Many
of these sophisticated and high-powered weapons are transported into the
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country by visiting balikbayans (Filipino immigrants visiting the country),
sometimes in collaboration with local gun-running syndicates.
An upsurge in motor vehicle theft in 1994, with the majority of incidents
occurring in Metro Manila, was attributed to a flourishing market in which
clandestine car dealers work with syndicates in the manufacture of fake car
registration certificates.166
Human trafficking is an illegal activity widespread not only in Philippines,
but also in Thailand. It is a extremely common practice and yields large
profits with low risks, although it deprives would-be migrants of their most
basic rights and places their lives in jeopardy. Women and children especially
are  highly vulnerable as  major sources of earnings in the markets for
prostitution and sex tourism. Numerous Filipinos from the provinces fall
victim to illegal recruitment agencies, while many others are preyed on by
foreign syndicates involved in the prostitution trade in Asian and European
countries. “In recent years, cases of international trafficking of Filipinos for
purposes of prostitution have increased, as more and more women are either
duped or have opted to leave the country illegally in search for work. In
almost all of the cases, the women are led to believe that they would work
as entertainers, singers or domestic workers, only to be deceived once they
reach their destinations”.167
Human trafficking gangs are among the largest and best-organised foreign
crime rings operating in Thailand. Thailand “has... become the major im-
porter, exporter and transit country in the international trafficking sex trade.
This is a highly organised and lucrative trade involving millions of girls and
women world wide. It is organised by international and Asian criminal groups
where the girls often use false passports and documents and travel through
Malaysia, Hong Kong and/or Singapore to reach their destinations. There
have been recent reports that girls as young as 13 are being trafficked and
sold into brothels in Australia and Japan.”168
The extensive presence of foreign criminal organisations in Thailand has
given rise to considerable alarm. Gangs of other nationalities commit various
crimes, including banknote forgery, fraud, robbery, drug trafficking and
human smuggling. According to police officers in charge of combating
86 2 Organised Crime Across Borders
166 Country Report presented by the Republic of the Philippines at the 9th United Nations
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Cairo, Egypt,
29 April-10 May 1995.
167 The Government of the Republic of Philippines, “Trafficking of Women in Migration:
Perspective from the Philippines”, paper presented at Eleventh IOM Seminar on
International Response to Trafficking in Migrants and the Safeguarding of Migrant
Rights, Geneva, 26-28 October 1994, p. 4.
168 The source of this data is End Child Prostitution in Asian Tourism (ECPAT): they can
be found in the Internet site of this organisation, at the following address:
www.rb.se/ecpat/country.html.
organised crime, in recent years the majority of serious crimes in Thailand
have been committed by foreigners rather than locals: at the top of the police
watch list are criminals from mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and
Singapore. Other gangs comprise Singaporeans, Burmese, Pakistanis, Syr-
ians, Bangladeshis, Sri Lankans, Filipinos, Indonesians, Germans and British
nationals. Moreover, higher-profile but deadly Yakuza rings have infiltrated
Japanese businesses in Thailand. Gangs from the former Soviet Union have
also moved in, along with Russian prostitutes. According to a report recently
compiled by Thai police, Chinese gangs are involved in almost every type
of crime, ranging from drug trafficking, prostitution and labour abuse to
robbery and human smuggling.169 Pakistani and Syrian gangs engage in
money and passport forgery, jewellery theft and bank robbery, while Bang-
ladeshi and Sri Lankan gangs specialise in forged passports. Philippine and
Indonesian rackets organise burglaries of hotels and jewellery outlets, ac-
cording to police investigations. The bulk of the crime committed by Bur-
mese gangs involves drug trafficking and the smuggling of people to third
countries. German and British criminals are mainly engaged in white-collar
crime, fraud, and forced prostitution
Turning to another regional question, it appears that Vietnamese gangs are
overtaking the Chinese Triads as the most serious threat raised by Asian
organised crime. These gangs are involved in the distribution of heroin,
extortion, illegal gambling and armed robberies.
Money laundering takes place mostly in Malaysia (which is fast becoming
a major financial centre in the Asia-Pacific), Singapore and Thailand. Money
laundering not only jeopardises the financial sector, it also affects the
political stability and development of the country. Numerous offshore finan-
cial institutions have set up in Malaysia, and the country may become a safe
haven for money to be laundered, with its deleterious consequences. The
various factors that make Singapore the world’s fifth largest financial centre,
and a likely successor to Hong Kong as the major regional centre after 1997,
make it attractive to money launderers. With increasing exploitation of its
myriad money remittance shops, many of them with international connec-
tions, Singapore has become a country of choice for some Asian traffickers
seeking to take advantage of its highly developed and very prosperous
financial sector. The belief that drug and other money is laundered through
both the bank and non-banking financial systems is based upon cases in
Australia, Hong Kong and elsewhere with Singaporean connections, but
Singapore itself is a major money laundering centre.170 Thailand has the
potential to become Asia’s next significant money-laundering centre, not
only because of the large volume of drug deals taking place in the country,
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but also because of attempts by neighbouring financial centres to curb money
laundering. While not regarded in the past as a significant money-laundering
centre, Thailand has the all necessary ingredients to become one: it is a hub
for heroin and other drug trafficking from the Golden Triangle; it has a
two-tiered system of banks and underground financial syndicates, both with
ties to the major financial centres (Hong Kong and Singapore); it has
inadequate narcotics controls, inadequate cross-border currency monitoring,
and no anti-money laundering laws. Significant money laundering already
occurs in the Thai-Malaysia border area.
2.2.7 Oceania
Organised crime in Oceania can be treated jointly with Australia, given its
pre-eminent importance in the region. In fact, New Zealand, another major
country in Oceania, shows little sign of being affected by a significant and
internationally-based organised crime problem. Some important Oceanian
islands are also used for money-laundering activities or for drug trafficking.
Australian organised crime is both fluid and multi-dimensional, with
numerous organised criminal groups involved in a wide range of criminal
activities as and when opportunities present themselves. This is due to the
growing entrepreneurial form assumed by organised crime in the country:
criminal structures are far less rigid, and individual contacts and networking
among criminals appear to be expanding, both within Australia and interna-
tionally.
Criminal organisations operating in Australia engage in both traditional
and new illicit activities. Some of them are based on ethnic membership,
notably the Chinese Triads, Vietnamese organised crime groups, Japanese
Yakuza, Italian organised crime, Lebanese criminal groups, Rumanian or-
ganised crime groups and Colombian cocaine syndicates. Four Triad groups
have been identified as active in Australia: the 14K, which is well entrenched
in Sydney but has offshoots in Melbourne; the Big Circle, which has been
noticeably active in both Melbourne and Sydney; the Sun Yee On, linked to
an alleged blackmailing racket in Melbourne; and the Wo Yee Tong and Wo
Shing Wo, sub-groups of the Wo Group, members of which have been
identified in Melbourne. These criminal groups are involved in illegal gam-
bling, extortion, blackmail and heroin shipments to Australia. Vietnamese
organised crime groups have grown rapidly in size and power over the last
ten years. Their illegal operations include heroin distribution, extortion,
illegal gambling and armed robberies. Australian Federal Police investiga-
tions have also revealed the presence of Japanese Yakuza members in
Australia, although their visits to the country are believed to be linked with
efforts to launder crime proceeds through real estate. In 1994, the police
launched a state-wide campaign against Japanese organised crime syndicates
believed to be trying to gain a foothold in the north-eastern part of Aus-
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tralia.171Italian organised crime is a national network, held together by family
relationships, lifelong friendships and mutual interests, rather than being a
corporate structure. Its activities are centred on the commercial cultivation
of cannabis and related money laundering, but some members are also
involved in the importing and distribution of heroin and cocaine, extortion,
and other offences. According to reports in the 1970s, a number of family-
based Lebanese criminal networks were involved in the importing of heroin
and hashish into Australia from Lebanon. As regards Rumanian organised
crime groups, in a number of states members of this small community are
involved in the importing of small amounts of heroin and social security
fraud. Colombian Cartels have used Australia as a transit country for both
drugs and money, and they are also trying to expand their share of the
Australian cocaine market.172
The methods used to move drugs into Australia are unclear because trends
are mostly estimated, as in other countries, from law enforcement seizures,
which do not always accurately represent the real magnitude of the trade. It
appears that the bulk of cannabis and amphetamines consumed in Australia
are produced domestically, while heroin and cocaine are imported: heroin
comes mainly from the Golden Triangle region in Southeast Asia, and
cocaine is imported from South America. Many of Australia’s seizures
involving imported drugs are made in Sydney, the country’s main interna-
tional gateway and drug distribution centre. However, the long unprotected
coastline in other parts of the country, particularly around the North, also
provides cause for concern. It was once argued that Australia’s isolated
position on the world map raised a barrier against trafficking. But modern
shipping and Australia’s strong economy have removed geographical barriers
and made Australia as vulnerable to illicit drug importation as any country
in Europe or North America. The volume of legitimate cargo arriving in
Australia is expanding, and the countries of Asia are rapidly becoming its
most important trading partners.
In the last few years Australia has seen the increased presence of Asian
criminal groups, which are more dangerous than the longer-established
European ones. The country has been singled out by Asian crime groups as
a “soft target” in particular for the quickly growing and increasingly lucrative
heroin trade. The growth of Asian-based crime and increasing evidence of
co-operation among groups, particularly the more violent Vietnamese gangs,
has not been at the expense of other organised crime. These various criminal
groups have developed “considerable expertise” and each now specialises in
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its own narrow area of crime, with little direct competition.173 Greater
economic clout resulting from the expanding markets for heroin and cocaine
has enabled organised crime  groups  to buy information and the latest
technology with which to protect their operations and to bribe corrupt
officials. The use of corrupt or compliant individuals is often crucial to the
success of money-laundering schemes.
A number of significant organised criminal networks are active internally
to the Australian economy, mainly in the large cities. For this reason, too,
Australia is increasingly a target for money laundering activities,174 espe-
cially since the tightening of banking regulations in the Caribbean, Latin
America and Europe. The main source of the money laundered in Australia
is the narcotics trade, but other forms of criminal activity generate profits
which require laundering: fraud, illegal gambling, illegal prostitution, large-
scale robbery and theft, arms smuggling, organised motor vehicle theft,
shoplifting, and breaking and entering. Japanese Yakuza and Vietnamese gold
smugglers are actively engaged in money laundering, as are Hong Kong
Triads and ethnic Chinese from Hong Kong and Singapore.175 In 1994, a
number of major money-laundering cases involved the transfer of funds to
countries in Asia, particularly Hong Kong.176
The Australian casino industry, luxury goods industry and gold bullion
industry are particularly vulnerable to money laundering. Apart from the
CTRA (Cash Transactions Reporting Agency) reporting requirements for
purchases with more than A$ 10,000 cash, the exporting of gold bullion is
not at present reportable under the Reports Act and there is no requirement
for bullion dealers to check the identities of customers purchasing and selling
bullion. Moreover, Australian lawyers (solicitors) are required to keep rec-
ords of all transactions relating to their trust accounts, but (although they
process large-scale cash transactions) they are not included in the definition
of “cash dealer” in the Report Act and are therefore not required to lodge
suspect or significant transaction reports. This renders solicitor trust accounts
vulnerable to laundering schemes, particularly ones involving real estate
transactions.
Besides Australia, also the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Nauru are
susceptible to the laundering of illicit proceeds. In the Solomon Islands, the
laundering of drug money is an established practice run by Australians and
Chinese, and appears to be tolerated by politicians who treat it as a source of
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development funds.177 Vanuatu and Nauru are among the countries whose
economies are used to convert drug profits into financial assets of apparently
legitimate origin. Vanuatu is a sophisticated offshore banking centre with
connections to Thailand, Hong Kong, England and France. Vanuatu has
registered more than 100 foreign banks, and incorporated more than 1,000
companies, over 600 of which are considered offshore companies. It is
believed that traffickers use these corporations to establish bank accounts in
countries other than Vanuatu, and then launder money through these foreign
banks.
In Guam, by contrast, there is no evidence that major criminal groups are
using the country to launder drug money.178 However, Guam is still the most
significant transhipment point in the Pacific insular area for heroin moving
from Southeast Asia to the USA. Its location, less-sophisticated drug detec-
tion equipment, and access to the US Postal System, make Guam a prime
location for traffickers wishing to break a large shipment of drugs down into
smaller loads for transport.
New Zealand is a completely different case. Owing to its relative isolation,
and close control by the police, New Zealand is not likely to become a major
drug producing, trafficking, or money laundering country. It is not a major
international banking centre and the scale of money laundering activity in
the country is believed to be low, although there is evidence that some
laundering of drug funds and proceeds from commercial crime does take
place.179
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co-operation
3  International Responses to Organised Crime
The growing concern regarding the development of organised crime, consid-
ered in the previous chapter, has been translated in an increasing number of
international initiatives dealing with this issue. These initiatives, which are
described in this chapter, have influenced those enacted at the domestic level
and which are considered, in turn, in chapter Four.
On the criminals’ side their transnational development is mainly due to:
– their wish to set a distance between the location in which the illicit activity
is conducted and the place from which they direct their operations, making
it more difficult for law enforcement agencies to reach the core of the
organisation;
– their wish to diversify their activities among several countries in order to
maximise opportunities and minimise the “law enforcement risk”. In
particular, they develop tactical alliances with local criminal groups,
taking advantage of their expertise and local range of action, and they
exploit the internationalisation of financial systems to conduct money-
laundering operations, thereby concealing the origin of illicit profits;
– their wish to respond to the international development of police and
judicial co-operation.
On the other side, the role of international organisations, both governmental
and non-governmental, is to overcome the problems that arise among coun-
tries because of legislative discrepancies and inefficient co-operation (in
information-sharing, in joint investigations, in the provision of assistance in
legal procedures - such as testimony-taking, locating persons and freezing
forfeitable assets - and in extraditing criminals). Their aim is to ensure that
rapid national action should not be hampered by the laborious mechanism of
supra-national policies.
This chapter illustrates the actions of the major international organisations
against organised crime (United Nations, Council of Europe, G7/P8, Euro-
pean Union, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
Organisation of American States) and other initiatives taken at the interna-
tional level, from the World Ministerial Conference on Organised Transna-
tional Crime held at Naples, Italy, in November 1994 onwards. Furthermore,
the most recent bilateral agreements on the same issue will be considered.
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3.2 The role of international organisations
in the fight against organised crime
3.2.1 United Nations
The United Nations has always played a central role in the fight against
organised transnational crime in all its specific manifestations, for example
corruption, money laundering, and trafficking in illegal migrants.
The main multilateral instrument in the fight against organised crime is
the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances. This Convention is a law enforcement instru-
ment and contains provisions requiring the development of international
co-operation in the fields of extradition, asset forfeiture, mutual legal assis-
tance, co-operation among the law enforcement agencies of member-states,
control of precursor and essential chemicals and crop eradication. One
hundred and fifty countries have to date signed the Convention, which is a
significant demonstration of consensus. The thirteen governments that are
signatories to the Convention but have not yet taken steps to become a party
include: Austria, Gabon, the Holy See, Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Kuwait,
Maldives, Mauritius, New Zealand, Philippines, Switzerland and Zaire. As
of 1997, forty-five governments had neither signed the Convention nor
become a party to it: Andorra, Anguilla, Armenia, Aruba, Benin, Bermuda,
British Virgin Islands, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central African Republic,
Chad, Comoro Islands, Congo, Djibouti, DPR Korea, Estonia, The Gambia,
Georgia, Haiti, Hong Kong, Iceland, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Korea,
Laos, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Mali, Marshall Islands, Micronesia,
Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, San Marino,
Sao Tome and Principe, Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Thai-
land, Turks & Caicos, Vanuatu and Vietnam.1
In recent years the United Nations has taken several further steps in the
fight against organised crime.
To help address the problem of the progressive internalisation and sophis-
tication of criminal groups, in 1994, at the World Ministerial Conference on
Organised Transnational Crime held in Naples, Italy, UN member States
adopted the Naples Political Declaration and Global Action Plan against
Organised Transnational Crime, with a view to strengthening and improving
“national capabilities  and international co-operation against organised
transnational crime and [to] laying the foundations for concerted and
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effective global action against organised transnational crime and the pre-
vention of its further expansion”.2
The Political Declaration and Action Plan points out the necessity for a
generally accepted definition of organised crime and the need to highlight its
main structural characteristics and modus operandi. In order to prevent and
combat the phenomenon, reliable statistics and information are necessary, as
well as substantive, procedural and regulatory legislation, and organisational
structures. Further to national action, particular importance is placed on
international co-operation. In this regard, bilateral and multilateral assistance
must be improved, as well as agreements and conventions on extradition,
mutual legal assistance, intelligence-gathering, and exchange and co-opera-
tion at the prosecutorial and judicial levels. It is important that all these issues
be tackled at the regional level, in order to devise appropriate regional
strategies to prevent the criminal groups operating in a particular region from
spreading their activities further afield. Since profit is the main goal of
criminal organisations, the Action Plan also urges member states to criminal-
ise money laundering, to adopt legislative measures for the seizure and
confiscation of illicit proceeds, and to heighten the transparency of financial
systems.
As  regards the further development of international instruments, the
Ministerial Conference requested the Commission on Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice to examine the feasibility of drawing up a convention against
organised transnational crime. Moreover, the Commission was given the task
of monitoring the follow-up and implementation of the Political Declaration
and the Action Plan, to “translate it into practice to the widest possible extent
at national, regional and international levels”.
The UN General Assembly approved the Naples Political Declaration and
Global Action Plan3 in its resolution 49/159. Moreover, the Economic and
Social Council, in its resolution 1995/11 of 24 July 1995, requested the
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice to ensure and monitor
their full implementation, and asked the Secretary-General to canvass the
views of governments on the opportunity and impact of instruments, such as
a convention against organised transnational crime. In the same resolution,
the Council proposed the creation of a central data bank of information on
existing legislation, regulatory measures and organisational structures di-
rected against organised crime. In pursuance of these resolutions, a Regional
Ministerial Workshop on Follow-up to the Naples Political Declaration and
Action Plan was convened in Buenos Aires in November 1995. The Work-
94 3 International Responses to Organised Crime
2 UN Economic and Social Council, “Draft Resolution. Naples Political Declaration and
Global Action Plan against Organised Transnational Crime”, in World Ministerial
Conference on Organised Transnational Crime, Naples, Italy, 21-23 November 1994,
UN doc. E/CONF.88/L.4.
3 UN doc. A/49/748, annex, chap. 1, sect. A.
shop called for increased technical co-operation, strategic co-ordination,
legislative action and other measures to combat organised crime. In order to
promote national and regional action, the Workshop adopted the Buenos
Aires Declaration on Prevention and Control of Organised Transnational
Crime.4
At its fifth session in 1996, the Commission on Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice continued to review the implementation of the Action Plan.
In its resolution 1996/27 of 24 July 1996, the Economic and Social Council
requested the Secretary-General to assist in the implementation of the Action
Plan, to continue with the collection and analysis of information on the
structure and other aspects of organised crime, and to provide technical
assistance to member-states requesting it. In its study on the feasibility of
drawing up an international convention, the Council requested the Secretary-
General to take account of the Buenos Aires Declaration. The same resolution
set up the Working Group on the Implementation of the Political Declaration
and Global Action Plan against Organised Transnational Crime and gave it
the task of assisting the Commission in implementing the Action Plan.
The Intergovernmental Expert Group is also taking an important part in
development of an international instrument against organised transnational
crime. During the Ninth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime
and Treatment of Offenders5, in resolution 2, entitled “International co-
operation and practical assistance for strengthening the rule of law: develop-
ment of United Nations model instruments”, the Commission on Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice was urged to consider establishing an
intergovernmental expert group to analyse practical recommendations for the
development of mechanisms of international co-operation, as well as the
development of model legislation on extradition. The Intergovernmental
Expert Group Meeting on Extradition, convened by the Secretary-General in
accordance with Economic and Social Council resolution 1995/27, was held
in Italy in December 1996.6
On 12 December 1996, the General Assembly adopted resolution 51/120,
which requested the Secretary-General to invite all states to state their
opinions on the elaboration of a convention on organised crime, taking into
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5 Ninth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders, Cairo, Egypt, 29 April-8 May, 1995.
6 Intergovernmental Expert Group on Extradition, Siracusa, Italy, 10-13 December,
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account a draft UN framework convention introduced by the Government of
Poland.7
In April 1997, a meeting8 in Italy on the same issue discussed a draft
framework convention against organised crime, together with the opinions
of governments.9 The necessity for a clear and specific common definition
of organised crime was stated, together with a list of offences to be covered
by it (namely fraud, money laundering, extortion and usury, kidnapping,
computer crimes, illicit trafficking in children, murder and infliction of injury
and trafficking in illegal firearms).
On 21 July 1997, during its 36th plenary meeting, the Economic and Social
Council adopted resolution 1997/22, which requested the Intergovernmental
Group of Experts - then elaborating the preliminary draft of the convention
against organised crime - to take account of existing international instru-
ments, the United Nations draft framework convention presented by the
Government of Poland, and the reports of the Working Group on the Imple-
mentation of the Naples Declaration and Action Plan. The Council recom-
mended that priority be given to the following issues:
“(i) Measures for judicial and police co-operation, particularly in relation
to mutual assistance, extradition, money laundering and confiscation of
illicit assets, protection of witnesses, information sharing, training and
other forms of technical assistance;
[...]
(ii) Provisions related to criminal offences, particularly in the area of crimi-
nal associations, conspiracy and money laundering;”10.
It also recommended that consideration be given to specific provisions
relating to crimes such as trafficking in children and illegal migrants, corrup-
tion, theft of motor vehicles, and offences related to firearms.
One of the most important issues, the scope of organised crime to be
covered by the convention, is still to be agreed upon. Another open question
is to what extent the convention will deal with the criminalisation of mem-
bership in a criminal organisation. The convention shall in all probability
cover such issues as extradition, mutual legal assistance, co-operation be-
tween law enforcement and judicial personnel, money laundering, and the
freezing, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds of crime.
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Furthermore, the United Nations has always been active in the fight against
the specific criminal conduct typical of organised criminal groups. Specific
manifestations  of organised crime, such  as bribery and corruption, the
smuggling of illegal migrants and the illicit traffic in children, were addressed
at the sixth session of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal
Justice.
On 24 July 1995, the Economic and Social Council adopted resolution
1995/10 on criminal justice action against the organised smuggling of illegal
migrants across national borders. It condemned the practice of smuggling
illegal migrants,  which is  an  activity which frequently involves  highly
organised criminal groups with international ties. Moreover, it emphasised
that a significant number of countries still lack criminal legislation on the
issue.11
On 12 December 1996, the General Assembly adopted resolution 51/62
entitled “Measures for the Prevention of the Smuggling of Aliens”. The
United Nations Declaration on Crime and Public Security, contained in
resolution 51/60, is of particular relevance, since articles 1 and 7 (d) of the
Declaration specifically refer to organised trafficking in persons and the
organised smuggling of migrants across borders.12
The United Nations has also given high priority to the problems created
by spreading corruption. In accordance with General Assembly resolution
49/157, the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice took
consideration of the recommendations of the Ninth UN Congress on the
Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, the background papers of
which included the draft international code of conduct for public officials13.
The Economic and Social Council adopted resolution 1995/14, requesting
the Secretary-General to finalise the draft code on the basis of consultations
with governments. In the same resolution the Council urged states to develop
and implement anti-corruption measures in the same resolution. In December
1996, the General Assembly adopted the International Code of Conduct for
Public Officials14. According to this Code, a public office is a position
entailing the duty to act in the public interest. The code focuses on issues
concerning the conduct of public officials, such as: (a) conflict of interest and
disqualification; (b) disclosure of assets; (c) acceptance of gifts or other
favours; (d) confidential information; (e) political activity. With resolution
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51/191, the General Assembly also adopted the United Nations Declaration
against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions.
In July 1997, the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Division organ-
ised the African Regional Ministerial Workshop on Action against Organised
Crime and Corruption in Senegal. At its final meeting, the Workshop unani-
mously adopted the Dakar Declaration, in which the Ministers and Repre-
sentatives of the African States expressed their concern about the increase
and expansion of organised criminal activities, corrupt practices and bribery
in international commercial transactions.15
As regards drug trafficking, the United Nations Drug Control Programme
(UNDCP) actively promotes adherence to and implementation of interna-
tional drug control treaties, such as the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. In 1996, the UNDCP
provided assistance to 15 countries in the drafting and implementation of
national drug control legislation and regulations.16
3.2.2 The Council of Europe
Founded in 1949, the Council of Europe is the oldest and most extensive
European political organisation, and it covers every policy area except
defence. Based in Strasbourg, France, it comprised, on 1 April 1997, 40
member countries17. Applications for membership from five European states
had been submitted and are being examined.
The action of the Council of Europe against crime is channelled through
the European Committee on Crime Problems (CDPC). Particular attention is
paid to the functioning of Council of Europe penal law conventions, perma-
nently monitored by the Expert Committee on the Operation of European
Conventions in the Penal Field (PC-OC).
The most recent action against organised crime is the final declaration and
action plan adopted by the presidents and prime ministers attending the 2nd
Summit of the Council of Europe,18 held in October 1997. The issues covered
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deal with democracy and human rights, social cohesion, security, democratic
values and cultural diversity, the Council’s structures and working methods.
From the point of view of the present analysis the issue of security is of
particular importance. The countries attending the meeting agreed as follows:
to strengthen international co-operation in the fight against terrorism; to boost
co-operation between member states in combating corruption, including its
links with organised crime and money laundering; to strengthen co-operation
in tackling problems related to the use of and trafficking in illicit drugs; and
to ensure common standards for the protection of children undergoing or at
risk of inhuman treatment, the aim being to prevent all forms of exploitation
including child pornography.19
In view of the specific problems faced by Central and Eastern European
countries in their fight against organised crime, and in particular against
money laundering and corruption, the Council of Europe has launched two
major projects.
The “Octopus” Project is a joint venture with the Commission of the
European Communities (Phare Democracy Programme). Its aim is to evalu-
ate the situation in sixteen Central and Eastern European countries with
regard to legislation and practice against corruption and organised crime. The
programme was established in June 1996 and is set to run for eighteen
months. The countries involved in the project are: Albania, Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland,
Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, “the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia” and Ukraine.
The Octopus project consists of four stages. The first comprises evaluation
of the problems of organised crime and corruption, followed by an assess-
ment of the efficiency of the countermeasures already taken by the countries
considered. As a result of this first stage, recommendations and guidelines
for action, as well as actions to promote co-operation at regional level, have
been formulated for each of the beneficiary states by five Council of Europe
experts. The third and fourth stages consist respectively of a follow-up on
implementation of the recommendations and guidelines formulated by the
experts and final evaluation of the  impact of the project, with further
proposals.20
The second initiative is the Programme for mutual evaluation of anti-
money laundering measures in countries not covered by the Financial Action
Task Force (FATF), about to be launched by the Council of Europe’s
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European Committee on Crime Problems with help from FATF itself.21 This
is an evaluation programme for countries that have already adopted legisla-
tion against money laundering. Prior to an on-site visit to each state, the
country involved is required to respond to a questionnaire drafted by the
Council of Europe. Selected experts then visit the country for discussions
with government officials, agencies, ministries and institutions concerned
with the issue, in order to describe findings and possible improvements in
their reports.22
The Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (opened for signature on 8 Novem-
ber 1990) came into effect on 1 September 1993.
By 1 September 1997 the Convention had been ratified and was in force
in sixteen countries: Austria, Australia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Repub-
lic, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The convention has
also been signed by Belgium, Croatia, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Liechten-
stein, Luxembourg, Moldova, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Slovenia,
Spain and Ukraine. Several countries (Germany, Poland, Russia and
Slovenia) are preparing their legislation for ratification.
Moreover, two Committees of experts have been created to conduct
constant analysis of organised crime. The results of this analysis will be
shared among member states to facilitate the development of a comprehen-
sive European strategy to harmonise legal systems. Accordingly, a new
Committee of experts on criminal law and criminological aspects of organ-
ised crime (PC-CO)23 was established on 1 April 1997, and given the brief
to examine the features of organised crime, to identify loopholes in interna-
tional co-operational instruments, and to propose new strategies. For this
purpose, in June 1997 a questionnaire was drafted to collect statistics on the
nature, structure and activities of organised crime groups in each country. As
the next step, the committee will focus on special means of investigation of
criminal activities, and on international co-operation and ways to improve it.
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It is evident from analysis of recent trends in organised crime that criminals
are making more frequent use of telecommunications, computers and the
Internet. With a view to studying this new trend, a Committee of experts on
crime in the Cyberspace (PC-CY) has been established and is already in
operation.
Finally, in June 1997, the Council of Europe adopted a draft recommen-
dation on the protection of witnesses which seeks to strike a balance between
the needs of an efficient criminal justice system and the rights of the
defence.24 The recommendation deals in particular with ensuring the safety
of witnesses giving testimony against organised crime.
Organised crime is often linked with corruption. As Peter Leuprecht stated
in his speech at the 21st Conference of European Ministers of Justice,25
“taken separately, organised crime and corruption already constitute major
threats to our fundamental values. The combination of the two, whenever it
occurs, can only have a devastating effect on democracy, rule of law and
human rights”.
At the 19th Conference of European Ministers of Justice (Valletta, 1994),
the Ministers recommended the establishment of a multi-disciplinary group
on corruption, in the belief that the effective fight against corruption requires
improves international co-operation among countries and international insti-
tutions. Following these recommendations, the Multidisciplinary Group on
Corruption (GMC) was set up in September 1994. In the following year it
prepared a draft Programme of Action against Corruption which was adopted
by the Committee of Ministers in November 1996 in the form of an action
programme for 1996-2000 which covers the following key points:
– definition of corruption;
– criminalisation of corruption offences and proceeds;
– development of codes of conduct;
– introduction of civil liability for corruption;
– definition of roles and responsibilities of institutions and individuals; and
– measures to prevent and fight corruption.26
The GMC has begun drafting two international conventions against corrup-
tion: one is a “classical” convention dealing with criminal law, the other is a
“framework” convention to be supplemented with protocols or other legal
instruments on specific topics. At the time of writing, June 1997, the draft
criminal law convention on corruption is in its second reading. The text
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provides for the co-ordinated criminalisation of a large number of corruption
offences as well as international co-operation to combat them.27
The draft framework convention - which covers subjects ranging from the
criminalisation of corrupt behaviour and the prohibition of the tax-deduct-
ibility of bribes to public tendering and the responsibility of the public
administration - has three main purposes. The first is to set out the principles
underpinning the fight against corruption. The second is to establish a process
for the identification and subsequent application of the international meas-
ures necessary to combat corruption. Finally, the convention seeks to provide
a follow-up mechanism which will reinforce the parties’undertakings.28 This
is intended to be an “open” convention, which means that non-member states
may  accede to it. The link between the convention and the additional
instruments may be a monitoring system which provides an overview of the
steps taken by governments and ensures a minimum degree of harmonisation
among measures.
In the field of civil law the GMC undertook, in October 1996, a study on
the feasibility of drafting a convention on civil remedies for the compensation
of damage caused by corruption.
As finally regards drug trafficking, on 31 January 1995, the Council of
Europe opened for signature an Agreement on Illicit Traffic by Sea, imple-
menting Article 17 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. The member states of the
Council of Europe, having expressed their consent to be bound by the 1988
UN Convention, agreed on “co-operation to the fullest extent possible to
suppress illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances by sea”
(article 2, n. 1). According to this Agreement, should a Party suspect on
reasonable grounds that a vessel flying its flag or without nationality is
engaged in or being used for the commission of a relevant offence, it may
request the assistance of other Parties to suppress its use for that purpose.
This Agreement is open for signature by the member-states of the Council
of Europe that have already expressed their consent to be bound by the 1988
UN  Convention. By 30 May 1997, five member-states  had signed the
Agreement (Greece, Italy, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom). The
Agreement will come into effect “on the first day of the month following the
expiry of a period of three months after the date on which three member States
of the Council of Europe have expressed their consent to be bound by the
Agreement” (article 27, n. 3).
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3.2.3 G7/P8
Since its institution, the G7 - the group comprising the major industrialised
countries (the United States, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom,
Italy and Canada) - has been constantly involved in the prevention and
repression of organised crime. The most significant actions undertaken by
the G7 have been, first, establishment of the FATF and (together with
Russia,29 formation of the so-called ‘P8’- Political 8) the creation of a Senior
Experts Group on Transnational Organised Crime which has enacted forty
recommendations to combat international organised crime.
The FATF was created at the July 1989 Paris Economic Summit by the
leaders of the G7 countries and the President of the European Commission
in order to develop an international strategy against money laundering. The
first concrete action taken by this international body was the issue, on 19
April 1990, of a report setting out forty recommendations for national action.
According to this report, countries should also move to criminalise money
laundering related to drug offences and extend this offence to the laundering
of assets deriving from other crimes; they should require financial institutions
to verify the identity of customers and of the persons on whose behalf they
are acting; they should keep records of transactions, including currency
transactions; they should develop adequate money-laundering programmes;
they should co-operate with each other, especially by providing mutual legal
assistance in the suppression of drug trafficking, money laundering and
related financial crimes.
Since issuing the report, the FATF has continued to monitor application
of its forty recommendations, which have been updated to reflect the evolu-
tion of problems. By means of meetings, special expert groups and contacts
with other nations (especially Russia, Czech Republic, Asian countries)
FATF has been collecting information on money-laundering problems and
strategies world-wide in order to develop a policy for the future. Several
important tasks were accomplished in 1996-1997, in particular a broad-rang-
ing review of money-laundering trends and techniques which also examined
the threat posed by the development of new technologies in payment meth-
ods. The FATF currently comprises 26 members: Austria, Australia, Bel-
gium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK,
United States, the European Union (represented by the European Commis-
sion) and the Gulf Co-operation Council.
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Linked to FATF is the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF).
This organisation - which involves most of the countries of the region and
which met for the first time on 5-6 November 1992 - is supported by five
FATF Members (the USA, the UK, France, the Netherlands and Canada). Its
principal task is to implement the FATF’s 40 recommendations, as well as
nineteen other points which relate specifically to the Caribbean’s regional
problems. Caribbean Basin Government ministers endorsed these recom-
mendations in Jamaica in November 1992, on the advice of the Caribbean
Drug Money Laundering Conference held in Aruba on June 8-10. Participat-
ing Governments include Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, the Bahamas, Brazil,
British Virgin Islands, Canada, Cayman Islands, Colombia, Dominican
Republic. France, Grenada, Jamaica, Mexico, Netherlands, Netherland An-
tilles, Panama, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Turks and Caicos, Trinidad
and Tobago, United Kingdom, United States and Venezuela. The importance
of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force in regional anti-money laun-
dering initiatives continues to increase. In October 1996, the CFATF adopted
a Memorandum of Understanding which formalises the organisation by
stating its mission, objectives and membership requirements. A total of 21
members, including several Central American countries new to the CFATF,
signed the Memorandum, while others are expected to sign it in the near
future.
On 15-17 June 1995, in Halifax, Canada, with the purpose of combating
transnational organised crime more efficiently, the P8 established “a group
of senior experts with a temporary mandate to look at existing arrangements
for co-operation both bilateral and multilateral, to identify significant gaps
and options for improved co-ordination and to propose practical action to
fill such gaps.”30 The first action taken by the Senior Expert Group on
Transnational Organised Crime was to issue, on 12 April 1996 in Paris, forty
recommendations for the combating of transnational organised crime. Dur-
ing the G7 Summit held in Lyon, on 29 June 1996, the P8 countries adopted
a political declaration in which they acknowledged the findings of the Senior
Experts Group on Transnational Organised Crime and endorsed the forty
recommendations prepared by the group. They also invited all countries to
adopt the recommendations and asked the Senior Experts Group to follow
implementation of these recommendations closely, and to report to the next
Summit.
The recommendations pursue different goals: to support institutions that
deal with organised crime; to encourage countries to sign existing conven-
tions; to counter the enormous threat posed by narcotic traffickers; to share
information and expertise to detect, investigate and prosecute criminals; to
increase operational co-operation among relevant agencies; to enhance, in
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particular through extradition, the bringing of fugitives to justice; to provide
the broadest possible mutual legal assistance; to deprive criminals of their
illicit profits by adopting appropriate legislation and by implementing rec-
ommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF); and to adopt the
necessary legislative and regulatory measures to combat corruption. The
recommendations thus cover a vast range of issues. For example, just to cite
the most important ones:
– “in cases where a criminal activity occurs in several countries, States with
jurisdiction should co-ordinate their prosecutions and the use of mutual
assistance measures in a strategic manner so as to be more efficient in the
fight against transnational criminal groups” (recommendation no. 7);
– States should work together to develop, through treaties, arrangements and
legislation, a network to simplify extradition (recommendation no. 8);
– “States should provide effective protection for individuals who have given
or agreed to give information or evidence, or who participate or who have
agreed to participate in an investigation or prosecution of an offence, and
of the relatives and associates of those individuals who require protection,
because of risk to the security of the person” (recommendation no. 13);
– States should consider setting up reciprocal  arrangements  to protect
witnesses and other endangered persons (recommendation no. 14);
– “States should consider adopting appropriate measures to ensure the
protection of witnesses during criminal proceedings. These might include
such methods as testifying by telecommunications or limiting the disclo-
sure of the address and identifying particulars of witnesses. Consideration
should be given to the temporary transfer as witnesses of persons in
custody, enlargement of the admissibility of written statements, and the
use of modern technology, such as video links, to overcome some of the
current difficulties with obtaining the testimony of witnesses located
outside the prosecuting State” (recommendation no. 15);
– “States should review their laws in order to ensure that abuses of modern
technology that are deserving of criminal sanctions are criminalised and
that problems with respect to jurisdiction, enforcement powers, investiga-
tion, training, crime prevention and international co-operation in respect
of such abuses are effectively addressed” (recommendation no. 16);
– all states should criminalise the smuggling of persons, endeavouring to
simplify as much as possible the exchange of information on the transna-
tional movement of organised criminals and on forged and stolen docu-
ments used by traffickers, considering the most effective means for its
communication and improving the quality of travel documents (recom-
mendation no. 24);
– Considering the relevance and effectiveness of techniques like electronic
surveillance,  undercover operations and  controlled  deliveries, states
should review the domestic arrangements for such techniques, facilitating
international co-operation and exchanging experience in their use (recom-
mendation no. 26);
– “States should consider adopting legislative measures for the confiscation
or seizure of illicit proceeds from drug trafficking and other serious
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offences, asset forfeiture, as required, and the availability of provisional
arrangements, such as the freezing or seizing of assets, always with due
respect for the interest of bona fide third parties. States should also
consider the introduction of arrangements for the equitable sharing of
such forfeited assets” (recommendation no. 30);
– States should enhance, through legislation and regulation, the fight against
corruption, establishing standards of good governance and legitimate
commercial and financial conduct, and developing co-operation mecha-
nisms to suppress corrupt practices (recommendation no. 32).
– States should take adequate steps to join or to implement existing interna-
tional Conventions drawn up to fight transnational organised crime; while
the G7 countries commit themselves to supplementing existing Conven-
tions and to the adoption of new instruments in response to the changes in
the organised criminal activities (recommendations no. 35-36).
As a follow-up to the 1996 G7 Lyon Summit, the Senior Experts Group set
out its plans for future action in the sector of alien smuggling and fraudulent
documents. The Group decided to take action to improve co-operation and
the exchange of information on legal and law enforcement standards, and on
security matters relating to national identification documents31.
Mention should also made of the most recent summit meeting of the P8
(Washington DC, 10 December 1997), at which an action plan was drawn
up to prevent the infiltration of computer networks by organised criminal
rings. The countries concerned undertook to equip themselves with ad hoc
internal instruments and to improve international co-operation in the sector.32
3.2.4 The European Union33
The European Union provides criminals with a fertile ground for transna-
tional activities. The Treaties that established the European Community and
the subsequent Treaty of Maastricht grant total freedom in the movement of
capital, goods, services and persons across the borders of the member-states.
It is therefore understandable that organised criminal rings should take
advantage of the situation, specialising in transnational illegal behaviour and
exploiting the opportunities for movement within the Union provided by
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loopholes in national legislation. Consequently, criminal groups tend to
organise themselves transnationally, setting up illicit enterprises, moving
criminal goods and criminal proceeds from one country to another, estab-
lishing bases in the most secure countries, and entering the illegal sectors in
which they perceive high opportunities for gain, with low risks.
Drug trafficking, money laundering, fraud (especially against the Euro-
pean Union’s interests), corruption, trafficking in aliens and their exploitation
are all forms of illicit behaviour that constitute a mounting threat not only to
the individual states of the Union, but also to the European Community as a
whole. Money laundering in particular is facilitated by new technologies. The
institutions of the European Union institutions define the phenomenon as
follows: “organised crime is increasingly becoming a threat to society as we
know it and want to preserve it. Criminal behaviour is no longer the domain
of individuals alone, but also of organisations that pervade the various
structures of civil society, and indeed society as a whole. Crime is increas-
ingly being organised across national borders, also taking advantage of the
free movement of goods, capital, services and persons. Technological inno-
vations such as Internet and electronic banking turn out to be extremely
convenient vehicles either for committing crimes or for transferring the
resulting profits into seemingly licit activities. Fraud and corruption take on
massive proportions, defrauding citizens and civic institutions alike”.34
How can the European Union bodies react to this complex situation? Given
that the existence of the European Union itself, with its rules and aims, is a
push factor that spreads organised crime, are the European institutions
equipping themselves with the means necessary to combat organised crime?
Unfortunately, despite the overall supra-national power assigned to Euro-
pean institutions within the economic framework of the Union, as far as
crime, legal co-operation on criminal matters and immigration are con-
cerned, the situation is highly diversified.
Only since November 1993, in fact, has Title VI of the Maastricht Treaty,
the so-called ‘third Pillar’ of the Union, made specific provisions in the field
of justice and home affairs which cover immigration, drug addiction and
co-operation in civil, penal, customs and policing matters, creating a special
decision process. The member-states do not wholly surrender their sover-
eignty in these areas to the European Union, because decisions continue to
be taken unanimously. Previous informal co-operation has now been trans-
formed into an institutionalised system. That is to say, this particular deci-
sion-making standard lies midway between the traditional Community sys-
tem involving all the European institutions on the one hand, and intergov-
ernmental co-operation at the diplomatic level on the other.35 While the
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European Parliament and the Commission perform only a minor role in the
process, the European Council, again by unanimous vote, may adopt joint
actions and decisions (which bind the member-states to the extent that they
contain explicit obligations) and establish Conventions. It is mainly within
this legal framework that the fight against organised crime at the European
Union level is to be conducted.
It is difficult to provide a detailed description of the most recent actions
taken against organised crime within the European Union. The criteria
adopted here are the illegal activities against which such action is directed,
the importance of the instruments adopted, and the methods of prevention
and control used.
Since drug trafficking and addiction are problems that afflict all the
member-states, efforts have been made to enhance international co-operation
and the exchange of information. The action by the European Union in this
sector is based on the 1994 Communications from the Commission to the
Council and on the conclusions of the Cannes and Dublin European Councils
(held in June 1995 and December 1996 respectively). The purpose of these
instruments is to combat drug trafficking, to reduce drug demand, and to
develop co-operation among countries.
The European Council held in Dublin on 13 and 14 December 1996
stressed the need to harmonise laws, develop further co-operation among law
enforcement agencies, pay careful attention to synthetic drugs, and fully
implement the EU Directive on money laundering, considering its application
outside the classical financial sector.36 Also emphasised was the role of
information, education and training on health matters in reducing drug
demand. As regards co-operation among countries, the European Council
also gave prominence to the implementation of international agreements,
notably the Vienna Convention against Illicit Trafficking in Narcotics Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances, and to improve the exchange of information
among partners on drugs (especially with countries of Latin America, the
Caribbean, Central Asia and Central and Eastern Europe).
Following this advice, a joint action37 was issued on the approximation of
the laws and practices of the police, customs services and judicial authorities,
on combating drug addiction, and on the prevention of illegal drug traffick-
ing. This joint action, further to the harmonisation of legal, police and
customs systems within the Union in order to suppress illegal drug traffick-
ing, urges the member-states to: combat illicit movements of narcotic drugs
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and psychotropic substances within the Community, including “drug tour-
ism”; punish serious drug trafficking offences with the most serious penalties
available in their penal systems; endeavour to change their legislation or to
close legal loopholes as regards synthetic drugs; take appropriate steps to
combat the illicit cultivation of plants containing ingredients with narcotic
properties, and make it an offence publicly and intentionally to incite or
induce others, by any means, to commit offences involving the illicit use or
production of drugs. On 16 December 1996, the Council issued a resolution
intended to halt the illicit cultivation and production of drugs within the
European Union. On 20 December 1996, the Council passed a resolution on
sentencing for serious drug offences, asking member-states to ensure custo-
dial sentences for serious illicit trafficking in drugs. On the same date, the
Council adopted a further joint action on participation by member-states in
a strategic operation planned by the Customs Co-operation Council to combat
drug smuggling on the Balkan route. Recently, on 16 June 1997, the European
Council enacted a joint action relating to information exchange, risk assess-
ment and the control of new synthetic drugs.
As far as drug-related police co-operation is concerned, a special unit - the
European Drug Unit (EDU) - was created by a ministerial agreement in June
1993. The initial task of this unit was to solicit the exchange of information
on narcotics and money laundering. EDU will be examined in more detail
later when Europol and police co-operation are discussed.
As regards fraud against the European Union’s financial interests, in 1994
the European Commission established UCLAF (Unitè contre la lutte anti
frode), a special unit responsible for the prevention of fraud affecting the
budget of the Union. This type of fraud, which seriously damages not only
the proper functioning of the Community but also the interests of all mem-
ber-states, is controlled by organised criminal networks. UCLAF has both
legislative and operational functions, being responsible not only for the
devising of measures to protect EU funds, but also, more generally, for
developing a strategy against economic and financial crime prejudicial to the
Community, as well as operational countermeasures against counterfeiting.
Another task of UCLAF is that of information-gathering and analysis: it
publishes a yearly report on the results of its activities.38
The most noteworthy action taken by the European Union in the suppres-
sion of fraud consists of the following measures:
– Community regulations aimed at co-ordinating administrative co-opera-
tion between member- states and the European Commission in the areas
of customs and agriculture;
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– a Directive, issued on 18 December 1995, on protection of the European
Community’s financial interests which, amongst other things, defines acts
damaging to the Union’s budget;
– the Convention on the Protection of the European Communities’Financial
Interests (adopted by the Council on 26 July 1995), which provides a
common definition of fraud and binds the member-states to punishment
of such behaviour (and its instigation or abetting) as a criminal offence in
their national penal systems.
Bearing in mind that corruption is an extremely common criminal activity
practised by organised criminal networks, and in particular considering the
prejudicial effects of corrupt practices at both the Community and national
level, on 26 May 1997 the European Council drew up the Convention on the
Fight against Corruption Involving Officials of the European Communities
or Officials of Member States of the European Union. The aim of this
Convention is to strengthen judicial co-operation in the fight against corrup-
tion. The Convention gives a legal definition of active and passive corruption,
obliging member-states to punish it as a criminal offence if committed either
by national officers or by European Union officials. Those committing the
offence or instigating it should be punished by effective, proportionate and
dissuasive criminal penalties, including, in the most serious cases, imprison-
ment, which may lead to extradition. Other rules envisage the jurisdiction of
the member-states and their total co-operation in the investigation, prosecu-
tion and punishment of such offences when they involve more than one
country.
A criminal activity provoking increasing alarm within the European Union
is the trafficking in migrants. The trade is largely controlled by powerful
criminal organisations able to operate internationally, to corrupt officials, to
counterfeit documents, and to control black labour markets. Women and
children are particularly vulnerable because they are easy commodities for
sexual exploitation in the host countries. The European Union institutions
have recently grown increasingly aware of this burgeoning criminal activity.
A Communication setting out immediate steps to be taken against child
pornography on the Internet, and a Green Paper on the Protection of Minors
and Human Dignity were adopted by the European Commission on 16 October
1996. A Communication was issued one month later by Commissioner Anita
Gradin on Trafficking in Women for the Purpose of Sexual Exploitation, the
aim of which was “to stimulate a broad policy debate and to promote a
coherent European approach to this issue....such an approach should include
measures to improve both international and European co-operation, whilst
putting more effective measures in place at national level”.39
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The European Council, for its part, has adopted:
– a joint action which extends the Europol Drug Unit’s mandate to include
trafficking in human beings40;
– a joint action to establish a programme for information-sharing among
member-states on the trade in human beings and the sexual exploitation
of children (the so-called STOP programme).41 The STOP programme
will develop co-ordinated initiatives to combat the trade in human beings
and the sexual exploitation of children, the abduction of minors, and the
use of telecommunications to trade in human beings and sexually exploit
children. The specific aim of the programme is to provide training,
exchange programmes, meetings and seminars, studies and research and
the dissemination of information to judges, public prosecutors, law en-
forcement agencies, civil servants, or the public services dealing with the
phenomenon;
– a joint action introducing a programme of training, exchanges and co-oper-
ation in the field of identity documents42 (the so-called SHERLOCK
programme), run by the European Commission, with a view to reinforcing
action against the false papers used by clandestine immigration networks.
Another method to fight organised crime within the European Union is to
strengthen legal co-operation among all member-states. For example, facili-
tating and simplifying the extradition procedures for criminals accused of
particular offences should accelerate the prosecution of persons involved in
organised criminal rings operating transnationally. The Convention on Sim-
plified Extradition Procedure between the Member States of the European
Union, adopted by the European Council on 10 March 1995, aims to abolish
a number of bureaucratic formalities when the person in question agrees to
extradition. The Convention on Extradition between the Member States of
the European Union, adopted by the European Council of Dublin on 27
September 1996, seeks to facilitate extradition. The requested state may not
refuse a demand for extradition if the offence is punishable under the law of
the requesting States by a maximum period of at least 12 months’ imprison-
ment and by the law of the requested Member State with a penalty of a
maximum period of at least 6 months’ imprisonment. Should the offence be
classified in the requesting state as conspiracy or association to commit an
offence, the requested state cannot refuse extradition by claiming that its
penal law does not provide for the offence if the purpose of the conspiracy
or association is to commit crimes related to terrorism and drug trafficking
or other forms of illicit behaviour deleterious to individual freedom or which
create a collective danger. It is in any case necessary for these acts to be
punishable by the requesting member-state with a penalty amounting to at
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least 12 months’ imprisonment. Extradition may not be refused on the
grounds that the person requested is a national of the requested member-state.
These two Conventions are currently being ratified by the EU member-states.
Furthermore, an important European Union Convention on Mutual Assis-
tance in Criminal Matters is currently being drafted. The aim of the Conven-
tion is to reduce the difficulties deriving from cross-border searches for
evidence and to simplify and accelerate procedures by making it easier to
obtain evidence from other countries, by improving and intensifying cross-
border investigations, and by enabling contact and information exchange
among investigators and judges in different member-states.
In view of the fact that criminal groups are able to prosper because of
discrepancies among the legal systems of the member-states of the European
Union, it is evident that a key instrument in combating organised crime is the
inter-state harmonisation of penal legislation. A good example is provided
by the Council Resolution on Individuals who Co-operate with the Judicial
Process in the Fight against International Organised Crime, adopted on 20
December 1996. In this case the Council calls on all member-states to take
appropriate measures to encourage persons participating or having partici-
pated in a criminal organisation of any kind to co-operate with the judicial
process. By ‘co-operation’ is meant the disclosure of essential information
to the  investigation authorities, or collaboration with the  authorities in
depriving criminal groups of their illegal resources or their criminal proceeds.
Information may concern the composition or the activities of the criminal
network, its links with other illegal groups, or offences committed or about
to be committed by it. Following the advice of the Council, member-states
are required to introduce rules granting benefits to individuals who break
away from criminal organisations and help the authorities in the gathering of
evidence essential for identification of the perpetrators of crimes and their
arrest. Close protection is to be granted to these collaborators and to their
families or other individuals who, as a consequence of their revelations, are
likely to be exposed to serious and immediate danger. The Council also
stresses the need for judicial assistance among states as regards trials involv-
ing individuals co-operating in the fight against international organised
crime. Also, keeping clearly in mind that the instrument of the resolution is
not binding for Member States, the relevance of the Council’s act must be
stressed, for it represents a moral imperative and a well-defined way to be
followed in addressing criminal organised networks operating in Europe.
The elaboration of an efficient strategy against international criminal
syndicates should result in combating it on an international scale, and it
should allow for the circulation of police information and knowledge among
the law enforcement agencies of the Member States at least as fast as
organised crime gangs cross national borders. The European Union institu-
tions have always felt the need for police co-operation in the fight against
organised crime and have acted accordingly by formally establishing Europol
and its first step - the European Drug Unit (EDU).
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In June 1991 in Luxembourg, Heads of Government or State of all Member
States stressed, upon an initiative of the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl,
the urgency for creating a force called Europol. Pending the drafting of the
Convention establishing Europol, in June 1993 an embryonic form of Euro-
pol, the European Drug Unit (EDU), was set up through a ministerial
agreement. The initial task of EDU was the exchange of information among
law enforcement agencies on narcotics and money laundering. With a joint
action adopted by the European Council on 10 March 199543, the role of
EDU was better defined and this unit was put in charge of the exchange of
information and intelligence in relation to illegal organised criminal activ-
ities affecting two or more States and of helping police and relevant national
agencies to combat them. The criminal activities to be covered by EDU were
illegal drug trafficking, illicit trafficking in radioactive and nuclear sub-
stances, crimes involving clandestine immigration networks and illicit vehi-
cle trafficking. With another joint action, on 16 December 199644, the
Council extended the mandate of EDU also to the trafficking in human
beings. The creation of EDU was principally caused by the bureaucratic
slowness linked to the birth of Europol.
The Convention on the Establishing of a European Police Office (Europol
Convention), in fact, was drawn up by the European Council on 26 July 1995,
but as of this writing (December 1997) it has not yet been ratified by all
Member States. On the basis of this Convention, and with the aim of
improving the effectiveness of the competent authorities in the Member
States and co-operation among them in preventing and combating terrorism,
unlawful drug trafficking and all other forms of serious transnational crime,
Europol has been endowed with different tasks: to facilitate the exchange of
information among Member States; to obtain, collate and analyse informa-
tion; to notify the competent authorities of Member States without delay of
any information and connections detected among criminal offences; to aid
investigation within the Member States and to maintain a computerised
system for collecting information. In each Member State a national unit
should be established or designed and should serve as a liaison body between
Europol and national authorities.
At the Dublin European Council of 13 and 14 December 1996, conscious
of the need for a serious and co-ordinated approach by the Union to organised
crime problems, the Council expressed the hope of rapid ratification of the
Europol Convention by Member States. In this Council further decisions
have been taken, the most important of which was the establishing of a High
Level Group to draw up an action plan with specific recommendations
covering all the aspects of organised crime.
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This action plan, drafted by the High Level Group, was adopted by the
Council on 28 April 1997 and can be considered the most serious planning
of the activities of the Union against organised crime. The remainder of this
chapter will deal at greater length with this action plan because of its
relevance, its recent adoption, its broad and detailed range of proposals and
its long-term programme, which involves all European Union institutions and
Member States in active future collaboration. The guidelines, expressed in
recommendations, that the European Union and Member States should
follow in enhancing their struggle against organised crime are very clear.
In the field of police co-operation, each Member State should ensure a
high level of co-ordination among all its law enforcement agencies, provid-
ing a single central contact law enforcement agency to exchange information
and maintain contact with the authorities of other Member States (recom-
mendations no. 1-2). The action plan also asks for rapid ratification and
implementation of the Europol Convention, stressing that the powers of
Europol should be broadened to include the following: “(a) Europol should
be enabled to facilitate and support the preparation, co-ordination and
carrying out of specific investigative actions by the competent authorities of
the Member States...; (b) Europol should be allowed to ask Member States
to conduct investigations in specific cases...; (c) Europol should develop
specific expertise which may be put at the disposal of Member States to assist
them in investigating cases of organised cross-border crime...; (d) Full use
should be made of possibilities of Europol in fields of operational techniques
and support, analysis and data analyses files (for instance registers on stolen
cars or other property)...; (e) Access by Europol may be sought to the
Schengen Information System or its European successor” (recommendation
no. 25). The possibility for Europol to collaborate with third countries and
international organisations should also be taken into account (recommenda-
tion no. 24).
The Commission, the Council and Member States should develop a
comprehensive policy against corruption, trying to enhance the transparency
in public administration. This object should be achieved primarily through
prevention elements, “addressing such issues as the impact of defective
legislation, public-private relationships, transparency of financial manage-
ment, rules on participation in public procurement, and criteria for appoint-
ments to positions of public responsibility...”, but also not forgetting “the area
of sanctions, be they of a penal, administrative or civil character, as well as
the impact of the Union’s policy on relations with third States” (recommen-
dation no. 6). The Commission, the Council and Member States, together
with professional organisations concerned, should always study and diffuse
methods for reducing the susceptibility of liberal professions and other
professions to organised crime, for example through the adoption of codes
of conduct (recommendation no. 12). “The Member States and the European
Commission should ensure that the applicable legislation provides for the
possibility for an applicant in a public tender procedure who has committed
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offences connected with organised crime to be excluded from participation
in tender procedures conducted by Member States and by the Community. In
this context it should be studied whether and under what conditions persons
who are currently under investigation or prosecution for involvement in
organised crime could also be excluded. Specific attention should be paid to
the illicit origin of funds as a possible reason for exclusion” (recommendation
no. 7).
As far as fraud against the financial interests of the European Union is
concerned, recommendation no. 10 of the action plan states that: “the
Member States should consult regularly the competent services of the Com-
mission with a view to analysing cases of fraud affecting the financial
interests of the Community, and deepening the knowledge and understanding
of the complexities of these phenomena within existing mechanisms and
frameworks. If necessary, additional mechanisms shall be put in place with
a view to arranging such consultations on a regular basis. In this context,
future relations between Europol and the Commission’s anti-fraud unit
(UCLAF) should be taken into account.”
The action plan also considers the necessity for countries to harmonise
national legal systems by adopting the same offences all over the European
Union. Thus, on the basis of recommendation no. 17, “the Council is
requested rapidly to adopt a joint action aiming at making it an offence under
the laws of each Member State for a person, present in its territory, to
participate in a criminal organisation, irrespective of the location in the
Union where the organisation is concentrated or is carrying out its criminal
activity.”
On the basis of recommendation no. 9, the structural funds of the Union
should be employed to avoid large cities of the Union from becoming grounds
for organised criminal groups. ”Particular attention should be given to
groups not fully integrated in society, since these may be vulnerable targets
for criminal organisations.”
In the field of money laundering and confiscation of the proceeds of crime,
the action plan (recommendation no. 26) suggests that the Council, the
Commission and Europol endeavour to:
– improve the international exchange of data;
– make as general as possible the criminalisation of the laundering of the
proceeds of crime, considering the opportunity of extending this offence
to negligent behaviour;
– introduce in the legal systems of the Member States confiscation rules that
allow confiscation regardless of the presence of the offender, who could
have deceased or absconded;
– extend the obligation posed by article 6 of the European Directive on
Money Laundering to all offences linked with serious crimes and to
persons and professions different from financial institutions;
– address the issue of money laundering committed via the Internet and
other electronic means of payment (it should be remembered that recom-
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mendation no. 5 calls for a cross-pillar study in the field of high-technol-
ogy crime);
– try to reduce the use of cash payments and cash exchanges by natural and
legal persons from serving to cover up the conversion of the proceeds of
crime into other property;
– consider common strategies to be undertaken in the fields of economic
and commercial counterfeiting and in the falsification of banknote and
coins, also in view of the introduction of a single currency.
The action plan (recommendations no. 13-14) also calls for the rapid ratifi-
cation of the most relevant international Conventions concerning criminal
matters, such as (to cite some examples) the European Convention on
Extradition (Paris 1957), the Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters (Strasbourg 1978); the Convention on Laun-
dering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (Stras-
bourg 1990), the Agreement on Illicit Traffic by Sea, implementing Article
17 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances (Strasbourg 1995), the Convention on the Fight
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Vienna
1988). It also warmly invites Member States to ratify all the relevant Euro-
pean Union Conventions: the Convention on Simplified Extradition Proce-
dure between  the Member States of the European Union; the Europol
Convention, the Convention on the Protection of the European Communities’
Financial Interests, the Convention on the Use of Information Technology
for Customs Purposes; the Convention relating to Extradition between the
Member States of the European Union; and the Protocols to the Convention
on the Protection of the European Communities’ Financial Interests.
In conclusion, the Amsterdam Treaty should also be mentioned which,
modifying yet again the essential structure of the Union, could also be
considered a first attempt to follow some of the recommendations of the
action plan. Although signed on 21 September 1997, this Treaty has not yet
come into force, for it is waiting for ratification by all Member States. In
many of its points the Amsterdam Treaty focuses on criminal problems,
requiring different levels of co-operation among law enforcement and judi-
cial authorities of Member States, and between them and Europol, and calling
for the creation of a European research, documentation and statistical net-
work on cross-border crime within five years. On the basis of the articles of
the Amsterdam Treaty, Europol can ask Member States to conduct joint
investigations in specific cases; Member States are invited to set up joint
crime-fighting teams that can be supported by Europol; easier extradition of
criminals among Member States should be made possible, and all over the
Union a common minimum standard for rules and penalties in the field of
organised crime should be adopted.
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3.2.5 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD)
The OECD, established on 30 September, 1961, replaced the Organisation
for European Economic Co-operation.45 The twenty founding members of
the OECD were: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the
United Kingdom and the United States. Japan joined in 1964, Finland in
1969, Australia in 1971, and New Zealand in 1973. Yugoslavia was granted
special status in 1961, although its changing political status has not yet been
addressed by the OECD. INTERPOL, the Bank of International Settlements
and the Customs Co-operation Council all participate as observers.46
The supreme body of the Organisation, the Council, includes one repre-
sentative from each member country which also maintains a permanent
delegation and the functions of which is that of a normal diplomatic mission,
headed by an ambassador. The ambassador represents his or her country at
the meetings of the Council. Once a year, the Council meets at the Ministerial
level, under the chairmanship of one or more Ministers from the member
countries elected annually to this function. The Council produces Decisions
(legally binding on member countries) and Recommendations (expressions
of political will).47
Numerous international organisations that are not part of OECD, partici-
pate in OECD activities. The Commission of the European Communities
usually participates in the work of the OECD under a protocol signed at the
same time as the OECD Convention. The European Free Trade Association
may also send representatives to OECD meetings. In addition, the OECD
maintains official relations with the International Labour Organisation, the
Food and Agriculture Organisation, the International Monetary Fund, the
World Bank, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the International
Atomic Energy Agency and a large number of United Nations organisations.
In 1962, the OECD concluded special arrangements establishing close links
with the Council of Europe.48
The OECD entertains close relationships with other international organi-
sations; the twenty-four OECD members were among the first to join the
FATF, which is physically hosted by OECD. Despite the apparent willingness
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of individual OECD countries to combat money laundering, the OECD has
not published anything on the topics of money laundering, drug trafficking,
or asset forfeiture. The OECD has, however, held meetings on these topics
during the 1990-91 period.49
On 20 November 1997, OECD Member countries and five non-member
countries, Argentina,  Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile  and the Slovak Republic,
adopted a Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions. This Convention50 is the culmination of
two years of OECD work on the problem of making bribery of foreign
officials a crime. The Convention sets forth a standard for effective national
laws to criminalise bribery of foreign public officials in international business
transactions and a basis for effective international judicial co-operation.
The Convention deals with what, in the law of some countries, is called
“active corruption” or “active bribery”, meaning the offence committed by
the person who promises or gives the bride, as contrasted with passive
bribery, the offence committed by the official who receives the bribe. The
Convention seeks to assure a functional equivalence among the measures
taken by the Parties to sanction bribery of foreign public officials, without
requiring uniformity or changes in fundamental principles of a Party’s legal
system.
Article 1, “the offence of bribery of foreign public officials”, “establishes
a standard to be met by Parties, but does not require them to utilise its precise
terms in defining the offence under their domestic laws. It is an offence within
the meaning of article 1 to bribe to obtain or retain business or other improper
advantage through bribery whether or not the company concerned was the
best qualified bidder or was otherwise a company which could properly have
been awarded the business. The conduct prescribed by article 1 is an offence
whether the offer or promise is made or the pecuniary or other advantage is
given on that person’s own behalf or on behalf of any other natural person
or legal entity. It is also an offence irrespective of, inter alia, the value of the
advantage, its results, perceptions of local custom, the tolerance of such
payments by local authorities, or the necessity of the payment in order to
obtain or retain business or other improper advantage”.
As regards the sanctions, article 3 prescribes that “the bribery of a foreign
public official shall be punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive
criminal penalties. The range of penalties shall be comparable to that
applicable to the bribery of the Party’s own public official and shall, in the
case of natural persons, include deprivation of liberty sufficient to enable
effective mutual legal assistance and extradition. In the event that, under the
legal system of a Party, criminal responsibility is not applicable to legal
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persons, that Party shall ensure that legal persons shall be subject to effective,
proportionate and dissuasive non-criminal sanctions, including monetary
sanctions, for bribery of foreign public officials”.
Article 4 prescribes that, as regards the jurisdiction, “each Party shall take
such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the
bribery of a foreign public official when the offence is committed in whole or
in part in its territory. Each Party which has jurisdiction to prosecute its
nationals for offences committed abroad shall take such measures as may be
necessary to establish its jurisdiction to do so in respect of the bribery of a
foreign public official, according to the same principles”.
In article 7, “bribery of its own public official” “is intended broadly, so
that bribery of a foreign public official is to be made a predicate offence for
money laundering legislation on the same terms, when a Party has made
either active or passive bribery of its own public official such an offence.
When a Party has made only passive bribery of its own public officials a
predicate offence for money laundering purposes, article 7 requires that the
laundering of the bribe payment be subject to money laundering legislation”.
Article 9 states that “each Party shall, to the fullest extent possible under
its laws and relevant treaties and arrangements, provide prompt and effective
legal assistance to another Party for the purpose of criminal investigations
and proceedings brought by a Party concerning offences within the scope of
the Convention and for non-criminal proceedings within the scope of the
Convention brought by a Party against a legal person”.
Article 10 states that “a Party may consider the Convention to be a legal
basis for extradition if, for one or more category of case falling within this
Convention, it requires an extradition treaty. For example, a country may
consider it a basis for extradition of its nationals if it requires an extradition
treaty for that category but does not require one for extradition of non-na-
tionals”.
3.2.6 The Organisation of American States (OAS)
The Organisation of American States (OAS) was founded in 1890, and it is
a multinational organisation dedicated to the process of peace and develop-
ment in the Americas. The OAS is headquartered in Washington DC. It
currently has 35 Member States; in addition, the Organisation has granted
Permanent Observer status to 37 states as well as the European Union. The
Organisation operates through agencies and institutions throughout the West-
ern hemisphere. The OAS has made a significant effort in the area of the
development and codification of international law, with its organs adopting
over one hundred conventions regulating numerous aspects of public and
private law. Over the last few years, especially through the Plan of Action of
the Miami Summit held in December 1994, the OAS has also placed greater
focus on the problem of illicit drugs and related crimes.
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In the face of the growing drug problem, the OAS General Assembly
established in 1986 the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission
(CICAD), charging it with a mandate to promote and facilitate close co-
operation among member states in controlling illegal drug use, production
and drug trafficking.
The work of the CICAD is guided by the principles and objectives set out
in the Inter-American Program of Action of Rio de Janeiro Against the Illicit
Use and Production of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and
Traffic Therein, as well as in the provisions of the Anti-drug Strategy in the
Hemisphere, approved in 1996. Its primary objectives are to expand and
strengthen the member states’ capacity to lower the demand for illegal drugs
and prevent their use, to effectively combat illicit production and traffic
therein, and to promote a suitable inter-American response by increasing
regional activities involving research, information sharing, training of spe-
cialised personnel and reciprocal assistance.
In 1996, the CICAD comprised 29 member states: Argentina, the Baha-
mas, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Domi-
nica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana,
Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Saint Lucia, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, the United States, Uruguay and
Venezuela. At its twentieth regular session, the General Assembly added the
membership of Barbados and Grenada to CICAD, effective as per 1 January
1997.
In 1991, the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission created a
Group of Experts which prepared model anti-money laundering laws for
adoption by its members in order to harmonise differences in the legal
systems of the region. “Model Regulations Concerning Laundering Offenses
Connected to Illicit Drug Trafficking and Related Offenses,” were approved
by the CICAD in March 1992 and by the entire membership of the OAS in
May 1992, and recommended for adoption by its members. The framework
of the recommendations follows the Vienna Convention, and incorporates,
whenever possible, the recommendations tendered by the Financial Action
Task Force (FATF).
Also, since the Summit of the Americas Process began at the end of 1994,
the Executive Secretariat has been active in the Summit Initiative to Combat
the Problem of Illegal Drugs and Related Offences. Throughout 1995, the
Executive Secretariat participated with the member states in the process of
developing a draft Action Plan on Anti-Money Laundering Measures to be
agreed upon by Ministers responsible for combating money laundering in all
the countries of the hemisphere.
On 2 December, 1995 the Ministers met in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and
agreed to recommend the Action Plan to their respective governments in
furtherance of a co-ordinated hemispheric response to combat money laun-
dering including specific items for consideration by the OAS, CICAD and
its Expert Group in particular.
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In June 1996, the Group of Experts was reconvened to that end and reached
the following recommendations which were approved by the twentieth
regular session of CICAD held in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in October
199651, to the following effect:
– “to institute on-going assessment procedures;
– to carry out an initial analysis of the information provided in the replies
to the questionnaire. The analysis by the Group of Experts will first be
provided to individual member states to ensure accuracy and then be
published for distribution among member states of the Organisation;
– to consider in detail the desirability of countries establishing financial
investigation units and, if so agreed, to make a recommendation to amend
CICAD’s Model Regulations on Money Laundering accordingly;
– to develop a typologies exercise, including the collation and analysis of
money laundering methods, patterns and trends. This information can be
used to gain and exchange knowledge of the current money laundering
situation and to suggest future counter-measures”.
As regards the drug trafficking problem, at its sixteenth semi-annual session
in October 1994 the OAS/CICAD issued the “Declaration of Santiago”
which renewed the political commitment of the member states to support
CICAD and strengthen hemispheric co-operation against drug trafficking
and abuse. Meeting in Buenos Aires on its tenth anniversary, CICAD also
approved a new Hemispheric Anti-Drug Strategy as a platform for enhanced
drug control efforts in the twenty-first century. The new Anti-drug Strategy
in the Hemisphere52 (the Strategy), approved at CICAD’s twentieth regular
session held in October 1996, represents a commitment to international
co-operation to combat the drug problem, based on the principle of shared
responsibility and the need for a policy that balances preventive and law-en-
forcement measures. CICAD’s action programme supports drug control
activities region-wide in five priority areas and, among these, the “Legal
Development” regards the measures to improve the capacity of member
governments to prosecute drug-related crimes, and in particular, the devel-
opment of legislation for the control of money laundering, arms trafficking,
and the illegal diversion of precursor chemicals.
The Strategy was signed by representatives of some member states at the
ministerial-level meeting held in Montevideo, Uruguay, in December 1996.
Following the CICAD’s recommendations, the Hemispheric Anti-drug Strat-
egy shall be applied in accordance with the following terms:
– “the problem of drugs, which has become increasingly important in the
world, manifests itself as a complex, shifting and global phenomenon;
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– the problem of drug abuse and the demand for drugs, and the illicit
production, distribution and trafficking of drugs, including synthetic or
“designer” drugs, continue to be grave and interrelated. Sources of
special concern are the negative consequences of illicit drugs and other
controlled substances, and related offenses, which pose a serious threat
to the health and integrity of the individual and the normal development
of society (...);
– in view of the complexity and the global nature of the problem, the
countries of the hemisphere recognise the need to strengthen international
co-operation and for constant review and improvement of national poli-
cies, taking into account the particular circumstances of the phenomenon
as it appears in each country;
– the Hemispheric Anti-drug Strategy addresses the drug problem from a
global and multidisciplinary perspective. All countries of the hemisphere
recognise that they share a responsibility for ensuring that a comprehen-
sive and balanced approach is taken on all aspects of the phenomenon,
taking into account their available capabilities and resources (...)”.
The Anti-drug Strategy in the Hemisphere states that:
– “dismantling criminal organisations and their support networks should
be another of the key objectives of initiatives taken by the countries of the
hemisphere against illegal drug trafficking and related crimes. Enforcing
the law with respect to perpetrators, instrumentalities and proceeds from
criminal activities is an effective deterrent to participation in these unlaw-
ful activities;
– the countries of the hemisphere will intensify their efforts to exchange
information and gather evidence to enable them to bring to trial and
sentence the leaders and other members of criminal organisations and
their support networks, within the framework of full respect for due process
of the law.
– the countries of the hemisphere recognise the importance of having
modern legal systems for an effective strategy against the problem of
illegal drug trafficking and related crimes and the need to have adequate
extradition procedures;
– the countries of the hemisphere recognise that the smuggling of drugs,
chemicals, weapons and explosives, and the cross-border movement of
illicitly acquired assets by any means or method to avoid detection is a
grave problem (...);
– the countries of the hemisphere also recognise that implementation of
national programs and effective international co-operation in the area of
information exchange, training and the conduct of operations to detect,
track and confiscate these illicit shipments are important aspects of a
comprehensive strategy to be developed with due respect for the sover-
eignty and territorial integrity of each country”.
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On 29 March 1996, 23 member states of the OAS, recognising that “corrup-
tion is often a tool used by organised crime for the accomplishment of its
purposes”, signed the Inter-American Convention against Corruption.53 This
Convention is the first international instrument of its kind designed to
promote and strengthen the development by each state party of the mecha-
nisms needed to prevent, detect, punish and eliminate corruption; and to
promote, facilitate and regulate co-operation among the states parties to
ensure the effectiveness of the measures and actions to prevent, detect, punish
and eliminate acts of corruption in the performance of public duties and acts
of corruption specifically connected with those duties.
The purposes of the Convention are:
– “to promote and strengthen the development by each of the States Parties
of the mechanisms needed to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate cor-
ruption and
– to promote, facilitate and regulate co-operation among the States Parties
to ensure the effectiveness of measures and actions to prevent, detect,
punish and eradicate corruption in the performance of public functions
and acts of corruption specifically related to such performance”.
The States Parties have agreed to consider the applicability of measures
within their own institutional systems to create, maintain and strengthen,
among others:
– “standards of conduct for the correct, honourable, and proper fulfilment
of public functions”;
– “systems for registering the income, assets and liabilities of persons who
perform public functions in certain posts as specified by law and, where
appropriate, for making such registration public”;
– “government revenue collection and control systems that deter corrup-
tion”;
– “laws that deny favourable tax treatment for any individual or corporation
for expenditures made in violation of the anti-corruption laws of the States
Parties”;
– “systems for protecting public servants and private citizens who, in good
faith, report acts of corruption, including protection of their identities, in
accordance with their Constitutions and the basic principles of their
domestic legal systems”;
– “oversight bodies with a view to implementing modern mechanisms for
preventing, detecting, punishing and eradicating corrupt acts”;
– “deterrents to the bribery of domestic and foreign government officials,
such as mechanisms to ensure that publicly held companies and other
types of associations maintain books and records which, in reasonable
detail, accurately reflect the acquisition and disposition of assets, and
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have sufficient internal accounting controls to enable their officers to
detect corrupt acts”;
– “mechanisms to encourage participation by civil society and non-govern-
mental organisations in efforts to prevent corruption”.
3.2.7 Other international initiatives in the fight against
organised crime
This section aims to illustrate further steps taken by the international com-
munity against illegal criminal activities of organised crime, giving some
more examples of international organisations (both governmental and non-
governmental) and co-operational processes active in this context. In particu-
lar, attention focuses on: Interpol, the intergovernmental processes concern-
ing migrant trafficking within Europe, the International Organisation for
Migration (IOM), the Secretariat of the Inter-Governmental Consultations
on Asylum, Refugee and Migration Policies in Europe, North America and
Australia (IGC), the End Child Prostitution in Asian Tourism (ECPAT) and
Transparency International (TI).
Interpol is an international police force, the task of which is to assist police
authorities of the Member States (now almost all the nations of the world) in
collecting and sharing information on criminality. In the last years the
attention of Interpol had concentrated mainly on organised crime and on
collateral criminal activities, such as money laundering, and on developing
different forms of technical assistance for those states more at risk of criminal
infiltration, such as the Eastern European states.
At the 64th session of Interpol’s General Assembly, held in October 1995,
a resolution was unanimously adopted establishing the first major anti-money
laundering declaration in the organisation’s history. The adoption of this
major money laundering resolution by the member countries illustrates
Interpol’s commitment to thwarting international financial crimes and their
desire to strengthen international co-operation. The resolution recommends
that Interpol member countries consider adopting national legislation that
would:
– provide for the criminal prosecution of persons who knowingly participate
in the laundering of proceeds derived from serious criminal activity;
– allow for the seizure of property, with sufficient legal investigative author-
ity for law enforcement officials to identify, trace and freeze assets derived
from illicit activities;
– allow for the reporting of unusual or suspect currency or other transactions
by banks and other financial institutions, to appropriate officials who
would have authority to conduct further investigative inquiries.
– require financial institutions to maintain, at least for five years after the
conclusion of the transaction, all necessary records on transactions, both
domestic and international, in order to enable member countries to prop-
erly investigate money laundering and to enhance international co-opera-
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tion, by enabling member states to respond to requests from authorities in
other countries for such records;
– allow for the expeditious extradition of individuals charged with money
laundering offences.
In the field of migrant trafficking, from the beginning of the 1990s, some
international conferences have been held in Europe. They represent the
beginning of an important process of co-operation among Western and
Central-Eastern European countries on this matter. The Vienna Conference
(24-25 January 1991) and the Berlin Conference (30-31 October 1991) were
the first to address the phenomenon of alien smuggling in the European
region. Following these two conferences, a third one, held in Budapest on
15-16 February 1993, made specific recommendations related to migrant
smuggling in the European region and, most important, established a Work-
ing Group, the so-called Budapest Group, to follow the implementation of
these recommendations. Some recommendations of the Budapest Confer-
ence are related to re-admission agreements and declare the responsibility
principle of transit countries and the forced transportation of illegal aliens to
their countries of origin. Others are about the exchange of information.
Others again try to target traffickers through the criminalisation of their
activities, foreseeing specific offences and the confiscation of their proceeds
and means of transport.54 The Budapest Group, consisting of the Presidents
of the EU, of the ‘Schengen Group’ and of EFTA, together with four
European countries, is charged with the task of overseeing the follow-up of
these recommendations. The Group has already met several times. The first
meeting, in December 1993, was aimed at setting up the mandate and the
work method of the Group itself. In the second meeting, in Prague on 1-2
December 1994, the European Union States underlined the need to fully
co-operate with their Central and Eastern European partners. To reach this
aim an Expert Group was set up, the members of which are Austria, the Czech
Republic, Croatia, Hungary, Switzerland, the Presidencies of the European
Union and the Schengen Group, together with three supporting technical
organisations: the IOM, the IGC and the International Centre for Migration
Policy Development (ICMPD). This Expert Group met three times between
December 1994 and July 1995, before presenting a report on the results of
its work, which was approved by the Budapest Group at its third session, on
14-25 September 1995, in Zurich. In the Zurich session attention was focused
on the harmonisation of legislation to combat migrant trafficking; the Group
stressed the need for broadening the geographical scope of national laws, for
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strengthening the existing penalties for human traffickers and harmonising
anti-trafficking legislation of Central-Eastern and Western European coun-
tries. Furthermore in Zurich, the Budapest Group prolonged the mandate of
the Expert Group in preparation for the Oslo session. The experts were asked
to study four themes: the enhancing of previous decisions; anti-trafficking
model legislation; methods for exchanging information; and ways of techni-
cal and financial support among countries. During the Oslo meeting, held on
3-4 September 1996, the Budapest Group approved the report presented by
the Expert Group and, particularly, concentrated its attention on the need for
a minimum legislative standard against human trafficking all over Europe
(in trying to harmonise penal systems of Western and Central-Eastern Euro-
pean nations).
The IOM and the IGC, which are also supporting bodies of the Budapest
Group consultation process (as already noted), are two intergovernmental
organisations heavily involved in the world-wide study of migration dynam-
ics, with special attention to the alien trafficking phenomenon and the
harmonisation of legislation and law enforcement practices to disrupt it.
Among the many non-governmental organisations that contribute to curb-
ing organised crime in the alien smuggling sector, the End Child Prostitution
in Asian Tourism (ECPAT) should also be mentioned. This organism was
established in August 1990 by a community of individuals and organisations
who work together to end the spreading phenomenon of child prostitution in
Asian tourism, with particular attention to the trafficking of children and
women in the Asian continent. Its central office is located in Bangkok,
Thailand. At the April 1996 Executive Meeting, a new mandate was given to
ECPAT, that will continue its work through the campaign “End Child Pros-
titution, Child Pornography and the Trafficking of Children for Sexual
Purposes” extended to a wider geographical area, including most countries
in the world. The main activities in which ECPAT is involved are: building a
network of contacts among countries, establishing links among organisa-
tions, monitoring existing legislation (identifying loopholes and suggesting
legislative innovations), studying practical cases, adopting publicity cam-
paigns and developing national and international standards to protect chil-
dren. The main goals already achieved by the organisation can be synthesised
as follows:
– the reality of the commercial exploitation of children and of their traffic
has been recognised world-wide;
– Asian  countries have  changed their legislation to make possible the
prosecution of foreign sex abusers and to better protect minors (the
Philippines in 1992, Sri Lanka in 1995, Taiwan in 1995, Thailand in 1996);
– laws promoted by ECPAT that enable industrialised countries to punish
their own nationals for offences committed against children in other states
have been passed in Germany (1993), France (1994); Australia (1994);
USA (1994), Belgium (1995) and New Zealand (1995);
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– ECPAT is working closely with Interpol to monitor the activities of sex
offenders and of criminal organisations trafficking in children, bringing
many criminals before the courts of Asian countries. ECPAT enhanced the
strengthening of bilateral law enforcement, training of officers and the
enacting of special police programmes;
– the tourism industry has been made aware of its great responsibility in
protecting children in the context of sex tourism.
In the struggle against corruption, Transparency International (TI) has to be
mentioned. TI is a non-profit, non-governmental organisation, the aim of
which is to counter corruption both in international business transactions and,
through national Chapters, at national levels. The action of TI, through
studies, research, conferences and contacts with governments and individ-
uals, has the declared purpose of pushing governments to set up and imple-
ment effective anti-corruption legislation, policies and programmes;
strengthening public support and understanding for anti-corruption pro-
grammes; enhancing public transparency in international business transac-
tions and in the public administration in general; and encouraging all parties
to international business transactions to operate at the highest levels of
integrity, guided in particular by TI’s Standards of Conduct. All this should
be  achieved by establishing coalitions of individuals and governments;
participating in public fora; using publicity as a means for letting people
understand the damages caused by corruptive practices; and building national
chapters, that are more closely linked to the country situation and that
consequently are more capable of addressing local corruption problems.
Among the principal instruments that up to now have sustained Transpar-
ency International in constructing its network with governments and other
international organisations, educational programmes should be mentioned,
as well as conferences and contacts established through the national Chap-
ters. A recent ambitious project of TI consists in creating “Islands of Integ-
rity”, that is to say entire geographical areas totally without corruption, like
the one that is under construction in Ecuador.55 The instrument utilised to
concretise the idea of the “Integrity Islands” is represented by the Anti-Brib-
ery Pact, a declaration that the parties involved in a transaction have to
subscribe in order to stipulate a contract or to participate in a public procure-
ment. The Anti-Bribery Pact consists of two declarations that have to be
signed both by the government that binds itself to TI in adopting the
anti-corruption programme and by all the firms that are going to respond to
the public procurement. The prospective of large money penalties in case of
violation of the agreement gives it a special deterrent force.
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3.3 Bilateral agreements as a means
to combat organised crime
In this context the role of bilateral agreements and, in particular, of mutual
legal assistance treaties (MLAT) as an instrument to curb organised crime
cannot be bypassed and minimised. This kind of agreement is signed by two
countries. In it, the two countries consent to improve and intensify cross-bor-
der co-operation, to increase the level of investigations by sharing informa-
tion and know-how and to ease judicial co-operation by speeding up the
exchange of criminal proceeds and, among others, making the extradition of
criminals easier. The essential feature of these agreements is that they can be
tailor-made and they are adaptable to the different requirements and urgen-
cies which arise in a specific geographical context. Consequently, they can
more easily counter the peculiar threats coming from well-defined criminal
groups or criminal activities. Unfortunately, they also have some disadvan-
tages; in particular, it is very difficult for small states to get involved in the
negotiations needed to give life to such agreements, since such states often
lack the resources, competence and expertise required to finalise them.
It is not difficult to understand why bilateral and multilateral agreements
have spread all over the world, particularly in the areas where the presence
of organised criminal activities which can cross the borders with great ease
represents an alarming menace to the national stability. Building up special
law enforcement and legal assistance networks among countries can, there-
fore, be seen as a comprehensive response to the way in which criminal
organisations exploit particular countries and particular trafficking routes.
The United States, in particular, has always been very active in construct-
ing this web of agreements with other countries in order to counteract
organised criminality. Here reference should be made to the mutual agree-
ment which was signed in November 1982 between the United States and
Italy and which gave a powerful tool to magistrates and public prosecutors
in dismantling the organised criminal connections between the two nations.
More recently the United States has adopted other instruments of this kind.
On 23 May 1997 a mutual legal assistance Treaty between the United States
and Korea entered into force, extending to Southeast Asia the ability of
United States agencies to pursue money laundering cases and representing a
United States commitment to block international money laundering escape
routes. The United States - Korea treaty is the seventh MLAT that America
has put in force since the beginning of 1996. These agreements enhance
bilateral co-operation in criminal cases in Europe, South America, Southeast
Asia and the Caribbean56. On 30 April 1997, the United States and Australia
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signed a MLAT, with the aim of strengthening law enforcement investigations
in criminal cases. This MLAT includes taking testimony or statements;
providing documents, records and other evidence; transferring persons in
custody for testimony and other purposes; locating and identifying persons;
serving documents; and executing requests for searches and seizures and
freezing assets. In the Asia-Pacific region, the United States has a MLAT with
Thailand and recently concluded one with Hong Kong.57
A Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty signed by the United States usually
contains one or more of the following provisions:
– assistance in the investigation and prosecution of a range of crimes,
including money laundering;
– assistance in legal procedures such as taking testimony, locating persons,
and freezing forfeitable assets;
– availability of MLAT mutual assistance for offences that both countries
consider felonies, such as drug trafficking, theft and fraud, as well as
currency transaction violations;
– establishment of a “central authority” in each country to follow processing
and the executing of the assistance requests;
– permission to conduct searches and seizures relating to offences commit-
ted in the other signatory country;
– the commitment of the requested nations to promptly give assistance58.
As far as Europe is concerned, through a process of co-operation, contacts
have recently been established, especially among Western European nations
and with Central/Eastern European countries. It is therefore important to
mention that, as a consequence of the serious criminal problems inherent to
the relation between Italy and Albania, these two countries have signed a
bilateral agreement on 28 October 1997, aimed at stepping up the fight
against organised crime. On 13 December 1996, another agreement of the
same kind had been signed by Albania and Austria. Hungary signed bilateral
agreements with Moldova (June 1997), Latvia (March 1997), Poland (May
1996) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (April 1996). Poland concluded agreements
on the fight against organised crime with Slovenia (August 96) and the United
Kingdom (June 1997). On 6 October 1997, the United Kingdom and Russia
signed a joint plan for the fight against organised crime. On 4 April 1995,
Germany and Belarus signed an agreement for tightening their co-operation
in the fight against organised crime and nuclear smuggling. Many others
could be mentioned as examples of the strengthening network for mutual
co-operation.
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Turning to other regions, on 7 January 1997 the Israeli Government
approved mutual legal assistance legislation and sent it to the Knesset. This
legislation allows for comprehensive reciprocal legal assistance with compe-
tent foreign authorities regarding asset forfeiture investigations, the provision
of material evidence and witnesses for forfeiture proceedings and the imple-
mentation of forfeiture orders.59 Turkey has signed several bilateral agree-
ments to enhance co-operation in international narcotics interdiction. Turkey
also signed an agreement with the former Soviet Union in December 1990.
India has extradition treaties with Bhutan, Belgium, Canada, Nepal, The
Netherlands, Uganda, Britain and the USA. In September 1992, India and
Great Britain signed an extradition treaty and an agreement on the confis-
cation of terrorists’ property and assets. This agreement might inhibit the
illegal movement or laundering of money, particularly through the hawala
system which is widely used in the UK. At present, efforts are being made
to conclude extradition treaties with Hong Kong, Germany, the United Arab
Emirates, France and a new extradition treaty with the US. India has also
entered into mutual legal assistance agreements with Turkey, Switzerland,
the UK and Canada. At present efforts are being made to conclude mutual
legal assistance agreements with France. In addition to standard features, the
agreements with the UK and Canada, which are the most recent ones, also
provide for the confiscation of the proceeds of crime. Furthermore, the
Ministry of Home Affairs has concluded agreements with some countries for
combating terrorism and organised crime. On 5 May 1994, Pakistan signed
an agreement with Iran and the United Nations Drug Control Programme to
co-operate on controlling drug transit trade from Afghanistan. On 1 June
1995, Pakistan also signed two agreements with Kazakhstan on co-operation
in the fight against organised crime, drug trafficking and other dangerous
crimes. During 1994, it also agreed with the United Arab Emirates to expand
co-operation against “narco-terrorists”. Myanmar has modest anti-drug co-
operation with neighbouring countries. In late 1994, Myanmar and Bangla-
desh formally signed a drug co-operation agreement calling for information-
sharing and co-ordination of enforcement activities along the two countries’
mutual border.
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4 National Responses
to Organised Crime
– Recent trends
4.1 Introduction
4  National Responses to Organised Crime
Previous chapters have analysed organised crime trends and countermeasures
at the international or regional levels. The aim of this chapter is to describe
the manner in which countries have tackled the problem of organised criminal
groups and their activity at the national level. Different countries have in fact
responded according to the specific local threats raised by the criminal groups
they have to deal with. Despite the fact that different policies to counteract
organised crime can be formulated according to the purpose such policies
pursue (prevention or crime control), attention will be focused only on the
ways in which criminal law and law enforcement have been adjusted to
national legal systems. Three issues characterising the modern approach to
the matter will be analysed :
– the offence of belonging to a criminal association;
– the forfeiture and confiscation of illicitly acquired assets;
– law enforcement agencies and special means of investigation, including
witness protection programmes.
Reconstructing the legislation of different countries in these three areas is
virtually impossible, given that change takes place extremely rapidly, so that
information may be outdated and contradictory. For this reason, the informa-
tion set out in the present report should be considered as solely indicative of
country-specific situations. The data are derived from various sources: the
United Nations, the P-8 Group, the European Union, the OECD, the Council
of Europe and other major organisations, as well as from reports prepared by
experts on individual countries.
In keeping with the same structure of the second chapter of this report,
countries (those for which information is available) will be aggregated into
regional areas: North America, Central/South America, Western Europe,
Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia and Oceania. If a country is not mentioned, this
signifies either that information on this country was irrelevant to this report
or that it was not made available.
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4.2 Criminalising organised crime
Previous chapters have emphasised that the distinctive feature of organised
crime  is its organisational structure, which denotes some characteristic
features, rather than any particular criminal activity. The following compo-
nents represent the common denominator of organised criminal groups; a
structured organisation (either hierarchical or flexible) consisting of persons
who co-operate for a prolonged or indefinite length of time, the pursuit of
profit making, and the use of violence, intimidation and corruption.
The more complex organised crime becomes, the more difficult it is to find
a definition which is agreed upon by the law enforcement community,
academics, the media, and “supergrasses”, who have often improved our
understanding of organised crime, though only from a specific and partial
perspective. Moreover, since organised crime today is simultaneously a
domestic and an international problem, one which often raises similar threats
in different regions, it is important for each country to seek its own solutions
for its own problems while co-operating with other countries in tackling the
more general problem of the transnational dimension of organised crime.
Substantive criminal law has adapted to the changes brought about by
organised crime in different ways. The countries most seriously threatened
by organised crime have reacted by refining their legislation. In recent
decades, the main innovations in criminal legislation against organised crime
have concerned participation in the activities of criminal organisations and
the confiscation of assets acquired by means of criminal activity.
A recent trend that has substantially modified criminal legislation is
“Participation in Organised Criminal Associations”, which in many countries
corresponds to the crime of “conspiracy”. A conspiracy is the formation of a
combination of two or more persons on a continuing basis for the purpose of
committing an indefinite number of unlawful or criminal acts through the
common use of all necessary means to pursue a criminal course of action. To
be found guilty of criminal conspiracy, a defendant must be permanently
aware of his/her membership of that conspiracy, and s/he must be constantly
ready to implement its pre-established plans. Owing to the characteristics of
mafia culture, conspiracy has always been difficult to prove at trial. In view
of these difficulties, in 1982 Italy enacted a law providing for a new offence.
Three kinds of association crime are envisaged in Italy, and they are used
to counteract organised crime and its entrepreneurial dimension. Two of them
are closely interrelated: common association crime and drug-trafficking
association crime. The third offence is more specific and is known as
mafia-type association crime. An association is mafia-type when its members
systematically exploit a situation of environmental intimidation and the
widespread condition of duress deriving therefrom, not only in order to
commit crimes but also to acquire control of economic activities, or at any
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rate to gain unlawful advantages.1 Penalties are harsh: a minimum of four
years’ imprisonment, which in particularly aggravating circumstances is
increased to fifteen years for ordinary members and twenty-two years for
bosses and managers. Moreover, each specific crime committed within the
association is to be punished separately. A mafia-type association may be
simultaneously a drug-trafficking one, in which case, under the Italian law,
the two association incriminations may occur and be applied together, and
an increased penalty is applied.2
Born of an emergency situation, this law has proved highly effective in
combatting organised crime in Italy. Given the previous difficulty of gather-
ing sufficient evidence of crimes committed by members of a criminal
organisation, the new offence enables the court to convict a person upon sole
proof of his/her membership of a certain type of organisation. The crime of
“membership of an organised crime association” is based on the assumption
that members of criminal organisations commit crimes; an assumption that
has made it possible to prosecute top bosses for this crime alone, on the basis
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“Any person participating in a Mafia-type unlawful association including three or
more persons shall be liable to imprisonment for 3 to 6 years.
Those persons promoting, directing or organising the said association shall be liable,
for this sole offence, to imprisonment for 4 to 9 years.
Mafia-type unlawful association is said to exist when the participants take advantage
of the intimidating power of the association and of the resulting condition of submission
and silence to commit criminal offences, to manage, at all levels, control, either directly
or indirectly, of economic activities, concessions, authorisations, public contracts and
services, or to obtain unlawful profits or advantages for themselves or for others, or
with a view to preventing or limiting the freedom to vote, or to get votes for themselves
or for others on the occasion of an election.
Should the association be of the armed type, the punishment shall be imprisonment for
4 to 10 years pursuant to paragraph 1 and imprisonment for 5 to 15 years pursuant to
paragraph 2.
An association is said to be of the armed type when the participants have firearms or
explosives at their disposal, even if hidden or deposited elsewhere, to achieve the
objectives of the said association.
If the economic activities of which the participants in the said association aim to
achieve or maintain the control are funded, totally or partially, by the price, the product
or the proceeds of criminal offences,  the punishments  referred to in the above
paragraphs shall be increased by one-third to one-half.
The offender shall always be liable to confiscation of the items that were used or meant
to be used to commit the offence and of the items that represent the price, the product
or the proceeds of such offence or the use thereof.
The provisions of this article shall also apply to the Camorra and to any other
association, whatever its local title, seeking to achieve objectives that correspond to
those of Mafia-type unlawful association by taking advantage of the intimidating power
of the association.”
2 G. Turone, “Mafia-type criminality: The special features of Italian criminal law and
procedure to combat it”, paper presented at the Council of Europe Multilateral Seminar
on Organised Crime, Minsk, Belarus, 16-18 September 1996.
of evidence provided by turncoats. The law has proved its potential in a long
series of trials which have concluded with the conviction and sentencing of
top-ranking mafia leaders.
The Italian example of 1982 follows, albeit with numerous differences,
the American law set out in the legislation of the 1970s. Although judicial
interpretations of the United States Constitution have prevented the Congress
from prohibiting mere membership of an organised crime group, the Rack-
eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organisations Statute, commonly known as
RICO (18 USCA § 1961), makes it an offence for a person to participate in
the affairs of an enterprise involved in racketeering.
“Racketeering activity” is defined in § 1961 (1) as:
(A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery,
bribery, extortion or dealing in narcotic or rather dangerous drugs, which
is chargeable under state law and punishable by imprisonment for more
than one year;
(B) any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title
18 United States Code:
– section 201 (relating to bribery),
– section 224 (relating to sports bribery),
– sections 471, 472 and 473 (relating to counterfeiting),
– section 659 ( relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act
indictable under section 659 is felonious,
– section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare
funds),
– sections 891-894 (relating to extortion of credit transactions),
– section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling information),
– section 1341 (relating to mail fraud),
– section 1343 (relating to wire fraud),
– section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice),
– section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations),
– section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforce-
ment),
– section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or
extortion),
– section 1952 (relating to racketeering),
– section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering para-
phernalia),
– section 1994 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments),
– section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling busi-
nesses),
– sections 2312 and 2313 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen
motor vehicles),
– sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen
property),
– section 2320 (relating to trafficking in certain motor vehicles or motor
vehicle parts),
– sections 2341-46 (relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes),
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– sections 2421-24 (relating to white slave trafficking);
(C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section
186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labour organisa-
tions) or section 5012 (c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds)
or
(D) any offence involving bankruptcy fraud, fraud in the sale of security, or
the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying,
selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, pun-
ishable under any law of the United States.
The RICO statute allows prosecutors to link separate offences together,
enabling successful indictment with the imposition of triple damages, as well
as long terms of imprisonment. The RICO Act, part of the 1970 Organised
Crime Control Act, created the most important substantive and procedural
legal instrument in the history of organised crime control. It was explicitly
targeted at organised crime, and especially designed to counter its infiltration
of legitimate business. Introducing the concept of enterprise racketeering
changed the way in which organised crime investigations were conceived and
conducted, since RICO made it a crime to infiltrate, participate in, or conduct
the affairs of an enterprise engaged in racketeering. An enterprise is defined
as any “association in fact” comprised of two or more people. In US versus
Turkette,3 the US Supreme Court ruled that an enterprise could be a wholly
illegitimate group. This prompted a wave of prosecutions against individuals
for participating in criminal syndicates like Cosa Nostra. Since they have
only to prove an “association in fact” in an organised crime case, prosecutors
are provided with an excellent opportunity to introduce extensive evidence,
complete with charts and tables of organisations which depict the structure
of an organised crime family.
RICO requires the government to prove that a defendant has conducted or
participated in the affairs of an enterprise through “a pattern of racketeering
activity”, which is defined as at least two racketeering acts committed within
ten years of each other. The term “racketeering activity” (also called a “RICO
predicate”) is given detailed definition in the RICO statute, and it encom-
passes virtually all serious criminal activity prohibited by either state or
federal law, such as murder, robbery, drug dealing, fraud, and other serious
crimes listed in the statute. Thus, in a RICO trial, the defendant may find
himself charged with a variety of different crimes allegedly committed
at different times and places. The prosecution need only prove that the
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required proof of racketeer infiltration of a legitimate business, union, or governmental
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defendant committed all these crimes in furtherance of his/her participation
in the affairs of the enterprise.
RICO also provides for extremely severe sentences: twenty years on each
RICO violation and twenty further years for a RICO conspiracy. In addition,
RICO provides for large fines and the forfeiture of property (broadly defined
to include businesses, offices, jobs, personal property, cars, boats, planes and
real estate) acquired out of the proceeds of racketeering activity.
Another RICO criminal provision has proved of great importance, since
it gives the federal government the right to sue civilly for wide-ranging
injunctions to prevent a RICO offence from continuing. RICO’s civil focus
is future-oriented and preventive, rather than punitive. In fact, a judge may
issue whatever injunction or other remedial order necessary to prevent further
racketeering by the defendants. This topic will be analysed in greater detail
below.
Moreover, the Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute (CCE) is directed
only against persons engaged in large-scale drug dealing and requires, inter
alia, that the defendant commit at least three violations of the drug laws while
acting as a manager or organiser of five or more people. The United States
also has a statute which prohibits general criminal conspiracies and a separate
statute which prohibits drug-related ones.
The USA have taken another important step forward in the fight against
organised crime by introducing the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforce-
ment Act of 1994. This act introduces new and stiffer provisions for violent
drug-trafficking crimes committed by street gangs, increasing the maximum
prison sentence by up to ten years, under certain circumstances, for federal
drug or violent offences committed by members of a street gang. The Act
defines a “criminal street gang” as an “ongoing” group or association of five
or more persons which has as one of its primary purposes either:
– the commission of a federal drug offence, punishable by at least five years
in jail, or
– the commission of a federal violent offence.
In addition, members must have engaged within the previous five years in a
“continuing series” of such offences, and the gang’s activities must affect
interstate or foreign commerce.
Other countries without experience of the extensive organised crime
groups active in Italy and the USA for so many years have hesitated to follow
the Italian and American example, convinced that the category of ‘conspiracy
crime’ suffices to deal with the new types of organised crime. Moreover,
many countries punish organised crime according to their own particular
perception of the problem.
According to the definition used by the German Bundeskriminalamt
(BKA), for example, “organised crime is the planned commission of criminal
offences, determined by the pursuit of profit and power, which individually
or as a whole, are of considerable importance, whenever more than two
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persons involved collaborate for a prolonged or indefinite period of time,
each with own appointed tasks
– by using commercial or business-like structures, or
– by using violence or other means suitable for intimidation, or
– by exerting influence on politics, the media, public administration, judicial
authorities or the economy”.4
This BKA definition provides a benchmark for determination of whether a
criminal group ranks as “organised crime”. The definition has both its
advantages and disadvantages. While it has the advantage of focusing on
various forms of organised business crime, it does not specify what is to be
deemed “of considerable importance”, nor does it differentiate between
various categories of organised crime.
With some exceptions, one notes emerging consensus among different
legislations with regard to organised crime activities. A review of the legis-
lation of a number of countries with different cultural backgrounds shows
that certain offences are repeatedly cited as exemplifying organised crime
activities: illicit narcotics trafficking, gang robbery, receiving stolen goods,
trading in illicit firearms, blackmail, management and procuring of prostitu-
tion and illicit gaming (Germany); distribution of illegal drugs, kidnapping
for profit, extortion, fraud, loan sharking and counterfeiting of public money
or securities (Italy); dangerous drugs, offences against the person, larceny,
forgery and corruption (Jamaica). Statutory law in England and Wales
considers the following to be criminal activities: various forms of fraud, false
accounting, handling of stolen property, drug trafficking, forgery, living off
the earnings of prostitution, and various forms of assault, while according to
English and Welsh Common Law the following are criminal activities:
murder, manslaughter, kidnapping and false imprisonment.5
North America
Canada has long debated the introduction of organised crime as a criminal
offence. The country consequently does not envisage the specific offence of
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4 Arbeitsgruppe Justiz/Polizei des BKA, May 1990: “Organisierte Kriminalität ist die
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einzeln, oder in ihrer Gesamtheit von erheblicher Bedeutung sind, wenn mehr als zwei
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a. unter Anwendung von Gewalt oder anderer zur Einschüchterung geeigneter Mittel,
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b. unter Einflußnahme auf Politik, Medien, öffentliche Verwaltung, Justiz und
Wirtschaftzusammenwirken.”
5 E.U. Savona, “Enhancing national capabilities”, in E.U. Savona and P. Williams, Five
Papers prepared for the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch, United
Nations, Vienna, July 1994.
membership of a criminal organisation, although art. 462.3 of the criminal
code introduces the concept of “enterprise crime offence”, which covers a
series of crimes, such as bribery, fraud, corruption, betting, murder, theft,
robbery, extortion, forgery, counterfeiting, money laundering, as well as
possession of property obtained as a result of drug offences.
As already mentioned, the USA has legal provisions covering numerous
instances of conspiracy, as well as crimes committed in furtherance of a
criminal enterprise.
Central/South America
Article 210 of the criminal code of Argentina criminalises organised crime
as follows: the members of a criminal association comprising three or more
persons and created for the commission of crimes will be sentenced to 3 to
10 years’ imprisonment merely for membership of the association. The
minimum penalty prescribed for the organisers and chiefs of a criminal
organisation is 5 years.
Legislation in Chile does not define the concept of ‘mafia’ but - in articles
292 and following of the criminal code - it does sanction the crime of illicit
association.
Western Europe
The Danish penal code contains a provision (art. 114) which makes mere
membership of or participation in certain illegal organisations punishable.
This legislation, however, only applies in the case of crimes against the
constitution and against the highest authorities of the state.
There are several legal provisions in France which allow for the suppres-
sion of criminal organisations. Articles 265 to 268 of the penal code crimi-
nalise associations established or planned with a view to the commission of
crimes against persons or assets, as well as any of the following offences:
aggravated theft, destruction by means of explosive substances, extortion
with force, violence or intimidation. The penalty is imprisonment for up to
ten years, plus a fine. The commission of certain crimes by an organised
group is an aggravating circumstance which incurs a stiffer penalty. Theft by
an organised criminal group (art. 384 of the penal code), for example, is
considered an aggravating circumstance. ‘Organised criminal group’ is de-
fined by article 385 of the penal code as any criminal group established with
a view to committing one or more aggravated thefts characterised by the
preparation and the possession of material means to be used in the theft. The
penalty provided for the crime is imprisonment for ten to twenty years.
Germany punishes the same crime, although the law does not cover
passive membership. The offence is defined as the formation of a group
whose goals are the commission of offences, participation in the group,
soliciting for it, or providing it with support.
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Article 287 of the criminal code of Portugal criminalises “associaçones
criminosas”. A person founding a group, an organisation or an association
for the purpose of committing crimes is subject to punishment by imprison-
ment amounting to between six months and six years. The same penalty
applies to the persons who become members of such groups, organisations
or associations, or to those who provide them with help, particularly in the
form of weapons or ammunition, or who seek to recruit further members.
The organisers and leaders of such groups, organisations and associations are
subject to penalties consisting of two to eight years’ imprisonment. Should
the perpetrator of a crime prevent the continuance of the group, organisation
or association, or co-operate with the law enforcement agencies to prevent
the commission of further crimes, the above penalties may be reduced or
waived.
The United Kingdom, by contrast, does not envisage organised crime,
with the exception of certain terrorist groups. However, other legal provisions
in the country cover conspiracy, incitement, aiding, abetting, counselling or
procuring.
Eastern Europe
The countries of Central and Eastern Europe have begun to address the issue
of organised crime within the context of an overall re-examination of the law
of property, banking regulations and procedural law. The most apparent trend
is towards the criminalisation of organised crime, and sometimes also of the
mere existence of a criminal organisation.6
Albania and Bulgaria are currently amending their criminal codes in
order to introduce a specific offence which covers organised crime.
The criminal code of the Czech Republic contains a provision which
punishes criminal conspiracy (section 89, para. 20 CC). A ‘criminal group’
is identified in terms of its organisational structure, the roles and activities of
its members, and its pursuit of profit through the continuous and knowing
commission of crimes. Moreover, section 163a CC sets out a legal definition
of “criminal collusion” which makes it possible to prosecute a person who
“works for the benefit of a criminal organisation” even if this organisation
“has not yet specified its intentions”.
The criminal code of Croatia does not define organised crime directly,
but it does so indirectly in terms of various offences and crimes defined by
other parts of the legislation, and specifically articles 24, 19-23 of the
Fundamental Criminal Law. The features defining a criminal organisation
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are the following: the number of persons involved, the nature of the crimes
committed, the methods used, the extent to which the group is structured.
On 6 February 1996, the Estonian government approved amendments to
the code of criminal procedure, the criminal code and other laws in order to
equip the fight against organised crime with more effective instruments. As
well as the sentencing of persons for the commission of crimes, these
amendments make it possible to punish persons for membership of a criminal
group, and for forming a group of this kind. The confiscation of vehicles used
to transport contraband across borders is also envisaged. These amendments
to the laws will introduce the bail system as well as implementing the
principles of anti-terrorism legislation. Henceforth, wilful damage to power
lines will be treated as terrorism, while the provision also covers communi-
cations cables on railways or in the mines.7
In Hungary there is no definition of organised crime set out in the criminal
code, but the fact that a crime is committed in an organised manner is an
aggravating circumstance.
The Latvian definition of a criminal organisation, contained in art. 17 of
the country’s criminal code, reads as follows: “stable association of more
than 2 persons, created with the aim of committing criminal acts and in which
members of the group have distributed tasks by way of prior arrangement”.
Lithuania law defines organised crime as an association consisting of
three or more persons who have reached prior agreement to commit criminal
acts and serious crimes. The mere existence of such an organisation is
punishable.
Moldova similarly criminalises organised crime in art. 17 of its criminal
code. The criteria used to identify such an organisation are: permanence, its
organisation into a hierarchy, the commission of crimes.
In 1997 Poland enacted a new criminal code which, although it does not
contain any legal definition of a criminal organisation, makes two important
provisions with regard to organised crime relating to offences committed by
a criminal organisation, and organisations set up to commit crimes. A
criminal organisation differs from a series of illegal activities committed by
individuals or groups in terms of its greater level of organisation and fixed
hierarchical order. The mere existence of a criminal organisation is in itself
an offence.
Article 35, para. 4 of the criminal code of the Russian Federation defines
the concepts of conspiracy, organised groups and criminal societies (criminal
organisations), and article 210 specifically criminalises establishment of, or
participation in the activities of a criminal community (criminal organisa-
tion). Organised crime is defined as an offence committed by a unified
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organised group created with the aim of committing serious or particularly
serious offences, or by an association of organised crime groups created for
the same purpose. The mere existence of the organisation is not punishable.
Slovakia does not have an offence of organised crime in its criminal code,
but organised crime is sanctioned according to Act n. 249/1994.
The same is true of Slovenia, where organised crime is defined by the
following criteria: seriousness of the offences committed, and involvement
of at least three persons.
In “the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia”, according to art. 394
para. 1 of its criminal code, a sentence of between 6 months’ and 5 years’
imprisonment may be inflicted on persons who create a group for the purpose
of committing crimes  punishable with three years’ imprisonment or more.
Asia
On 6 March, 1997, China’s legislative assembly, the National People’s
Congress, started to review amendments to the nation’s criminal code which
dates from 1979. The amendments introduce into the statute book new crimes
described as “mafia, organised terrorism, crimes of instigating ethnic hatred
or discrimination, money laundering, computer crimes, securities frauds and
intruding on commercial secrets”.8
Japan does not envisage membership of a criminal organisation as con-
stituting an offence, but other legal provisions cover activity as a co-principal,
an instigator or an accessory of a group. A conspirator usually falls into one
of these categories. For certain serious offences preparatory acts and attempts
are punishable.
On 4 August, 1997 a new law designed to prevent hand control organised
crime more vigorously came into effect in Macau, following a wave of
violence in the country. Passed in July by the Macao legislative assembly
after several weeks of consultation with local communities and government
departments, the law is reported to have given the security forces and the
judiciary greater powers in combating crime. The new law comprises 42
articles, which give detailed descriptions of 21 types of activity constituting
“organised crimes,” including homicide, abduction, the smuggling of people,
forcing others into prostitution, aiding illegal immigration, illegally trading
in, manufacturing, using, carrying, and smuggling arms. The law states that
those found to have set up a triad will be sentenced to between five and twelve
years’ imprisonment, and leading members of underground groups will also
receive up to 12 years behind bars. The new law is based on a previous
anti-organised crime act which had failed to curb such activities. The new
4 National Responses to Organised Crime 141
8 “NPC to Work on Updating Criminal Law, New Crimes Defined”, in the British
Broadcasting Corporation, 7 March 1997.
legislation is said to “show the determination of the government to combat
activities of criminal gangs.”9
Oceania
In New Zealand the legislation set out in the Crimes Act 1961 describes an
“organised criminal enterprise” as a “continuing association of six or more
persons having as its object or as one of its objects the acquisition of
substantial income or assets by means of a continuing course of criminal
conduct” (art. 312A).
4.3 Asset seizure and confiscation
One of the most efficient means to dismantle criminal enterprises is to attack
their capital assets, as emphasised by the recommendations of the 1994
United Nations Ministerial Conference in Naples. Some countries, princi-
pally those that first experienced problems with organised crime, introduced
measures for this purpose many years ago. Their example has been followed,
and should continue to be so in the future, by other nations now lagging
behind in the fight against organised crime.
Given the numerous and substantial differences among national country
legislations, it is difficult to draw comparisons among them as regards the
confiscation of criminal assets. However, in order to furnish a picture of the
situation world-wide, an attempt will be made to find a common denominator
in these diverse national systems. Generally speaking, terms such as “freez-
ing” and “seizure” refer to judicial preventive measures in which the compe-
tent authority, in order to guarantee the prosecution of the “criminal trail”
(i.e. to furnish proof for subsequent confiscation), deprive the owner of the
right to freely dispose of his/her goods. Terms such “forfeiture” and “confis-
cation” refer to decisions taken by a judicial authority to deprive a convicted
person of the ownership of goods related to a criminal offence, goods which
are transferred to the state.
At this stage it is also important to stress the variety that can be found in
different domestic systems:
– according to the rules applied in different countries, confiscation may be
ordered in a civil or criminal trial;
– confiscation may be ordered particularly in respect of specific proper-
ties/items proved to be the proceeds or instrumentalities of crime (property
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confiscation, as in Spain and Italy); as regards the value of the criminal
proceeds (value confiscation, as in the common-law countries and the
Netherlands and Austria); or the two together (property/value confiscation,
as in Switzerland and Australia);
– the standard and the onus of proof required before a confiscation order can
be issued may vary greatly among countries. In some countries a criminal
standard of proof is necessary, in others, a less strict civil standard may
suffice for confiscation. Moreover, some domestic systems envisage re-
versal of the onus of proof;
– conviction is not always necessary for the confiscation of assets. Although
most countries consider confiscation to be part of the sentencing pro-
cedure (and consequently presuppose conviction), in some countries prop-
erty can be confiscated without conviction. There are two main methods
available to achieve this; first, through confiscation within the context of
criminal proceedings but without the need for a conviction or a guilty
finding (for example, in England and Wales a confiscation order may be
issued if the defendant has absconded for at least two years, if there is
proof to the civil standard that he has benefited from drug trafficking, and
if reasonable steps have been taken to find him; in Austria a confiscation
order may be issued in independent penal proceedings when there is no
formal finding as to the person’s guilt). Second, through a confiscation
order issued entirely independently of the criminal trial in administrative
or civil proceedings (examples can be found in the USA, Germany and
Ireland).10
Another preliminary statement is in order. The aim of the present analysis is
merely to provide a general overview of an extremely complex and profound
issue. Only the legislations of certain countries will be touched upon and used
as examples, since the overall intent is to highlight trends in attitudes towards
confiscation, and consequently to show the way forward for countries without
specific rules on the forfeiture of the proceeds from organised crime. General
tables - see the end of this section - will provide further details.
Some nations enacted confiscation laws in the distant past and have never
changed them since. Others have recently passed new confiscation legislation
or made important amendments, such as Switzerland in 1994, Greece in
1995, Ireland in 1994 and 1996, the United Kingdom, Portugal and Hong
Kong in 1995, Spain, Cyprus and South Africa in 1996, Austria in 1997.
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North America
Confiscation was introduced into the legal system of the United States11 in
1970 by RICO. Under this statute, the property acquired by or used to further
an illegal gambling business is forfeitable to the United States. In other words,
the legislation mandates the criminal forfeiture of property acquired or
maintained by the defendant in connection with the RICO violation. The
property is also forfeitable if it has been transferred to a third person, unless
the purchaser is able to demonstrate that he/she was in bona fide and that the
value paid for the goods did not give rise to the belief that the property was
subject to forfeiture. The US court may also issue seizure and freezing orders
to prevent the destruction of the property, its removal from the jurisdiction
of the court or, more generally, its unavailability for subsequent forfeiture.
Confiscation allowed by RICO is a penal action in personam. However,
the American legal system also envisages a civil action in rem. An action of
this kind is directed against property alleged to have been involved in, or to
be the proceeds from, criminal activity, so that the owner of the assets under
civil forfeiture does not necessarily have to be charged with, or convicted of,
a criminal offence. Generally, the Government will seize property that it
deems likely to be subject to forfeiture. Once the Government has seized the
assets and demonstrated probable cause for seizure, the property is subject
to forfeiture unless the owner can prove otherwise.
In 1978, the US Congress amended the Controlled Substance Act to state
that all assets acquired from the illicit drug trade belong to the United States
Government and are subject to civil seizure under the power of forfeiture.
This law was further amended in 1984, when Congress altered it to allow the
confiscation of real property used to facilitate drug violations.
In Canada12 substantive legislation in the area of proceeds of crime falls
exclusively within the jurisdiction of the federal Government and is set out
in the Criminal Code (as revised in 1985), the Food and Drugs Act (1985),
the Narcotic Control Act (1985) and the Proceeds of Crime Act enacted on
1 January 1989. The aim of the Proceeds of Crime Act, besides the definition
of two classes of offences associated with money laundering (drug offences
and enterprise crime offences), is to state specific provisions for the detection,
seizure and detention of the proceeds of crime and their subsequent forfeiture.
In Canada, criminal forfeiture is consequent solely on only a criminal
conviction for designated drug offences and enterprise crime offences. The
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expression “proceeds of crime”, in fact, refers to any property, benefit or
advantage, within or outside Canada, obtained or derived directly or indi-
rectly from: (a) the commission in Canada of an enterprise crime offence or
a designated drug offence; or (b) an act or omission undertaken elsewhere
but which, if it had occurred in Canada, would have constituted an enterprise
crime offence or a designated drug offence.
The court takes the decision to confiscate the proceeds at the sentencing
stage of the accused, and orders confiscation only if it is convinced beyond
any reasonable doubt that the property consists of the proceeds of crime.
There is no general civil forfeiture of property in Canada. However, an action
in rem against property, as in the USA, may be brought if the accused dies
or absconds.
The Seized Property Management Act, which came into force in Canada
in September 1994, created a government unit which co-operates with local
and international law enforcement agencies in the location, seizure and
disposal of forfeited property of criminal origin. This Act also permits
forfeited assets to be shared among the Canadian law enforcement agencies
and the foreign governments whose law enforcement agencies have partici-
pated in the joint investigations leading to the forfeiture.
Central/South America
In Mexico,13 the application of the juridical concept of confiscation of
property is prohibited by the Constitution. Nevertheless, the Penal Code
(which applies to the Federal District in matters of ordinary jurisdiction and
to the entire country in matters of federal jurisdiction) states the juridical
concept of seizure of the instrumentalities, objects and proceeds of crime.
For this purpose, the Federal Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the
Federal Department of Public Prosecution to take custody of any instrumen-
talities of, or property deriving from or constituting the proceeds or bearing
signs of, or having a possible connection with, an offence, with a view to a
subsequent request that the competent judicial authority issue an order for
the confiscation of such property.
Although Colombia14 has one of the most severe organised crime prob-
lems in the world, until 1997 it lacked a law permitting the confiscation of
criminal proceeds.15 In 1997, the Constitutional Court approved legislation
on confiscation; legislation that the Parliament had approved in December
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1996 and which made it possible to confiscate any goods obtained through
drug-trafficking activities.
Western Europe
In Italy,16 confiscation is regulated by art. 240 of the criminal code. The state,
in connection with a conviction, can or must (according to the individual
case) acquire the property or assets of convicted persons if they have been
instrumental in the commission of crime or if they represent the proceeds of
crime. Confiscation is ordered through a criminal procedure on the basis of
the rule of evidence required in criminal procedures (beyond reasonable
doubt).
Art. 416-bis of the criminal code (included in the criminal code as law no.
726 of 1982 - the so-called ‘Rognoni-La Torre’ law) states that unlawful
association to commit a crime (‘mafia type’ unlawful association) is an
offence, and contains more specific rules on the confiscation of goods owned
by organised criminals. The person convicted of belonging to a ‘mafia-type’
organisation “...shall always be liable to confiscation of the items used or
intended to be used to commit the offence and of the items that represent the
price, the product or the proceeds of such an offence or the use thereof”.
More recently, with law-decree no. 306/1992 (art. 12-sexies) with sub-
sequent amendments has introduced a particular form of confiscation (“con-
fiscation of unjustified valuables”), the main characteristics of which are:
– its applicability in connection with convictions for particularly dangerous
criminal behaviour;
– its partial reversal of the burden of proof;
– its very broad definition of forfeitable property. The law, in fact, permits
confiscation of all assets not commensurate with the income and the
economic activity of the person convicted, regardless of whether or not
the property can be associated with a particular predicate offence.
In the case  of convictions for such crimes as ‘mafia-type’ association,
extortion, kidnapping for the purpose of extortion, receiving of stolen goods,
usury, money laundering, etc., “confiscation shall be made of money, goods,
or assets whose origin cannot be accounted for by the offender and which
the latter, with or without the agency of natural or legal persons, appears to
own or to have at his/her own disposal for any purpose whatsoever out of all
proportion to his/her own income, as reported in his/her income tax decla-
ration, or to his/her economic activity”.
The Italian legal system envisages a further special form of confiscation,
as provided by articles 2-bis and 2-ter of law no. 575 of 1965 subsequently
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amended by laws no. 646 of 1982 and no. 55 of 1990. In the case of mafia
crimes and drug-related crimes, a special administrative procedure (regulated
by law and controlled by a judge) may be adopted to seize and confiscate
illegally acquired property. In particular circumstances, seizure (as a security
measure) is permitted of an asset within a special administrative procedure
if the asset is disproportionate to the income tax declaration and the legal
activity of the person concerned. Subsequently, a confiscation order may be
issued if the person concerned fails to prove that the asset has derived from
a legal source.
In the legal system of Belgium17 seizure is a preliminary coercive measure
in which the competent authority, in order to secure criminal prosecution,
usually prevents the owners, or others, from disposing of specific goods by
taking such goods into its custody.
The most recent changes were made to the Belgian rules on confiscation
on 17 July 1990. Confiscation is a decision taken by a court whereby specific
goods relating to crimes are removed from a convicted person. This type of
confiscation is an accessory sentence, which cannot be issued separately but
must be combined with a principal sentence. If the goods in question cannot
be retrieved, the court may estimate their monetary value and consequently
issue an order for value confiscation.
The German18 Criminal Code contains rules on forfeiture and extended
forfeiture. Forfeiture may be ordered as regards any pecuniary gain or
property resulting from commission of a crime. If the forfeiture is not
possible, the court may estimate the value of the assets and issue a compen-
sation order for its equivalent value.
The 1992 Prevention of Drug Trafficking and other Forms of Organised
Crime Act (OrgKG) introduced new provisions to combat organised crime
into the German legal system. This new law makes it an offence to undertake
action with the purpose of preventing or obstructing access by the criminal
prosecution authorities to assets deriving from certain criminal offences. It
is also considered as a criminal offence the prevention or placing in jeopardy
of the location, forfeiture, confiscation or seizure of incriminating property,
or detection of its origin. This legislation also provides special measures
which go beyond confiscation (the seizure of assets or extended forfeiture)
and are intended to deprive the offender of property acquired unlawfully. In
particular, as far as the extended forfeiture for certain types of crimes is
concerned (this form has been included in the Criminal Code), the court may
order forfeiture when, according to circumstances, there is reasonable sus-
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picion that goods have been acquired in order to commit criminal offences,
or that they are the result of the perpetration of such criminal offences. In this
case the burden of proof is reversed and rests on the defendant.
The Swiss19 criminal code permits the seizure and confiscation of assets.
More specifically, there are two types of seizure:
– probatory seizure, the purpose of which is to conserve the means of proof;
– conservatory seizure, the purpose of which is to restore property to its
rightful owner, or to enable its subsequent confiscation.
Under Swiss law, articles 58 and 59 of the criminal code govern the forfeiture
of assets resulting from a criminal offence, or assets which are the reward for
committing an offence, or which are presumed to be controlled by criminal
organisations. An amendment regarding provision in the case of organised
crime activities in the confiscation provision was made to article 58 of the
criminal code in 1994. This amendment empowers the courts to order the
confiscation of all assets found to be under the beneficial ownership of a
criminal organisation. Furthermore, if assets are found in the possession of
a person proved to be a member of a criminal organisation, or who has
assisted such an organisation in the execution of its criminal activities, the
criminal organisation concerned is assumed to be the beneficial owner of
such assets. In practice, Swiss law allows the confiscation of the property of
criminal organisations only on the basis of evidence that the organisation
itself controls the property. That is to say that it is not necessary to prove the
illegal origin of the property.
The United Kingdom20 has for some time had legislation on the tracing,
freezing and confiscation of proceeds from drug trafficking, and all other
serious crime, legislation which was strengthened by the Proceeds of Crime
Act of 1995. A confiscation order may be issued without conviction if the
defendant absconds or dies before the conviction itself. Confiscation of the
proceeds of crime may also occur through a special civil procedure within
criminal proceedings. This special procedure is applicable in the case of the
forfeiture of cash representing the proceeds or the instrumentalities of drug
trafficking, if they have been imported or exported. The United Kingdom has
also enacted laws to assist other jurisdictions in the tracing, freezing and
confiscating of the proceeds of all serious crimes (on a reciprocal basis).
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In April 1996, Cyprus21 enacted legislation on confiscation, namely the
“Law that Provides for the Concealment, Investigation and Confiscation of
Proceeds Resulting From Certain Criminal Actions”, the aim of which is to
deprive criminals of the proceeds from such serious offences as organised
crime, terrorism and prostitution.
In Ireland22 the first step  towards  introduction  of a  framework for
confiscation of the proceeds of crime was the Criminal Justice Act in 1994,
recently followed by the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996 (no. 30 of 1996), which
came into force on 4 August 1996. This statute introduces measures that,
through civil proceedings, permit the High Court to freeze and eventually
confiscate assets with a minimum value of IR£ 10,000 should it be proved
that these assets are the proceeds of crime, or that they have been acquired,
in whole or in part, with the proceeds of crime. The aim of this act is to provide
legal means in addition to those already established by the 1994 Criminal
Justice Act for the seizure and confiscation of the proceeds of crime.
Eastern Europe
After the fundamental legal, economic and social changes in Central and
Eastern Europe, many countries in this region have taken steps towards
introducing legislation targeted against organised crime and in which confis-
cation of criminal proceeds plays a crucial role.
In Russian Federation23 confiscation was first introduced in 1995 as a
sanction complementary to the penalties foreseen for the creation or running
of an organised criminal group or criminal organisation and for participation
in an organised criminal group. Today, confiscation in Russia is possible for
all types of crime.
A new law amending the penal code was passed in Poland24 on 6 June
1997 (signed by the President of the Republic on 27 June 1997) and came
into force on 1 June 1998. Among its many innovations are provisions for
combating organised crime which allow the confiscation of earnings from
activities committed within a criminal organisation.
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In Albania confiscation is possible under the penal procedure code, and
in Bulgaria confiscation is permitted under the criminal code. In Lithuania,
for instance, confiscation is an additional sanction which the judge must
apply for certain offences. In Moldova confiscation is envisaged by art. 33,
part I, of the Criminal Procedure Code and applies to all proceeds from any
kind of crime. In the Slovak Republic, confiscation is possible for all
criminal offences. In Romania art. 118 of Criminal Code and arts. 163-167
of the Code of Criminal Procedure deal specifically with confiscation.
Africa
South Africa25 enacted legislation in 1996 which, besides criminalising the
laundering of proceeds from any form of criminal activity, provides for the
confiscation of criminal proceeds (Proceeds of Crime Act 76, 1996). Accord-
ing to this legislation, the ‘proceeds of crime’ are defined as any payment or
other reward received or held by the defendant at any time in relation with
any criminal activity controlled by him or any other person. ‘Proceeds’ are
any property or part thereof which results directly or indirectly from the
commission of an offence. ‘Property’ is money and any other movable,
immovable, material or non-material thing.
The Proceeds of Crime Act does not allow the court to confiscate specific
property; that is to say, the court can only issue a payment order for an
amount of money equal to the value of the proceeds of a crime. The
Parliamentary Committee on Justice examined this problem in 1997 and
asked Parliament to introduce measures enabling the courts to confiscate
specific property.
Asia
The Japanese26 Penal Code provides for the confiscation and “collection of
equivalent value” (forfeiture) in regard to all crimes, with the exception of
only very minor ones. The Anti-Drug Special Law, which came into effect
in 1992, targets the illicit proceeds from drug offences.
The legal system of Thailand27 envisages confiscation only in relation to
drug offences. In fact, Thailand has enacted an ‘Act on Measures for the
Suppression of Offenders in an Offence Relating to Narcotics’ which gives
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the authorities the power to trace, seize and confiscate the property of
offenders.
Oceania
In Australia28 the legislation that deals with criminal confiscation of assets
at the federal level is the Proceeds of Crime Act (enacted in 1987). This highly
effective measure in combating organised crime allows a court to issue a
confiscation order if a person is convicted of an indictable offence against
Commonwealth or territory law. The confiscation order may take two forms:
a forfeiture issued irrespectively of the ownership of the property or a
pecuniary penalty based on the value of the benefit derived from perpetration
of the offence. On the basis of this law, it is also possible to freeze assets in
order to prevent the dispersal or removal of assets, and to issue confiscation
orders in relation to property used in, or derived directly or indirectly from,
the commission of an indictable offence against Commonwealth law.
Under Australian law, a statutory forfeiture of a defendant’s assets is
possible in drug-trafficking or money-laundering cases six months following
conviction if the defendant fails to prove that these assets were legitimately
acquired, i.e. if the defendant does not react to the property being confiscated.
In December 1991, Australia also set up a Confiscated Assets Trust Fund.
All assets recovered since then have been paid into this Trust Fund, the aim
of which is to collect all earnings from the instruments, profits and proceeds
of crime and use them to finance a wide range of projects.
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Country Year Drugs (D)
or serious
crimes (SC)
Property
or value
confiscation
Conviction
required?
Criminal
or civil (or
other easier)
standard
or proof
Reverse
burden
of proof?
Proceed
must be
linked to
conviction
Third party
property
Australia
Customs
Act
POCA
1979
1987
D
SC
PV
PV
no
yes1
civil
civil
no
yes
no
no
eff. control
eff. control
Austria 1997 SC PV no criminal yes2 no gift
Belgium 1990 SC PV yes criminal no3 yes yes
Canada 1989 SC PV yes both
possible
no no yes
Denmark 1930s SC PV yes4 criminal no5 yes all categories
Finland 1994 SC PV yes criminal no yes yes
France SC PV yes criminal yes (drugs)6 no (drugs) knowledge
Germany 1975 SC PV no criminal no7 yes yes
Greece 1995 SC PV no criminal yes no gift
Hong Kong 1995 SC PV yes8 civil yes no8 gift/eff.
control
Iceland 1940s SC PV no criminal no5 yes knowledge
Ireland 1994
1996
SC
SC
PV
P
yes
no
civil
civil
yes
yes
no
no
gift
yes
Italy 1950 SC P yes9 criminal yes10 no9 eff. control
Japan
Penal Code
Anti Drug Law
1908
1992
SC
D
PV
PV
yes
yes
criminal
criminal
no
yes
yes11
yes
knowledge
knowledge
Table 1. OECD countries.
Characteristics of National Legal Systems of Confiscation.
Explanation
Year: The year of enactment of the confiscation legislation or its last major amendment.
Drugs or Serious Crime: Does the legislation apply only to drugs or to all serious crimes?
Property or value: Does the confiscation law relate principally to items of property (Property) or does it
provide for payment of a sum of money (Value)? [Principal and most frequently used method in bold type]
Conviction required: Is conviction required before confiscation can be sought, or is it possible to
confiscate without conviction (either in a wide or limited range of cases)?
Reverse burden of proof: Is it mandatory or discretionary for the court to reverse the burden of proof,
so that the defendant or owner of the property to be confiscated must prove that the property
(or the alleged benefit from the crime in a value system) has not acquired from crime?
Proceeds must be linked to conviction: Does the confiscation law allow a person to be deprived only
of the proceeds of crimes for which s/he has been convicted?
Third party property: Although many countries prosecute the accomplice(s) or associate(s) of the
defendant who commits the predicate offence, criminal defendants are not included as “third parties”
in this table. This column sets out three types of situation (this is not an exhaustive list) in which property
which is owned or held by third parties may be confiscated or made subject to the confiscation order:
(i) gift: the property is given to a third party by the defendant for little or no real consideration;
(ii) knowledge: whether the third party knew, believed, suspected, could not be unaware, etc.,
that the property was the proceeds of crime;
(iii) effective control: the defendant was still effectively in control of the property at the time of
the confiscation proceedings, whoever the nominee owner was.
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Luxembourg 1989 SC PV no criminal no yes yes
Netherlands
Neths. Antilles
Aruba
1993
SC
SC
SC
PV
PV
PV
yes
yes
yes
other12
criminal
criminal
no
no
no
no
yes
no
yes
yes
yes
New Zealand 1992 SC PV yes1 civil yes11 yes eff. control
Norway 1985 SC PV no criminal/civil no yes gift/
knowledge
Portugal 1995 SC PV yes criminal no yes knowledge
Singapore 1993 D PV yes civil yes no gift/eff.
control
Spain 1996 SC P yes criminal no yes yes13
Sweden 1940s SC PV yes criminal no yes yes
Switzerland 1994 SC PV no criminal yes no yes
Turkey 1920s SC PV yes criminal no yes no
United Kingdom 1995 SC PV yes8 civil yes no8 gift
United States
civil forfeiture
criminal
forfeiture
1986
1984
SC
SC
P
PV
no
yes
civil
criminal14
yes15
no
no
yes
know/eff.
control
gift/eff.
control
TOTALS D: 1
SC: 25
P: 16
V: 6
PV: 4
Yes: 17
NO: 7
Both: 2
Criminal: 16
Civil: 6
Both: 3
Yes: 11
No: 13
Both: 2
Yes: 13
NO: 12
Both: 1
Yes: 25
No: 1
Source: FATF VIII, Evaluation of laws and systems in FAFTF Members Dealing with Asset Confiscation and Provisional Measures,
Appendix I to Annex B, 21 July, 1997.
Footnotes
1 Australia and New Zealand - except for persons who die or abscond prior to conviction, who may be deemed convicted
for confiscation purposes.
2 Austria - the onus of proof may be partially reversed in cases where there has been repeated commission of crimes over a period,
or when the defendant is a member of a criminal organisation.
3 Belgium is considering whether to reverse the burden of proof as part of a packet of measures against organised crime.
4 Denmark - an order can be made without conviction if there is no prosecution because the limitation period for the offence has expired.
5 Denmark has introduced a bill, and Iceland is considering whether to introduce one, which requires the defendant to show on probable
grounds that his property was legitimately acquired and not through serious offences.
6 France - a court may order the confiscation of a defendant’s property (whether acquired before or after the crime and whether
legitimate or not) if the defendant is convicted of a drug-trafficking or drug money-laundering offence. The property is confiscated
without the prosecution having to do more than obtain a conviction.
7 Germany - if the defendant is convicted of certain offences the court may assume that his/her assets of the defendant have acquired
from illegal activity, if the circumstances warrant it, and confiscate them.
8 Hong Kong and the United Kingdom - a confiscation order may be issued without a conviction if the defendant absconds or
dies prior to conviction. In addition, cash imported or exported and constituting the proceeds or instrumentality of drug trafficking
may be forfeit without a conviction.
9 Italy - in certain cases, confiscation may occur without conviction.
10 Italy - for drug trafficking and organised crime, the onus of proving that assets are legitimate may be placed on the defendant if his/her
assets are not commensurate with his/her income. In such cases the provision can apply to any assets, and not just to those constituting
the proceeds of the offence of which the person is convicted.
11 Japan and New Zealand - for drug offences, if the property was obtained during the period of the offences and the value of the property
is not commensurate with the defendant’s legitimate income.
12 Netherlands - the standard of proof is slightly easier than the full criminal standard.
13 Spain - property may be confiscated if it is a gift and the third party knew or suspected that it was the proceeds of crime. Similarly,
a confiscation order may be executed against property subject to the effective control of the defendant if the third party is a bare
nominee titleholder acting in bad faith.
14 United States - in criminal cases, the standard of proof is that appropriate to a sentence hearing, namely the preponderance of the evidence.
15 United States - in civil cases, if the government shows that there is probably cause to bring the proceedings, the burden shifts to the defendant,
who must show that s/he was unaware that the property was acquired illegally or did not consent to the use of the property in an illegal manner.
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4.4 Law enforcement and special means
of investigation
In the last few years, in most countries of the world, one notes a shift in the
behaviour of organised criminal groups. Today, more stable and enduring
organisations operate simultaneously in multiple criminal markets, and their
vulnerability to traditional law enforcement methods and policing appears to
have diminished. As a consequence traditional street-level police strategies
have proved too limited in their power and scope and, in reaction to the
evolution of organised crime, the law enforcement agencies are trying to
change as well.
Counteracting criminal organisations demands methods quite different
from traditional ones, and the experience of many countries has suggested
that, in order to boost the abilities of investigators and to reduce the time taken
to conduct investigations or prepare cases for courts, it may be advantageous
to use information obtained by means of electronic monitoring, undercover
agents, controlled delivery of drugs, the testimony of accomplices, and other
methods of preliminary investigation or evidence.
Although there is a general agreement among countries on the need to
equip law enforcement agencies with strategic investigative capacities, and
to establish clear directives in programming for specific goals, differences
are evident in the application of special means of investigation, especially as
regards undercover agents, controlled delivery and electronic surveillance.
Undercover policing frequently combines a variety of methods: gathering
intelligence, considering criminal policy goals (e.g. not intervening in a
controlled crime scene), and protecting information sources and the secret
identity of agents. However, characteristic of the definition and implementa-
tion of these technologies and methods is striking the difficult balance
between the right to privacy and the needs of the law enforcement agencies.
Many of the countries that have successfully used these methods against
organised criminal groups have also been able to establish this balance.
Some countries do not allow the use of undercover agents, others impose
some restrictions in terms of the crimes regarding which these methods can
be used (e.g. only for drug trafficking), and yet others prohibit incitement to
commit a crime, and on this basis do not approve the use of undercover
agents.. Some countries allow the controlled delivery and the sale of drugs
to an undercover officer, and in some limited cases allow an undercover
officer to deliver drugs to another person. The United States and many
European countries, for example, have recently seen a significant expansion
in the use of undercover police tactics and technological means of surveil-
lance. In the USA, the growing use of undercover methods has been accom-
panied by an increase in other special means of investigation including
computer files, video and audio surveillance, and electronic location moni-
toring. In recent years, certain new forms of surveillance and covert activities
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for the prevention and control of organised crime have also been introduced
in Europe, but not to the same extent as in the United States. Controlled
deliveries of drugs, for example, are now regarded as legal in most European
countries, although their changed status has yet to be ratified by the codes of
criminal procedure.
4.4.1 Law enforcement agencies
Organised crime may be investigated by a variety of law enforcement
agencies with different jurisdictions. Although many countries do not have
specialised units to investigate organised crime cases, when resources permit
there may be greater value in the creation of one or more specialised units
dedicated to the investigation of organised criminal groups, particularly in
the areas of money laundering, drug trafficking and corruption. Close co-or-
dination and communication within and between agencies and units is
essential if action against organised crime is to be successful.
North America
In Canada - with reference to the organisational aspects of law enforcement
- criminal investigators do not belong to a separate corps as they do in certain
European countries. In Canada there are three kinds of police forces: a federal
police force (the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, RCMP), three provincial
police forces, and the municipal police forces of the country’s cities. Except
for the smaller ones, all Canadian police forces act on essentially the same
mandate, which comprises, in addition to the maintenance of order, criminal
investigations as well.
The RCMP has specialised in the investigation of certain kinds of crime,
like drug trafficking and corporate crime. In addition it also provides techni-
cal assistance to all the other Canadian forces. For example, the Canadian
Police Information Centre, which is the central data bank on Canadian
offenders, is managed by the RCMP, which collects and processes data from
all other police forces and from courts and corrections.29
In 1992, Canada launched a pilot initiative called the Integrated Anti-Drug
Profiteering (IADP) unit. These units are located in Vancouver, Toronto and
Montreal, and they co-ordinate a linked system of enforcement-related
resources. Their primary responsibility is to provide legal advice and to
address the legal issues that arise at the various investigative stages of a
proceeds of crime case. All units are housed in RCMP facilities under the
management and direction of the RCMP. The objective of the IADP unit
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initiative is to test the integrated concept of investigating and prosecuting the
upper echelons of money laundering and organised drug trafficking through
the seizure and forfeiture of their illicit proceeds.
In the United States the FBI is the primary agency responsible for
investigating organised crime activities, but other investigative agencies,
such as the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS), the United States Customs Service, the office of the Immigra-
tion and Naturalisation Service, the Bureau of Alcohol and Tobacco Fire-
arms, the United States Secret Service, and other federal, state and local
investigative agencies, also play important roles in responding to organised
crime. In 1981, on the basis of analysis of investigative and prospected
successes, the FBI developed and initiated the Enterprise Approach to
Investigations. Under this strategy, organised crime itself became the inves-
tigative focus, rather than the members of an organisation who commit
particular violations. The RICO statute is an integral component of the
enterprise approach. One reason for the success of the FBI’s organised crime
programme was its ability to develop an intelligence base on the structure,
make-up and activities of Cosa Nostra over many years and to transfer
intelligence from one field division to another. This was facilitated by the
development and implementation of the Organised Crime Information Sys-
tem (OCIS), a computer network (set up in 1980) designed to collect,
evaluate, store and disseminate organised crime intelligence information.
One of the principal features of US enforcement measures is the use of
task forces, which are run by the Organised Crime Drug Enforcement Task
Force (OCDETF) Program. This programme draws on the expertise of nine
federal agencies30 as well as a number of state and local law enforcement
offices in the co-ordination of the investigation and prosecution of sophisti-
cated and diversified criminal drug-related and money-laundering enter-
prises.
The Organised Crime Narcotics (OCN) Trafficking Enforcement Program
(begun in 1986) provides back-up for US law enforcement agencies devel-
oping regional projects to investigate and prosecute major organised crime
and narcotics trafficking offences. OCN projects undertake cases against
criminal conspiracies and offenders which require time-consuming investi-
gative techniques and for which co-ordination among agencies is essential.
The primary goal of the OCN Program is to enhance - through the shared
management of resources and joint operational decision-making - the ability
of local, state and federal law enforcement agencies to remove specifically
targeted major narcotics trafficking conspiracies and offenders through in-
vestigation, arrest, prosecution, and conviction. A variation on the standard
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OCN project is constituted by OCN Gang Violence Enforcement projects,
which identify gangs or criminal groups responsible for committing major
acts of violence and a disproportionate share of the violence occurring within
a jurisdiction. Once the violent group has been identified, the OCN Gang
Violence Enforcement project develops comprehensive investigative strat-
egies to remove the identified members, elements and layers of the gang from
the jurisdiction and to neutralise their ability to commit major acts of
violence.
Central and South America
In Brazil law enforcement is divided among the Military Police, the Federal
Police, and the Civil Police. One of the responsibilities of the Federal Police
is to monitor the Amazon region, which is the gateway for drugs entering
Brazil. In Cuba the National Drugs Commission, an interagency body under
the Ministry of Justice, co-ordinates narcotics investigations and law enforce-
ment. In Haiti the responsibility for counter-narcotics law enforcement
currently attaches to the Ministry of Defence. Two drug units, subordinate to
the Haitian military, co-ordinate intelligence gathering and interdiction ac-
tivities. The National Narcotics Bureau (NNB) directs law enforcement
activities; subordinate to the military Chief of Staff, it is comprised of 40
officers and enlisted men. The Centre for Information and Co-ordination
(CIC) is responsible for the collection, analysis and dissemination of intelli-
gence for narcotics law enforcement and employs about 30 security service
personnel.
In Mexico, in 1993, the government created the National Institute for the
Fight against Drugs, which has overall responsibility for counter-narcotics
activities and targets drug trafficking, money laundering and arms smug-
gling. In Panama the Judicial Technical Police (PTJ) is the law enforcement
agency responsible for the struggle against the still prevalent narcotics traffic
in the country. The PTJ is composed of former Panamanian Defence Force
members. In Uruguay, in March 1994, the Interior Minister set up an
Anti-Mafia Unit to combat Uruguayan criminal organisations through intel-
ligence work. This Unit has begun to process information from various
sources and has launched an investigation into the origin of capital which
permits individuals to enjoy lifestyles not commensurate with their “official”
incomes.
Western Europe
With regard to law enforcement measures in Belgium, intelligence activities
are handled by the Department of Serious Financial and Commercial Crime
(Department SFCC), which has prime responsibility in the field of organised
crime, financial matters and money laundering. It is the only central service
with such responsibility and can co-ordinate police investigations as well as
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carrying them out in its own right. In addition to operational case analysis,
this service also conducts strategic crime analysis.
In Denmark, the National Criminal Intelligence Service was established
in 1992 at the Office of the National Commissioner in Copenhagen. The
Service collects and provides information, particularly drug-related, and
assists the police nation-wide.
The most important of Finnish law enforcement agencies in combating
organised crime and money laundering is the National Bureau of Investiga-
tion (NBI) which operates directly under the supervision of the Ministry of
the Interior. This agency has jurisdiction over the entire country and acts as
Interpol’s National Central Bureau (NCB) in Finland. In order to conduct its
investigations, the NBI clearing house has two full-time intelligence officers
and one other officer. It was established in 1993 and has expanded to its
present form since the beginning of 1994. The clearing house is located
within the Intelligence Unit of the NBI. Hence, if necessary, it is able to utilise
all the intelligence capabilities of the agency. Criminal investigation work is
dealt with by the NBI investigators or by local police officers, alone or
together, on a case-by-case basis.
In France, police and customs officers are responsible for the identifica-
tion and investigation of organised crime and money laundering offences.
They conduct their enquiries in accordance with their respective powers
under the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Customs Code. Legislation
has, however, equipped them with specific means to fight drug trafficking
and money laundering by authorising, in an Act of 19 December 1991, the
practices of controlled delivery and the infiltration of networks. The law
provides that, in order to record offences of drug trafficking and the launder-
ing of its proceeds, police inspectors and, under their authority, police officers
may, after informing the Public Prosecutor, conduct the controlled transport
of narcotics or their proceeds. The law contains identical provisions for
customs officers. Worth mentioning is the fact that undercover work by police
and customs officers is permitted in money-laundering cases, but it is used
very selectively. Some law-enforcement techniques such as sting operations
are legal but they have not been widely accepted or employed.
In 1990, the French Ministry of the Interior created a new central unit, the
Central Office for the Prosecution of Serious Fraud (Office Central de
Repression de la Grande Délinquance Financière - OCRGDF). Established
by an inter-ministerial order of 9 May, 1990, this unit investigates offences
of an economic, commercial and financial nature connected with organised
crime, and especially those relating to large-scale aggravated theft, terrorism
or drug trafficking. The OCRGDF is responsible for: (a) promoting, organ-
ising and co-ordinating action by the police and the gendarmerie targeted
against persons committing offences related to serious fraud, and their
accomplices; and (b) participating, with the ministries and the public and
private bodies and international bodies concerned, in the study of preventive
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and repressive means to be used in order to combat serious fraud committed
in conjunction with organised crime.
The OCRGDF intervenes on its own initiative or on request from the local
and regional police and gendarmerie services or judicial authorities. It is
empowered to establish relations and to correspond directly, for the purpose
of co-operation and the exchange of information, with the central services of
other states with similar functions, and with any other body responsible for
the prosecution of serious fraud. The main characteristic of the office is that
it has extremely broad powers which are invoked when offences of a financial
character are connected with organised crime.
In Germany,31 since 1984 there has been a significant expansion of
specialised organised crime units within the criminal police force. This has
resulted from agreement on a proposal by a subcommittee of the Conference
of the Ministers of Interior to link the various police forces of the Federal
Government and of each Land into an integrated system through recommen-
dations and binding decisions. As a consequence of this agreement, special
units and divisions to fight organised crime have been established with the
additional task of both co-ordinating and implementing the use of covert
operations. Units or Divisions of this nature have been set up (1) at the
Bundeskriminalamt (Federal Bureau of Criminal Investigation) for special
interstate cases and international organised crime; (2) at the Landeskrimi-
nalämter (State Bureau of Criminal Investigation) for interstate crime; and
(3) in major cities for regional organised crime to the extent that focal points
of organised crime are located in these regions.
In the meantime, all Länder have created units of this kind in the state
criminal investigation bureau, while the Bundeskriminalamt has simulta-
neously expanded its corresponding departments. The general features of
these units can be summarised as follows: (a) they constitute a new field of
specialisation in the criminal investigation departments, with sophisticated
technology, increased financial resources and a higher strength and profes-
sionalisation of personnel, integrating police intelligence, crime investigation
and undercover methods; (b) these units build their own information systems,
inaccessible to the rest of the criminal investigation department. In addition
to the regional data-banks maintained by the State Bureau of Criminal
Investigation, they also run a national “PIOS” data-bank at the Bundeskrimi-
nalamt (PIOS denotes Persons, Institutions, Objects - like buildings - and
Things - items of potential material evidence) where all information of
potentially interstate interest is collected; (c) the data stored in these data-
banks are only partially the product of the investigations and covert opera-
tions performed by these units themselves. For the most part they are
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extracted from information gathered in the day-to-day activities of the police
and the ordinary detective superintendents’ offices.
Legally, these units do not possess special police powers directly linked to
organised crime. The so-called Organised Crime Law (OrgKG) of 1992 (an
amendment to the code of criminal procedure), avoids any definition of the
term ‘organised crime’, which serves only to mark out different areas of
responsibility in the criminal investigation division. However, the assignment
of cases to an organised crime unit makes a real difference. It opens up the
use of methods of “preliminary investigations” (Vorfeldermittlungen) codi-
fied in the criminal procedure and police statutes. The use of electronic
surveillance, wire tapping and covert registration is authorised for a wide
range of crimes, although techniques and methods of proactive, covert
investigation are available only to the highly professional units dealing with
organised crime and drugs, terrorism and political crime32.
In Ireland , in 1995, the Government approved the establishment of a new
National Bureau of Fraud Investigation within the law enforcement forces.
The National Bureau of Fraud Investigation has also assumed a central role
in the fight against money-laundering offences and other irregular financial
activities by organised criminals. As well as this Bureau of Investigation, in
July 1995, and in order to stop the growing threat of drug trafficking within
the country, the Irish police set up two specialised units to investigate the
financial affairs of these criminals. One of the units traces their assets and
the other investigates the laundering of drugs proceeds.
Like other countries, Italy suffers from the problem of several law en-
forcement agencies with overlapping powers. The difficulty of co-ordinating
the three main law enforcement agencies (Polizia, Carabinieri and Guardia
di Finanza) has always existed, and only in 1990 - with decree law n. 321 -
were judicial police services envisaged which would co-ordinate investiga-
tions of organised crime set up at the central and inter-provincial level in each
of the three law enforcement agencies.
Law n. 203/91 completed the legislative process begun by decree law n.
321 of 1990 and led to the creation of the central and inter-provincial services
of the three police forces: (1) the Central Operational Office (Servizio
Centrale Operativo - SCO) and Inter-provincial Centres of Criminal Police
(Centri Interprovinciali Criminalpol) for the Italian National Police; (2) the
Special Operational Unit (Raggruppamento Operativo Speciale - ROS) and
the Crime-Fighting Provincial Offices within the Carabinieri Corps (Servizi
Provinciali Anticrimine dei Carabinieri); and (3) the Central Organised
Crime Investigating Office (Servizio Centrale di Investigazione sulla Crimi-
nalità Organizzata - SCICO) and Inter-provincial Units within the Guardia
di Finanza (Gruppi Interprovinciali della Guardia di Finanza - GICO).
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By law, a public prosecutor investigating organised crime must draw on
all three of these services, which in turn must co-operate with each other in
their  information-gathering and investigative  activities,  with the other
branches of the judicial police, and with any foreign police force that may be
involved. The government has also stipulated that the central and inter-pro-
vincial services must assume the character of “inter-forces” in particular
regions of the country. In 1991, emphasis was once again placed the need for
the co-ordination of investigations, with the proposal that Central and Inter-
provincial Offices could become, in certain regions and for specific needs,
combined forced units.
The need to create new structures and new organisational models gave rise
to law 410/91, which allocated the functions previously performed by the
High Commissioner for the Fight Against Mafia (Alto Commissario Anti-
mafia) among various bodies: co-ordination was assigned to the General
Council for the Fight Against Organised Crime (Consiglio Generale per la
lotta alla criminalità organizzata); information gathering to the security
services; and policing in its twofold guise as preventive and judicial investi-
gation to the Antimafia Investigating office (Direzione Investigativa Anti-
mafia - DIA), an inter-force body operating under the aegis of the Department
of Public Security of the Ministry of the Interior. The General Council for
the Fight Against Organised Crime, presided over by the Minister of the
Interior and consisting of the heads of the police forces and the information
services, is responsible for planning overall strategy.
This piece of legislation pursues two main objectives, therefore. It has
sought to specialise the powers and functions of the various police forces,
allocating specific tasks and primary competence in its sector to each of them
and creating an integrated investigative system in which specialised agencies
interact with the supervisory investigative structures. The second objective
has been to involve the Security and Information services more directly in
this sector.
Repressive action against organised crime has also been enhanced by
enabling investigating bodies to undertake initiatives with a broader scope
and backed by an updated criminal procedure code introduced in 1992 which
gives the Criminal Police greater autonomy in gathering information about
crimes.
Still to be fully developed is legislation relating to the protection of
co-operating witnesses (pentiti) and their family members. Law 82/91 estab-
lished, for the first time and systematically, the basis for the entire witness
protection system, setting out procedural aspects and providing for the
creation of the Servizio Centrale Protezione under the direction of the
Department of Public Security, a body appointed to implement a special
“programme” drawn up by a special Central Committee at the Ministry of
the Interior presided over by an Under-Secretary of State. In 1993, 90
protection programmes were set up, and in 1994 a further 280 were added.
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In the Netherlands, the police increasingly rely on methods and tech-
niques labelled “proactive policing” (relating to the collection and analysis
of tactical and strategic intelligence) to deal with serious and organised
crime.33 As regards the organisational aspect of national law enforcement
forces, the country has a regulated system of collecting and analysing
criminal information and exchanging this information with other police
agencies: a Central Police Intelligence Agency (CRI), local CID-information
units and the special CID-Departments of the fiscal police, the General
Inspectorate of the Ministry of Agriculture, the Economic Control Service
and the CID-units of the Branch Associations. Legally, information can only
be used for investigative purposes. The registration system of the competent
police departments is regulated by Dutch and international law, for example
the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
Intelligence is collected by the Fiscal Police, the General Inspection Service
of the Ministry of Agriculture (especially for EC fraud), the Economic
Control Service and the investigation departments of the Executing Author-
ities for social benefit. Banks also have intelligence units which analyse
criminal information.
In Norway, the National Bureau of Crime Investigation (NBCI), a new
unit created in 1991, is responsible for national and international criminal
intelligence. The Criminal Intelligence Division at the NBCI has one intelli-
gence contact officer and one deputy at each of the 54 police districts in
Norway. These contact persons keep themselves updated on information of
interest within their police district and report back to the central unit. The
information is recorded on-line in a national central data base. In general,
criminal intelligence is based on information already in the possession of the
police or of which it gains knowledge. However, information is also obtained
from data which are available to the public, researchers, tax authorities, etc.
The fight against organised crime in Portugal is led by several law
enforcement forces, primarily the Policia Judiciaria, which depends on the
Ministry of Justice, while all the other Portuguese police forces depend on
the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Judicial Police is headed by a General
Director (Direcçáo General) appointed by the Minister of Justice. There are,
moreover, three special government departments engaged in the fight against
organised crime, each of them headed by an Assistant General Director, who,
like the General Director, usually belongs to the judiciary. The General
Director therefore supervises the DCITE (Direcçáo Central de Investigacao
do Trafico de Estupefacientes, which combats drug trafficking and money
laundering), the DCCCFIEF (Direcçáo Central de Combate a Corrupçáo e
Criminalidade Economica Financeira, which investigates economic crime
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and corruption), and the DCCB (Direcçáo Central de Combate ao Bandi-
tismo, which fights terrorism, racketeering and kidnapping).
In Sweden, the National Police Board is the central administrative author-
ity for the Swedish police, which is divided into local and regional police
forces. In each county there are divisions dealing with frauds drug trafficking
or economic crime, while the National Criminal Investigation Department
handles serious offices at the national or international level.
Other law enforcement authorities are the National Unit Against Eco-
nomic Crime and the Public Prosecution for Special Cases. The Public
Prosecution Authority holds overall responsibility for all criminal investiga-
tions involving coercive or provisional measures, as well as prosecutions,
and it also directs investigations and conducts prosecutions. The Public
Prosecution for Special Cases is part of the National Unit Against Economic
Crime established in June 1995 as part of the Public Prosecution Authority
and consists of prosecutors, police and experts from the tax and recovery
authorities. It performs a specialised role in the investigation and prosecution
of more complex economic crimes connected with business, trade and
industry.
In Switzerland the Swiss Federal Office of Police (Office fédéral de la
Police - OFP) co-ordinates measures to combat illegal drug trafficking and
supervises inter-cantonal investigations into the financing of drug trafficking,
while also undertaking inquiries on its own account. The OFP also provides
training for cantonal police forces by circulating information on the latest
laundering techniques. Through a centralised unit, it is also responsible for
intermediation between foreign and cantonal authorities and for the provision
of judicial assistance.
Proposals made in the past to amend the Swiss Criminal Code in order to
institute a Central Office for Combating Organised Crime (Office central de
lutte contre le crime organisé - OCCO) led to the enactment of a Federal Law
adopted by Parliament on 7 October 1994 which came into force on 15 March
1995. This Office advises, informs and co-ordinates action in this specific
field and handles contacts concerning international co-operation with foreign
police authorities, its specific task being to analyse the tendencies and types
of money-laundering activities.
The United Kingdom has nine regional crime squads comprising officers
seconded from the 43 metropolitan police forces for a three-year turn of duty.
The responsibility of these units is to (1) identify and arrest those responsible
for serious criminal offences which transcend the jurisdiction of individual
police forces; (2) co-operate with the Regional Criminal Intelligence Offices
in gathering intelligence; and (3) on request by the Chief of one of the 43
police forces, to assist in the investigation of serious crime. All operations
conducted in relation to organised crime are recorded within the intelligence
system and then cross-referenced on the individuals under investigation.
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Eastern Europe
In 1991, the Bulgarian parliament passed a law which regulates the structure
and activity of the Central Service for Organised Crime Control (CSOCC),
a specialised body set up within the Interior Ministry to combat organised
crime in the country. The new law covers anti-terrorism investigations and
intelligence, and the fight against trafficking in drugs, arms and cultural
artefacts. The CSOCC (alone or in co-operation with other specialised
bodies) carries out investigative, tracing, intelligence-gathering, organisa-
tional and other operations targeted at acts of terrorism against government
institutions, as well as against the representatives and institutions of other
countries and international organisations. The tasks of the service also
include the prevention and control of the illegal production of, trade in, and
trafficking of drugs, illegal dealing and trafficking in arms, automobiles,
cultural and historical valuables. Blackmailing, kidnapping and hostage-tak-
ing also fall within the CSOCC’s remit. A special provision in the law
concerns the struggle against corruption in the government administration
and organised crime in the economic and financial sectors. The act further
authorises the CSOCC to maintain surveillance, within the country’s borders,
on individuals suspected of involvement in criminal activity. The various
agencies belonging to this service have the power to demand information
pertaining to organised crime from traders, banks and government bodies.
The act makes provision for co-operation with the services of other countries
and international organisations on the basis of effective accords.34
In Hungary the Central Criminal Investigating Directorate is a police
force responsible for investigating organised crime. In Lithuania the special
investigation units of the Office of the Prosecutor General and the Services
of Organised Crime in the Ministry of Interior conduct investigations into
organised crime. The Russian Federation has established a system to
combat organised criminal groups which comprises a national-level special
department concentrating on dangerous crime, organised crime, narco-busi-
ness and corruption, and units of the same type, subordinate to the Ministry
of Internal Affairs, at the interregional and regional levels. Investigations into
organised criminal groups may be carried out by internal affairs or state
security organs, or by the procurator, depending on the nature of the activity.
The role of the procurator is to uphold the laws providing sanctions against
criminal acts, and to supervise and guide the investigation of organised crime
cases. The procurators are entitled to remove any criminal cases from the
investigative agencies and to pursue them themselves. As a rule, this power
is exercised in cases of great significance or in those with major societal
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impact. In Slovakia the General Prosecutor’s Office has an independent
working unit specialised in organised crime.
Oceania
Investigations by Australian law enforcement agencies are restricted to
matters which lie within their respective jurisdictions, State or Common-
wealth. Although most criminal law is the responsibility of the individual
state  (each  state  has agencies responsible for financial fraud and drug
trafficking, including prosecution), co-ordinated strategies to target major
organised crime groups, including ones engaged in money laundering, are
implemented via the NCA (National Crime Agency) and involve co-ordina-
tion of all relevant state and federal law-enforcement and regulatory agencies.
The NCA is an investigative agency which deploys multi-disciplinary teams
of police, financial investigators, lawyers, intelligence analysts and support
staff to investigate organised crime. The NCA Act of 1984 assigns a number
of coercive powers to the NCA, including the ability to compel people to
produce documents and to give sworn evidence before the Authority. These
powers are not available to traditional police forces. The NCA may also use
facilities such as telephone interception and listening devices, although these
are only available after a judicial warrant has been obtained under the relevant
Federal and State or Territory legislation.
The Australian Securities Commission has extensive powers to investigate
contraventions of the Corporations Law and associated legislation dealing
with corporate crime. The Australian Office of Strategic Crime Assessments
(OSCA) is a new body set up to provide the Australian Government with a
policy-relevant, system-wide overview of significant crime trends and crimi-
nal threats to Australia likely to emerge within three to five years; the aim is
to enhance law enforcement policy development.
4.4.2 Undercover agents
The use of police agents operating in secret - for which the Anglo-American
term “undercover” is generally used - appears to have become standard
practice in modern police work. In recent years undercover policing has
become a matter of public debate, especially in North America and in Western
Europe. Much of the discussion concerns the fact that although the method
is increasingly seen as an efficient and even necessary strategy to combat
major organised crime, it is a risky undertaking which involves the invasion
of privacy, the exploitation of trust, danger to third parties, and the risk of
police corruption and a compromised judicial system.35
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Sophisticated organised crime cases demand sophisticated undercover
work. Although the police and the other law enforcement agencies still
engage in the more traditional undercover work involving for example casual
bar contacts, they are now increasingly required to set up elaborate money-
laundering storefront operations which not only appear to be a viable money-
exchange operations but may in fact carry out transactions. Although the use
of undercover agents and of sting operations may help law enforcement
agencies to build cases against criminal organisations, these methods do not
usually provide in-depth knowledge on the functioning and membership of
larger organisations.
In Canada, the most publicly known cases of undercover policing fall,
among others, within the sectors of drug offence crime, corporate crime, low
clearance-rate crime (e.g. organised burglary and theft of motor vehicles) and
low visibility crime (e.g. tax evasion).36
In the United States the use is permitted of undercover agents who secretly
record conversations with the subject under investigation. Unlike electronic
surveillance, this type of recording does not require a search warrant or a
court order,37 given that the Fourth Amendment does not extend to encounters
voluntarily undertaken by the target of the investigation.
The DEA (Drug Enforcement Administration), like most other US law
enforcement agencies, occasionally runs deep undercover operations. The
vast majority of undercover operations involving DEA agents are part-time
affairs in which the agent returns to his office or home after meeting a contact
in his/her undercover capacity. Few DEA operations require agents to remain
undercover for more than a few days at a time.38
In Argentina, in December 1994, the Argentine Congress passed legisla-
tion which permits members of the law enforcement agencies (police and
security forces), to operate as undercover agents in drug-related cases. The
law also permits internationally controlled deliveries and allows judges to
reduce sentences or to drop charges against suspects who co-operate in drug
investigations.
In Macao, a law enacted on 4 August 199739 gives the police broader
power of investigation and evidence-gathering. Under this new law, the courts
will be able to deal with suspected crimes, and the police forces will be able
to use undercover agents.
In the Russian Federation a law on the operational activity of the police
was passed in 1992 which empowers the police to engage in surveillance
166 4 National Responses to Organised Crime
36 J.P. Brodeur, in op. cit. p. 81.
37 18 USC § 2511(c).
38 E.A. Nadelmann, “The DEA in Europe”, in C. Fijnaut and G.T. Marx (eds), op. cit. p.
276.
39 Xinua News Agency, 4 August 1997.
activity, to monitor mail, and to eavesdrop on telephone conversations and
other forms of communication. Non-life-threatening technical devices may
be used to monitor citizens. The circumstances under which police personnel
can initiate such undercover activities are indicated, and undercover methods
may not be employed without approval of the courts or the procuracy. The
section of the law on the use of informants states that informants are entitled
to protection, if necessary, as well as to pension benefits for their term of
service.40
Greater use is being made of undercover agents in Germany as a result of
the general and complex transformation of organisational structures, crime
and policing strategies in the country. Today, undercover operations are staged
more systematically and on a broader scale than was the case prior to the
1980s. They are now combined with techniques of electronic surveillance and
investigation that, in the 1970s, were restricted to the anti-terrorist activities
of the political police. This expanded pattern of undercover operations centres
on special areas of investigation, referred to as organised crime. 41
In Sweden the use of agent provocateurs is a matter of controversy. More
passive crime provocation, such as buying drugs, is regarded as permissible,
whereas more active crime provocation, like selling drugs, is not allowed.42
In Italy the legal system does not specifically provide for undercover agents.
It does, however, allow undercover investigations with regard to drug-traf-
ficking and money-laundering crimes.
4.4.3 Electronic surveillance
Electronic surveillance is one of the most powerful technologies employed
to collect evidence. Organised criminal groups make extensive use of wire
and oral communications, and the interception of these communications to
obtain evidence of the commission of crimes, or to prevent their commission,
is an indispensable aid to law enforcement and the administration of justice.
Electronic eavesdropping has figured prominently in almost every organ-
ised crime prosecution of recent times. Indeed, the American FBI and state
and local agencies have utilised both telephone interceptions and micro-
phones secreted in cars, homes, restaurants and social clubs for some of their
most important investigations into organised crime. In some cases, the FBI
has also been able to pick up conversations on the streets using high-power
surveillance microphones.
4 National Responses to Organised Crime 167
40 L. Shelley, “Soviet Undercover Work”, in C. Fijnaut and G.T. Marx (eds), op. cit. p.
171.
41 H. Busch and A. Funk, op. cit. p. 56.
42 D. Töllborg, “Undercover in Sweden: The Swedish Security Police and Their Modi
Operandi”, in C. Fijnaut and G.T. Marx (eds), op. cit p. 264.
The effectiveness of the electronic surveillance technologies is, from some
points of view, limited and works only in the short term. Criminals are
adapting to this technology by using encrypted telephones and faxes which
render interception impossible. The development of crypto-technology is
creating major problems for law-enforcement agencies, neutralising their
powerful instruments of electronic surveillance. The debate centres on strik-
ing the right balance between individual rights to privacy and the needs of
crime control. At issue is whether only one standardised crypto-technology
should be available, giving the law enforcement agencies the ability to
intercept it, or whether, due to market pressures, different crypto-technol-
ogies should be used, making interception more difficult.
North America
In 1993 Bill C-109 amended the Canadian Criminal Code and introduced a
scheme for the protection and interception of private oral communications
and telecommunications pursuant to a judicial authorisation. For investiga-
tive purposes, the courts can now authorise electronic video surveillance, the
interception of cellular phone communications and the use of dialled-number
recorders and electronic tracking devices.43 Bill C-10944 allows the police to
intercept a private communication if: (a) either the originator of the private
communication or the intended recipient gives consent to the interception;
(b) there are reasonable grounds to believe that there is a risk of bodily harm
to the person consenting to the interception; and (c) the purpose of the
interception is to prevent bodily harm. The contents of the interception are
inadmissible as evidence except for the purposes of proceedings in which
actual, attempted, or threatened bodily harm is alleged. The Act requires the
police to destroy any recordings and any transcript of the recording or notes.
It also extends the category of individuals entitled to apply for judicial
authorisation and the number of judges who may authorise the interceptions,
while also allowing for exceptional or emergency interception by the police
without consent or prior authorisation.
The United States allow the use of court-authorised electronic surveil-
lance to gather evidence on serious criminal activity. This evidence-gathering
technique is subject to stringent safeguards designed to protect privacy
rights. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
unlawful searches and seizures. In the conduct of most searches the Consti-
tution of the USA requires law enforcement authorities to obtain a search
warrant from a judge constitutionally and organisationally independent of
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the police and the prosecutor. In order for the police to obtain a search
warrant, a police officer must normally execute an affidavit which states
specific facts demonstrating good grounds to believe that evidence of a crime
will be discovered. The judge before whom the affidavit is executed will
decide whether the facts set out in the affidavit establish probable cause
justifying the issuance of a warrant permitting the police to conduct the
search. If the police search a location without a warrant (except in emergency
situations), the evidence acquired during the search cannot be used against
any defendant who had a reasonable expectation of privacy at the location of
the search. This law is called the exclusionary rule of evidence, and it is
strictly enforced by courts. No court authorisation is needed for an under-
cover agent or consenting witness to voluntarily record a meeting with the
subject of an investigation.
Even more stringent procedures are followed to obtain court orders for the
electronic interception of conversations in which no participant consents to
the surveillance. Such surveillance requires permission from a senior official
of the Department of Justice, and probable cause that evidence of a crime
will be intercepted and that other investigative procedures have failed or
appear unlikely to succeed, or appear to be excessively dangerous.45
In 1997, the European Union, in co-operation with the FBI, launched a
system of global surveillance communications in order to combat serious
crime and to protect national security. The Council of the EU and the FBI in
Washington have co-operated for the past five years on a plan to introduce a
global telecommunication tapping system.46 The draft Resolution on the
“lawful interception of communications”, an initiative by the Netherlands,
was discussed by the K4 Committee in March, April, November and Decem-
ber 1994. The JHA Council discussed the draft Resolution in March 1994,
but it was only formally adopted by “written procedure” on 17 January 1995.
The decision was not published in any form for almost two years - on 4
November 1996 it finally appeared in the Official Journal. The Resolution
divides into three parts. The first states that “the legally authorised intercep-
tion of telecommunications is an important tool for the protection of national
interest, in particular national security and the investigation of serious
crime”. The second part (the Requirements) imposes an entire series of
obligations on network providers (for example satellite communications
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networks) and on service providers, who furnish the equipment for national
Telecom centres, business, groups and individuals. The third part of the
Resolution consists of a glossary of definitions.
The Requirements are based on the needs of “law enforcement agencies”
(defined as services “authorised by law to carry out telecommunication
interceptions”) who “require access to the entire telecommunication trans-
mitted by the interception subject” (defined as “person or persons identified
in the lawful authorisation and whose incoming and outgoing communica-
tions are to be intercepted”) who is the subject of an “interception order”
(defined as “an order on a network operator/service provider for assisting a
law enforcement agency with a lawfully authorised telecommunications
interception”).
Law enforcement agencies must also be given access, not just to the
content of a communication, in whatever form, but also to “associated data”,
“post-connection” signals (for example conference calling or call transfer),
all numbers called, all numbers called from - in both cases  even if a
connection is not made - plus “real-time, full-time monitoring capability”,
the location of mobile subscribers, simultaneous and multiple interceptions
“by more than one law enforcement agency”, and “roaming” by mobile
phone users “outside their designated home serving area”.
The network operators and service providers are expected to provide “one
or several ‘permanent’ interfaces from which the intercepted communica-
tions can be transmitted to the law enforcement monitoring facility”. And, if
they provide “encoding, compression or encryption” to the customer they
must provide it en clair (decrypted) to the law enforcement agencies. Finally,
they are obliged to ensure that “neither the interception target nor any other
authorised person is aware of any changes made to fulfil the interception
order (...) and to protect information on which and how many interceptions
are being or have been performed, and not to disclose information on how
interceptions are carried out”.
Central and South America
In Jamaica, the law does not allow the use of electronic surveillance for the
collection of evidence. Brazilian law allows electronic surveillance after the
officials making the request have received judicial authorisation.
Western Europe
Belgium forbids the use of wire-taps on telephone, listening devices (“bugs”)
in homes, offices and cars, although information obtained abroad from legal
wire-taps is admissible in Belgian courts.47
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In France, until the 1991 law, only court-ordered wire-taps were legal, but
there were also parallel “administrative wire-taps” which were avowedly
illegal but officially accepted. The Law of July 1991 stipulated the juridical
conditions for judicial wire-taps and legalised administrative ones, which it
placed under the control of an independent commission. The law also defined
the legal motives for installing non-judicial wire-taps: telephones could be
tapped only for reasons of “national security”, organised crime, terrorism or
the “protection of national economic and scientific interests”.48
In Germany, electronic surveillance, along with the other forms of inves-
tigation falls within the responsibility of the investigators. Legislation spe-
cifically addresses electronic surveillance and other forms of sophisticated
criminal investigations, and allows such forms with some limitations. Under
current legislation, the admissibility of these methods is limited by strict
interpretation of the constitutional law on proportionality with respect to
criminal investigations, and also by other principles of constitutional law,
together with basic principles of law and justice. Investigative methods
affecting the domain of individual personality to any considerable extent, or
methods employed in secrecy, are only admissible in connection with serious
offences. In addition, the government must establish that other investigative
procedures less injurious to the persons concerned, have been considered.
In Italy, in cases concerning serious offences, telephone wiretapping and
the interception of telephone communications are allowed. The order for such
surveillance is issued by a preliminary investigations judge at the request of
the prosecutor. In urgent cases, the prosecutor may order the interception by
issuing a decree stating all the reasons for the measure. However, the
prosecutor must submit within 24 hours a written application to the prelimi-
nary investigations judge for the wiretap authorisation. The judge must
confirm or deny the request within 48 hours. In addition, Italian law provides
for preventive telephone tapping in accordance with the anti-Mafia law. Such
tapping must be authorised by the public prosecutor and carried out in
compliance with the relevant statutory provisions governing such surveil-
lance. Information obtained under this law may be used to develop evidence,
but may not itself be offered as proof at trial.
In Norway electronic surveillance is allowed as long as the fact is publicly
announced; hidden surveillance is illegal.
In Sweden49 wire-tapping is technically performed by the Telecom Ad-
ministration on directions from the police. According to the Swedish Consti-
tution, wire-tapping is only permissible when it is supported by law. Police
have the legal right to perform wire-tapping for the purpose of disclosing and
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preventing crime. The basic regulations regarding wire-tapping are set out in
the Code of Judicial Procedure (Rättegångsbalken)50. These rules allow the
use of wire-tapping in preliminary investigations by the police, and they
concern the investigation of already-committed crimes in order to secure
evidence. The rules provide various forms of protection against the undue
use of wire-tapping: the measure shall be decided upon by a court of law, it
can only be used against a person suspected on reasonable grounds of having
committed certain serious crimes, permission can only be granted for a month
at a time and must only relate to the telephone of the suspect him/herself or
a telephone that is believed on reasonable grounds to be used by this person.
It is not illegal for a policeman to record a conversation in which s/he himself
participates with the help of a microphone concealed on his/her person;
whereas it is considered illegal if s/he uses the technique to record a conver-
sation in which s/he takes no part, despite the fact that the purpose in both
cases is to secure evidence of crime on tape. A milder version is so-called
secret ‘tele-surveillance’, a recently-introduced measure whereby the Tele-
com Administration can be asked to give information about calls to or from
a certain telephone. This measure need not be based on crimes as serious as
those for which wire-tapping is envisaged, but the suspicion must still be
reasonable and the measure must decided by a court of law. ‘Bugging’
signifies the surreptitious technical interception of oral communications
carried out in ways other than telephonically. In Sweden bugging is a criminal
offence, and there is no exception for the Security Police. The crime is called
‘illegal listening’ and is punishable with a fine or imprisonment up to two
years.51
The United Kingdom allows electronic surveillance evidence to be ad-
mitted under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984. The decision to
use electronic means in an investigation is contained in non-statutory guide-
lines which require investigators to obtain approval from the appropriate
authorities before beginning the surveillance. The Intrusive Surveillance
Code of Practice applies to any authorisation for intrusive surveillance (under
Part III of the Police Act 1997) by the police, Her Majesty’s Customs &
Excise, the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) or the National
Crime Squad.
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51 D. Töllborg, op. cit. p. 255.
Eastern Europe
In Bulgaria, under current criminal law, although telephone tapping, elec-
tronic surveillance and other forms of interception are allowed, the informa-
tion obtained cannot be admitted as evidence in court cases.52 In Hungary,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, the law authorises
the use of special means of investigation in criminal cases, in particular
electronic monitoring, telephone tapping and other means to intercept com-
munications.
The Russian Federation allows the use of electronic surveillance in
criminal investigations and requires the police or other investigative officials
to obtain authorisation from either the procurator or the court. Electronic
surveillance includes the monitoring of telephone conversations involving a
suspect or other means of communications. Any fact learned as a result of
the electronic surveillance may be submitted as evidence in criminal cases.
Asia
China allows investigators access to covert electronic surveillance conducted
by the government. As regards the Japanese system, although the law is silent
on the issue of electronic surveillance, certain forms of interception are
allowed if a warrant of inspection has been issued.
4.4.4 Controlled delivery of drugs
The technique of controlled delivery - where drug enforcement agents allow
an already-detected consignment of illicit drugs “to go forward under their
control and surveillance, in order to secure evidence against the organisers
of such illicit drug traffic” - is regarded as particularly effective by many drug
enforcement agents. 53
In France controlled deliveries from Spain to the Netherlands are not
unusual. In Denmark, controlled deliveries are regarded as entirely legal;
the Dutch and Danish police frequently co-operate, particularly on shipments
passing through Denmark en route to Sweden.54 In Italy, controlled deliver-
ies of drugs are allowed by the law. In the United Kingdom undercover
agents can be used to investigate organised crime, but they are prohibited by
internal regulations to incite or to procure the commission of a crime. The
controlled delivery of drugs to establish a defendant’s guilt is allowed.
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Because55 so many controlled deliveries cross national borders, the legal
status of this investigative technique have been addressed, not just within the
confines of individual European states, but also by the Council of Europe and
various international associations and conferences of drug enforcement
agents. One particularly influential development has been the inclusion in
the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances of provisions encouraging the use of controlled
deliveries.56
In the United States, controlled deliveries of drugs are permitted under
law, and may form the sole basis for criminal liability. A controlled delivery
of drugs generally takes two forms: (1) drugs which have been discovered as
a result of a search are delivered to the person for whom they were originally
intended, who is then usually arrested following the delivery; (2) a co-oper-
ating witness arranges for the sale of a large quantity of drugs to a person
who intends to resell them to others. The target of the investigation is arrested
upon the completion of the sale.
4.4.5 Witness protection programmes
The use of the testimony of accomplices has proved extremely helpful in
prosecutions involving organised crime cases, because  the use of such
testimony may enable the law enforcement agencies to penetrate organised
criminal organisations. In the past, the unwillingness of victims and other
witnesses to testify raised a major impediment against successful organised
crime prosecutions in many countries. Fear of retribution was well founded
since there were many examples of potential witnesses being murdered or
beaten. In response to this problem, some countries have found it advanta-
geous to enact legislation to protect witnesses and/or oblige witnesses to
testify truthfully, and provide sanctions if they refuse to do so.
Providing physical protection for witnesses is only one aspect in securing
their co-operation. The principle behind the concept of immunity is that not
all offenders will be prosecuted in order to secure the conviction of others.
If the potential witness/informant is involved in the criminal activity, and is
therefore vulnerable to conviction and imprisonment, some “agreement” may
be necessary whereby the threat of further prosecution is exchanged for
information. The ability to offer immunity in exchange for information may
make it possible to advance a particular case that otherwise would go
unprosecuted, and to gather information about particular crimes.57
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North America
As regards Canada, in March 1995 the federal Government tabled a bill to
formally create Canada’s first national witness protection programme, which
came into effect on 20 July, 1996. Prior to this entry into force, there had been
no “national” witness protection programme to meet the needs of all police
forces across Canada. The 1984 RCMP Source Witness Protection Program
(SWPP) was originally designed to meet the requirements of the RCMP
alone. It has since been expanded to provide services to all Canadian police
departments and other enforcement agencies; services which include imme-
diate temporary protection, relocation, change of identity (including new
documentation) and subsistence or maintenance funding.58 At present, there
is no formal system in Canada for granting immunity to police informants;
rather than immunity in the sense of an absence of charges, the “exchange”
more often takes the form of plea bargaining. Serious charges are exchanged
for lesser ones (plus the information).59
In the United States the Witness Security Program (the Program), author-
ised in the Organised Crime Control Act of 1970, sought to guarantee the
safety of witnesses who agreed to testify for the government in organised
crime cases. Run by the United States Marshalls Service, the Witness
Security Program applies to witnesses before, during and after trial. It
protects them during their prison terms, and if they are released, provides
them with new identities, jobs and homes in new locations.60 The Program
is governed by numerous rules and procedures relating to the type of person
admitted into the program. Before a person is accepted, a detailed review is
conducted concerning the possible threat to the witness posed by potential
criminal defendants and their associates. The Witness Security Program is
available to accomplices who agree to testify against a defendant.61
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60 The Witness Security Program authorises the Department of Justice to perform the
following services in addition to physical guarding: (1) issuing documents to enable
the witness to establish a new identity or otherwise protect the witness; (2) providing
temporary housing for the witness; (3) providing for the transportation of household
furniture and other personal goods to the new location; (4) providing subsistence
payments to the witness; (5) assisting the witness in obtaining employment; (6)
providing other necessary services to assist the witness in becoming self-sustaining.
These services are also available for immediate family members or close associates of
the witness. The legislation authorises the disclosure of the identity of the protected
witness if s/he is under investigation or has been arrested for a serious criminal offence.
18 USC § 3521 (b)(1).
61 18 USC §§ 3521-3528.
Central and South America
In Brazil the law permits the testimony of accomplice witnesses, but prohib-
its the use of anonymous testimony in judicial proceedings. The country has
no procedure for compelled testimony and has no legislation authorising
witness protection.
Western Europe
Italy has enacted legislation which specifically provides for witness protec-
tion and relocation. This programme is administered through a special central
protection service within the Department of Public Security of the Ministry
of Interior. Informal measures exist for the protection of informants by the
police; such forms of protection typically involve the payment of money to
the informant or confidential source.
In the United Kingdom the law admits the testimony of accomplice
witnesses but prohibits the use of anonymous testimony in judicial proceed-
ings. Witnesses can be compelled to attend court, but they generally cannot
be obliged to make a statement in advance. There is no legislation covering
witness protection, but the police have the capability to provide for the
protection, relocation and change of identity for witnesses who have given
evidence in criminal trials and are known to be in danger. In certain cases,
courts have the power to order that witness addresses should not to be made
available in court, or to the defence, to impose reporting restrictions, and to
allow witnesses to appear behind a screen.
Eastern Europe
The criminal code of Bulgaria contains a provision whereby special inves-
tigative means can be used to collect evidence, but the results cannot be used
as evidence in court. In July 1997 an amendment which will enable the
prosecutor to use the result of the investigation in court was being considered
in Parliament. Moreover, although all special investigative means are used,
special programmes for the protection of witnesses are still under prepara-
tion, and no special arrangements/privileges can legally be offered to those
who collaborate with the authorities. In the Czech Republic the law allow
the concealment of the identity and personal data of witnesses. In Lithuania
the law provide for the physical protection of witnesses, or the change of
identity or place of residence or work.
In the Russian Federation, in 1995 the Federation Council approved the
laws entitled “On the Fight against Corruption” and “On the Fight against
Organised Crime” which were subsequently accepted by the State Duma
after being finalised by a bilateral conciliatory commission. The new version
of the law contains additional measures for supervision by the prosecutor
and the courts and the means whereby this can be put into effect. It also
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contains measures to protect witnesses. The number of bodies responsible
for combatting organised crime has been substantially reduced.62
Criminals are taking full advantage of the complexities of the international
financial system, and today it is almost impossible to investigate any form of
organised  criminal  activity without  first  tracing  its proceeds overseas,
through multiple jurisdictions and bank accounts. Law enforcement agencies
are slowly shifting their attention from individual criminals to the financial
gains from criminal operations, and legislation providing for the forfeiture
of proceeds  of criminal activity should be combined  with an array of
prosecutorial and other instruments in the fight against organised transna-
tional crime. These instruments should comprise computerised information
systems, witness protection schemes, electronic monitoring, financial and
business co-operation, funding for forensic expertise, asset-management/as-
set-sharing mechanisms and international agreements. The acceptability of
many of these methods, such as electronic surveillance, should be bound by
strict observance of legal requirements and the principles of criminal proce-
dure.
Since in each country the structures, techniques, methods and participants
used in combating organised crime are in some cases radically different, the
key element in regulating their interaction at the national and international
level is co-operation63 among law enforcement agencies in investigating,
apprehending, and prosecuting international criminals. It is important to
establish lines of co-operation and communication and shared understanding
of common goals throughout the world. Effective help in tracing organised
criminal groups is provided by investigative co-operation between law en-
forcement agencies and special units, since this permits exchange of infor-
mation so essential to neutralise the activities and movements of criminal
groups.
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63 The formal means by which one nation may request the assistance of another in
obtaining evidence for use in an investigation or prosecution are: Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaties (MLATs), case-specific Mutual Legal Assistance Agreements
(MLAAs) and Letters Rogatory. In addition to these formal means, law enforcement
officials often use informal channels of co-operation developed through personal
relationships among prosecutors, criminal investigators and others engaged in
investigating organised crime cases. While the information provided through informal
channels is not usually evidence admissible at a trial or other formal proceeding, formal
evidence may be developed from this type of information.
